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Abstract
Happiness economics is a relatively new field that has attracted the attention of
researchers from many areas. Happiness economics explores the relationships between
various economic factors and aspects of individual life and individual well-being. In
this field, life satisfaction is frequently used as an indicator of individual well-being.
Although subjective data can provide meaningful information regarding different as-
pects of individual life, their usefulness for policy purposes is still undervalued. In this
dissertation, several issues are addressed. First, the impact of two corruption mea-
sures, state capture and individual perceptions of corruption, on voters’behavior and
on the outcomes of elections is examined. Second, the effects of economic reforms on
life satisfaction of religious and non-religious people are analyzed. Third, the impact
of the euro introduction on life satisfaction is evaluated.
The first chapter examines to what extent voting behavior of people with different
employment status and the distribution of votes are affected by regional differences
in corruption. Using data from the Russian Parliamentary (State Duma) Elections of
1999 and 2003, I develop and estimate a SUR system of equations which takes into
account specific features of the Russian electoral system. The paper distinguishes
between hard and perceived measures of corruption and analyzes the effects of cor-
ruption on the shares of votes for particular parties and on voter participation in
elections. Additionally, a series of Monte Carlo simulations are performed to analyze
the effects of corruption on the distribution of votes.
The second chapter focuses on the effects of reforms and religion on happiness in
transition economies. Previous literature suggests that religiousness insures happiness
against various individual stressful life events. This phenomenon is well-explored in
developed countries but rarely studied in Post-Communist countries where religion
was offi cially suppressed for a long period. These countries have undergone significant
economic transformations over the past two decades. Using cross-sectional Life in
Transition Survey data and historical data on religions, I examine if religion insures
against aggregate shocks to happiness during the transition period. Additionally, the
endogeneity of religion is taken into account. The findings suggest that economic
reforms may have both positive and negative effects on happiness. Religiousness
indeed insures happiness against positive and negative effects of economic reforms
during the transition period. Also, religiousness affects perceptions of economic and
political situations in these countries positively.
In the third chapter, coauthored with Vladimir Otrachshenko, we analyze the
perceived impact of the euro introduction on the life satisfaction of individuals in 17
European economies. Using data from the Eurobarometer surveys and applying the
difference-in-differences approach, we explore which groups were primarily affected
by the euro introduction and whether the life satisfaction of individuals adapted to
the euro introduction within two years. Additionally, we test the association between
changes in life satisfaction and perceived changes in prices after the euro introduction.
The empirical findings suggest that in most EU12 countries, individuals perceived the
euro introduction negatively, while individuals from most new member countries were
either not affected or were affected positively. Our results also provide evidence of
adaptation to the euro introduction within two years for some groups. These findings
are particularly relevant for analyzing public opinion regarding the euro introduction.
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Abstrakt
Ekonomie štěstí je relativně nový obor, který upoutává pozornost výzkumník̊u v
mnoha vědeckých oblastech. Ekonomie štěstí zkoumá vztahy mezi r̊uznými aspekty
jednotliveho života a individuálním blahobytem. V této oblasti spokojenost se živ-
otem je často používána jako indikátor úrovně individuálního blahobytu. Subjektivní
údaje mohou poskytnout smysluplné informace o r̊uzných aspektech individuálního
života, ale jejich užitečnost pro účely hospodářské politiky je stále podhodnocena.
V této disertační práci se zabývám několika náměty. První námét se týká dopadu
objektivné a vnímané korupce na volební chování a výsledky hlasování. Předmětem
druhěho námětu je vliv ekonomických reforem na spokojenost se životem nábožen-
sky a nenábožensky založených lidí. Ve tretím namětu se jedná o hodnocení dopadu
zavedení euro měny na lidskou spokojenost.
První kapitola disertační práce obsahuje studium vlivu regionálních rozdil̊u v
rozměrech korupce na chování volič̊u s r̊uznými zaměstnaneckymi poměry a na výsledky
hlasování. Pro tento ůčel jsou použita data z voleb do ruského parlamentu (Státní
Dumy) v letech 1999 a 2003. Konstruovaný model ve formě systému rovnic SUR bere
v úvahu specifické rysy ruského volebního uspořádání. V analýze je bran ohled na
rozdíl mezi objektivnou a vnímanou korupcí ve studiu dopadu korupce na výsledky
jednotlivých stran a na účast na volbách. Vliv korupce na rozdělení hlas̊u mezi poli-
tickými stranami je dále zkoumán s pomocí Monte Carlo simulacemi.
Druhá kapitola se zaměřuje na dopady reforem a náboženstvi na štěsti v tranz-
itivnich ekonomikách. Předchozi literatúra naznačuje, že religiozita zajiš,tuje štěsti
proti jednotlivým stresujicím životním událostem. Tento jev je dobře prozkoumán
v rozvinutých zemích, ale jen zřídka studován v postkomunistických zemích, kde
náboženství bylo po dlouhou dobu oficiálně potlačováno. Tyto země prošly význam-
nými ekonomickými proměnami v posledních dvou desetiletích. Základem analýzi je
ekonometrický model pro studium otázky, zda náboženství pojištúje proti agregatním
šokúm ve štěstí během přechodného obdobií. Modelové parametry jsou odhadovány s
použitím dat z Life in Transition Survey a historických informací o náboženství. En-
dogeneita náboženství je paťričně brána v úvahu. Výsledky naznačují, že ekonomické
reformy mohou mít pozitivní i negativní dopady na štěstí. Religiozita skutečně za-
jiš,tuje štěstí proti pozitivním a negativním účink̊um ekonomických reforem během
přechodného období. Religiozita rovněž pozitivně ovlivňuje vnímání současné eko-
nomické a politické situace v těchto zemích.
Ve treti kapitole, v spoluautorství s Vladimirem Otrachshenko, zkoumáme vní-
maný dopad zavedení eura na jednotlivou spokojenost se životem v 17 evropských
ekonomikách. V tomto připadě používáme data z Eurobarometru a „difference-in-
differences“ přístup v zkoumání skupin, které byly primárně ovlivněny zavedením
eura. Dále testujeme vztah mezi změnami v životní spokojenosti a vnímané změny
cen po přechodu na euro. Empirické výsledky naznačují, že jedinci z r̊uzných zemí
vnímají dopad zavedení eura odlišně. Ve většině zemí EU12, jednotlivci vnímají zave-
dení eura negativně, zatím co jedinci z většiny nových členských zemí bu
,
d nebyly
ovlivněny nebo byly ovlivněny pozitivně. Naše výsledky rovněž poskytují evidenci
o přizp̊usobení se zavedení eura do dvou let u některých skupin. Tyto nálezy jsou
zvláště d̊uležité pro analýzu veřejného mínění, týkajicí se zavedení eura.
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Chapter 1
Corruption, Voting and Employment Status:
Evidence from Russian Parliamentary Elections
Abstract
This paper examines to what extent voting behavior of people with different em-
ployment status and the distribution of votes are affected by regional differences in
corruption. Using data from the Russian Parliamentary (State Duma) Elections of
1999 and 2003, I develop and estimate a SUR system of equations which takes into
account specific features of the Russian electoral system. The paper distinguishes
between hard and perceived measures of corruption and analyzes the effects of cor-
ruption on the shares of votes for particular parties and on voter participation in
elections. Additionally, a series of Monte Carlo simulations are performed to analyze
the effects of corruption on the distribution of votes.
Keywords: corruption, economic voting, elections, employment status, Russia
JEL Classification: C31, D72, D73, E24
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1.1. Introduction
The countries that experienced the transition from a planned to a market economy
have undergone numerous interconnected economic, social and political reforms over
the past two decades. However, the levels of democracy and law enforcement in these
countries are yet weak. This reduces the credibility of reforms and the accountability
of politicians to voters and provides incentives for corruption (Tavares, 2007).1 In-
deed, for most transition economies, a high level of corruption has become a prominent
feature (e.g., according to the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency Interna-
tional). Numerous studies concur that corruption has a negative impact on economic
development and the results of elections (among others, Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Svens-
son, 2005). Thus, understanding the role of corruption on economic behavior and
electoral outcomes and reducing corruption are keys to economic development and
growth in transition countries.
In the literature, the effects of economic factors on voters’ choices are referred
as "economic voting" (Powell and Whitten, 1993, among others). The research on
economic voting in transition countries suggests that people with different employment
status, including those who are unemployed, and the employees of private and state
sectors, are likely to support or oppose different parties during elections. This is
explained by their different income levels and employment prospects during transition
period reforms (Rodrik, 1995; Fidrmuc, 1998; Jackson et al., 2003; Grafstein, 2005,
among others).
When investigating different aspects of political support for economic reforms in
different transition countries, very few studies have been focused on economic voting in
Russia. Using data from the Russian Parliamentary (State Duma) Elections 1999 and
2003, this research in the SUR framework examines to what extent the distribution
of votes and voting behavior of people with different employment status are affected
by a regional level of corruption. The voters are divided into four groups by employ-
1For the purposes of this research, I use the definition of corruption as “the use of public offi ce
for private gains”, given by Bardhan (1997, p. 1321).
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ment status: the employees of private and public sectors, those who are unemployed,
and those who are out of the labor force. Also, the behavior of voters employed at
enterprises of different size is explored. The contribution of the paper is threefold: (i)
differently from other studies, participation in elections and the outcomes of elections
are analyzed simultaneously; (ii) an evaluation of hard and perceived measures of cor-
ruption is provided; (iii) simulations of artificial outcomes of elections using different
levels of corruption are performed. This paper also accounts for a specific feature of
the Russian electoral system, the option to vote “Against All”parties. Such analysis
aids understanding of factors that influence the distribution of voting outcomes in
transition countries and should be taken into account when implementing reforms.
Two measures of corruption are used. The first measure is Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) of Transparency International measured for Russian regions. The second
measure is the state capture index constructed by Slinko et al. (2005) and Yakovlev
and Zhuravskaya (2009) for Russian regions.2 State capture is defined by the authors
as legal privileges given by the regional government to the largest firms in the region
that take various forms of soft budget constraints. As Slinko et al. (2005) argue,
a large state capture index indicates high political power of the largest firms in a
region. Firms with high political power are likely to seek the reelection of a current
government and, thus, may make efforts to influence the voting choice of employees.
Using two different measures of corruption also helps to evaluate perceived and hard
evidence of corruption. Recently, using data from Indonesia, Olken (2009) attempted
to evaluate hard and perceived measures of corruption in the analysis of determinants
of corruption. As the author argues, researchers and policy makers should not rely
solely on perceptions of corruption due to possible biases. The analysis of the effects
of corruption on voting results provided in this paper expands the evaluation of hard
and perceived measures of corruption.
The findings suggest that even when controlling for corruption, people with differ-
2Theoretical foundations for state capture were developed by Laffont and Tirole (1991). Hellman
et al. (2000) and Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2003) study the dynamics and consequences of
state capture in transition countries.
3
ent employment status vote differently. Moreover, regional differences in corruption
are indeed correlated with changes in the voting behavior of people with different em-
ployment status. Corruption positively influences participation in elections and also
has indirect effects on the participation of people with different employment status.
Using two different measures of corruption provides complementary results for the
analysis of voting outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
literature relevant to this research. I then describe the methodological framework,
data used, and results obtained.
1.2. Literature
This section is divided into two parts. The first reviews theoretical and empirical
studies that highlight the different voting behavior of people with different employ-
ment status. The second addresses the effects of corruption on voting results and
economic development
1.2.1. Employment Status and Different Voting Behavior
The first attempt to identify economic groups who support or oppose reforms in tran-
sition economies was Rodrik (1995). In Rodrik’s model, employees vote in favor of
or against state sector restructuring and privatization reform. The reform implies a
reduction in the level of subsidy paid to state employees and financed through the
taxation of the private sector. Rodrik argues that whereas privately employed individ-
uals always support such reforms, political support from state employees depends on
the timing of voting. During early transition voting, state employees support reforms
since the probability of finding a higher-paid job in the private sector is high. During
late transition voting, state employees tend to oppose reforms and prefer continue
to receive some state subsidy. The model has the unrealistic assumption of no un-
employment in the post-transition period. Fidrmuc (1998) further modified Rodrik’s
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model, allowing for some level of unemployment after the transition and introducing
unemployment benefits into the model. Under these more realistic assumptions the
preferences of the unemployed and state employees are similar: during the early tran-
sition period they prefer a low subsidy, whereas during the late transition period they
tend to no longer support reforms and prefer the highest possible subsidy. Fidrmuc
(1998) also finds empirical support for theoretical predictions of the voting preferences
of the unemployed: a negative relationship exists between support for reforms and
the unemployment rate. Jackson et al. (2003), using data from Poland, have also
shown empirically that the privately employed more often support parties proposing
market-oriented reforms.
The role of unemployment in the process of reform implementation was also em-
phasized by Blanchard (1997), who argues that a high unemployment rate tends to
block reforms, as both the unemployed and state employees would not support the
restructuring reforms. The author further argues that introducing unemployment
benefits into the model may change the results. Under a certain level of wages in
the state and private sector, the level of unemployment benefits, and the probabil-
ities of losing and finding jobs, the unemployed and state employees may support
restructuring of the state sector.
Grafstein (2005) emphasizes that the unemployed and the employed are basically
different types of voters because of different initial income (unemployment benefits
or wage) and different future employment prospects. In Grafstein’s model, the em-
ployment prospects of voters depend on the victory of a particular party during the
election, i.e. a voter either receives or loses his/her job depending on election results.
Grafstein emphasizes that if a so-called party of growth proposes to increase the prob-
ability of receiving a job for the unemployed and decrease the probability of losing
it for the employed, then both groups are likely to support such a party. Empirical
tests of the model using US data support the author’s hypotheses about the voting
decisions of the unemployed: they support the party of growth less if their education,
their income, unemployment benefits, and unemployment rate are greater.
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Discussion of the specific features of the Russian transition began with Leijon-
hufvud and Ruhl (1997) and increased greatly after the famous keynote address by
Stiglitz (1999). As Stiglitz (1999) argued, the specifics of Russian transition is charac-
terized by the failure to understand the basic principles of market economy functioning
and reform implementation. Russian reform-makers concentrated on the justification
for particular reforms without a clear understanding of how to gain public support
for the reforms. Stiglitz thus concluded that without a solid reform strategy, the
implementation of reforms cannot be successful.
Few studies have attempted to empirically estimate public support for economic
reforms in Russia. Warner (2001) examines differences in the support for price liberal-
ization and small-scale privatization across Russian regions during the Parliamentary
elections in 1995. Although economic reforms towards a market economy were not un-
popular in the Russian regions, the average level of support for parties associated with
market reforms was not strong. Another study of Russian public support for economic
reforms was done by Frye (2006) who, using firm-level survey data from eight Russian
regions, investigates how political support for four market-oriented parties depends
on the creation of new workplaces in the country. Managers of fast-developing private
enterprises are more likely to support market-oriented parties so as to avoid extra reg-
ulations and higher costs of hiring a workforce. This conclusion supplies a rationale
for why employment in private and public sector should be taken into account when
estimating political support for economic reforms in Russia.
1.2.2. Corruption, Voting and Economic Development
Numerous studies suggest that corruption is an obstacle to economic development
(among others, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Svens-
son, 2005). However, Basu and Li (1998) highlight that in transition economies,
corruption often coexists with reforms which are successfully improving a country’s
economic development. The strategy for implementing reforms, the authors argue,
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should allow for a temporary reduction in bureaucratic control so as to bring some
benefits to corrupt bureaucrats and gain their support.
The impact of corruption on voting results has also been widely studied in polit-
ical literature. Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977) suggest that corrupt candidates
may still have public support because voters are either unaware of the cases of cor-
ruption, they ignore corruption, or they have individual preferences to support a
particular candidate even if this candidate is known to corrupt. Similarly, Peters
and Welch (1980) point out that the reelection of corrupt candidates may occur for
several reasons: imperfect information about a candidate’s corruption, voting for a
corrupt candidate in exchange for some personal benefits, and, finally, voting for a
corrupt candidate because of that candidate’s membership in a party whose program
the voter supports. Also, Welch and Hibbing (1997) argue that the negative impact of
corruption is different for challenger and incumbent: voters tend to punish challengers
more.
Various impacts of corruption on the Russian economy have also been analyzed in
the literature. Dininio and Orttung (2005), using corruption perceptions data, analyze
regional differences in corruption between Russian regions. The authors emphasize
the roles of political, social, institutional, and structural factors in explaining regional
variation in corruption. Slinko et al. (2005) and Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2009)
highlight that high levels of corruption are an obstacle to the development of small and
medium enterprises in Russia. Using constructed data on Russian state capture, the
authors argue that large firms which receive privileges from the regional government
tend to be more profitable and to develop faster than firms without such privileges.
Thus, a high state capture index reflects the political influence of large firms and
implies weaker performance for small and medium businesses.
To summarize, corruption has been characterized in the literature as a significant
factor influencing voting results and economic development. Yet previous studies
analyzing the voting behavior of people with different employment status do not
account for corruption as a factor that may influence their voting behavior. The
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econometric model for analyzing multiparty elections constructed in this research
enables such analysis.
1.3. Methodology
1.3.1. Specific Features of Russian Parliamentary Elections
According to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Russian Parliament, the
Federal Assembly, has two chambers: the Council of the Federation and the State
Duma. The Council of the Federation is formed from the representatives of legislative
and executive authorities from each region. The State Duma consists of 450 deputies
who are elected for four years. In the 1999 and 2003 elections, 225 deputies were
elected from federal lists of candidates proposed by political parties, proportionally to
the vote share received by a party during parliamentary elections, and the other 225
deputies were elected by majority voting for one particular candidate from each out of
225 electoral districts in Russia (Federal Law # 175-FZ). According to the legislation,
individual candidates may or may not be affi liated with a political party and cannot
be elected from more than one electoral district. Also, individual candidates can
be included both into a list of candidates by a particular party and as individual
candidates, thus, there may the interaction between voting for a particular party and
for an individual candidate. It would be interesting to analyze such interaction and
strategies of parties and voters. However, it would be diffi cult to control for such
interaction in the estimation. Nevertheless, this paper still provides an interesting
analysis of the voting outcomes of political parties during the State Duma elections,
using data only on the voting results from federal lists of candidates.
Apart from voting for particular candidates (federal lists of candidates), until 2006
the Russian electoral system had a specific feature, the option to vote “Against All”
candidates. The option to vote “Against All” is an explicit form of protest voting
against all candidates which was available in the Russian Federation at elections at
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all administrative levels and has become a basic element in the Russian Electoral
system.3 “Against All”has not only regularly received a comparatively large share of
votes, but even has its own unoffi cial electoral campaign on behalf of the opponents
of reforms (Oversloot et al., 2002). For instance, during the Russian parliamentary
(State Duma) election of 2003, the option “Against All”received almost enough votes
to be “elected”to Parliament: “Against All”received 4.7%, while a party is required
to receive 5% of all votes to be elected. This share was greater than that of 19 of
23 parties participating in the election.4 For comparison, at the State Duma election
of 1995, the share of votes “Against All”was greater than the share of 33 out of 43
parties, and in 1999, 20 out of 26 (Oversloot et al., 2002). This evidence indicates
that the option “Against All”played a significant role in Russian elections and should
thus be included in the analysis of the 1999 and 2003 parliamentary elections.
According to Russian legislation, a party which receives more than 5 percent of
all votes is elected to Parliament.5 During the 2003 parliamentary election, in total
23 political parties participated, though only four were elected to Parliament. During
the 1999 parliamentary election, 26 parties participated and 6 were elected. Table
1 presents the results of 1999 and 2003 and a short description of the main parties
participating.
I analyze the voting results for those parties which were elected to Parliament
during the parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2003 (i.e. received more than 5 per-
cent) or received more than 3.5 percent of votes. Since the list of parties participating
in the 1999 and 2003 elections is slightly different, I include different parties in the
analysis of the 1999 and 2003 voting results. The following parties are within the
scope of analysis for the 2003 election: Political Party "United Russia", Commu-
nist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
3According to The Federal Law of the Russian Federation #107-FZ of July 12, 2006 this option
has been cancelled at all levels of elections.
4According to the statistical data from the Russian Parliamentary Election 2003 “Vote Return in
Federal Electoral District”, available online from http://gd2003.cikrf.ru/gdrf4_engl.html
5On the Election of Deputies of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,
Federal Law of the Russian Federation No.175-FZ of December 20, 2002.
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(LDPR), National-Patriotic Union "Rodina" ("Motherland"), Russian Democratic
Party "Yabloko" ("Apple"), "Union of Right Forces", and the option “Against All”.
For the 1999 election, I analyze the results for parties "Interregional Party "Yedin-
stvo", Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), Liberal Democratic Party
- Zhirinovsky block, electoral block "Otechestvo-All Russia", Russian Democratic
Party "Yabloko" ("Apple"), "Union of Right Forces", and the option “Against All”.
In both the 1999 and 2003 analyses, the returns to all other parties participating in
elections are grouped into a category referred to as “other”, satisfying the constraint
that all shares of votes sum up to one.
1.3.2. Model
In this section, I present the econometric model to analyze the effects of regional
differences in corruption on the distribution of votes, the voting behavior of people
with different employment status, and on participation in elections.
In a model for the analysis of voting outcomes one has to account for two electoral
data features. First, each vote share falls within the interval between zero and one,
and, second, all vote shares sum up to one (King, 1990; Katz and King, 1999). This
means that the vote shares of parties are dependent on each other. This is important
for the choice of estimation method.
Different methods have been proposed for estimation of the voting outcomes model.
As Katz and King (1999) point out, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not
applicable for the analysis of voting outcomes since it requires a potentially unbounded
dependent variable. For the analysis of multiparty elections, the authors propose a
method which requires multivariate logistic data transformation and then followed by
the likelihood maximization of multivariate t distribution. The obvious disadvantage
of such a method, as the authors concede, is that it is computationally diffi cult to
apply to any case of more than three parties.
Based on Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated (SUR) method, Tomz, Tucker, and
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Wittenberg (2002), propose a modification to Katz and King’s model. The SUR
method jointly estimates equations for all parties participating in elections and links
equations only by their disturbances (Greene, 2003). The observed vote share of each
party has the form of multinomial logit (MNL). This method is suitable when an
individual chooses one alternative from a group of choices (Wooldridge, 2002). This
accurately represents voters’decisions in multiparty elections. Tomz et al. (2002)
apply multivariate logistic transformation to convert observed vote shares from the
unit interval to an unbounded scale. The received vector of log-ratios for each electoral
district is assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution. Further, the feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) technique (as described, e.g., by Greene, 2003) is
applied to the SUR system of regression equations of log-ratios of vote share on the
set of explanatory variables. Tomz et al. (2002) point out that the estimates of
coeffi cients can also be obtained by separate regressions for each party, but SUR is
more effi cient. Further, Jackson (2002), extending the analysis done by Tomz et al.
(2002), gives a detailed description of the model and estimates the proposed model on
data from the 1993 Polish Parliamentary election. The statistical model proposed by
Jackson (2002) can be used for the analysis of any number of parties. The author pays
special attention to the error term and the description of distributional assumptions.
The approach proposed and developed by Tomz et al.(2002) and extended by
Jackson (2002) is applicable to analysis of the Russian Parliamentary elections be-
cause it allows analysis of multiparty elections and is relatively simple in terms of
computations, which is important for transforming and estimating the large dataset
of Russia.
In line with Tomz et al. (2002) and Jackson (2002), I first perform the MNL











where subscripts i, i = 1, 2, . . . I, and j, j = 1, 2, . . . , J − 1, stand for electoral
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), for each party j relative to base party J . It is assumed that
the vector Yi = [Yi1, . . . , Yi(J−1)] follows multivariate normal distribution with mean
vector mi and variance matrix
∑
. Like Tomz et al. (2002), I model mi so that
mi = [xi1β1, xi2β2, . . . , xi(J−1)β(J−1)], i.e., as a linear function of explanatory variables
(x) and coeffi cients (β).
The observed vote share Vij that party j receives in electoral district i during the
elections has the form






and ViJ stands for the vote share that base party J receives in region i during the
elections. Vij ∈ [0, 1] for all i and j,
J∑
j=1
Vij = 1 and for all i.
To transform the data on vote shares, I choose a base party to use as a benchmark
for comparison. For both the 1999 and 2003 elections I have 8 categories to estimate: 6
major parties, category “other”, and the option “Against All”.6 The category “other”
stands for the sum of all vote shares of all other parties participating in the election,
that is 17 other parties in the 2003 election and 20 other parties in the 1999 election.
For both the 1999 and 2003 elections I use "the party of power" as the base party. In
2003, this party is "United Russia", while in 1999, this is the party "Otechestvo-All
Russia".7
After the transformation, I construct the SUR system of linear regression equa-
tions. It has 7 linear equations to account for the major parties and “Against All”
option, and the equation for participation in elections.
6It would be interesting to compare the results from the model with the "Against All" option (i.e.,
estimated using the data from the 1999 and 2003 elections) and without the "Against All" option
(the 2007 and 2011 elections). However, data on regional corruption after 2003 are not available for
this purpose. As mentioned by Dininio and Orttung (2005), data on regional corruption have been
collected by INDEM after 2003, but have not been published due to inconsistency with previous
findings.
7For the purpose of statistical analysis, any of the defined categories can be chosen as the base
because the results are statistically invariant. However, to make the interpretation of the estimated




















where subscripts i and j stand for electoral district and party, respectively. Vij is the
share of votes; Participationi is the number of voters participating in the elections;
Corri is the level of corruption measured either by state capture index or integral
corruption perception index (integral CPI); Statei is the number of state employees;
Privatei is the number of private employees; Unemi is the number of the unemployed;
and Outi is the number of people out of the labor force. Xij is the set of regional
characteristics that may influence the votes for particular parties, such as the real
gross regional product (GRP) per capita, the number of students and pensioners,
the share of urban population, and the number of registered voters in the electoral
district; βj·, γj, α·, and δ are the parameters of the model, and εij and µi are stochastic
disturbances. The stochastic disturbances εij are correlated across the equations since
the dependent variable is constructed from the shares of votes for parties and a higher
log-ratio for one party implies a lower log-ratio for others. Since the support for a
particular party is conditional on voting, each disturbance term εij is correlated with
µi. To avoid the selectivity problem, participation in elections and voting outcomes are
estimated simultaneously.8 The interaction terms between Corri and Statei, Privatei,
8Since all equations have the same regressors, the estimated SUR model is equivalent to equation
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Unemi, and Outi are included to account for the indirect effects of corruption on the
voting behavior of people with different employment status.
The estimated parameters from the SUR system represent by how much a 1-
unit change in some explanatory variable changes the log-ratio of the vote share of
party j to the vote share of the party of power, Yij=ln(
Vij
Vib
), given the variables in
the model are held constant. To express the results in terms of vote shares, it is
necessary to calculate a new set of Y s based on real or hypothetical values for Xs
and coeffi cient estimates, and then convert Y ’s back to vote shares by reversing the
logit transformation. However, the signs of the coeffi cients on particular variables in
the SUR system can be interpreted as support (positive sign) or opposition (negative
sign) to a particular political party in comparison with the vote share of the party of
power.
The direction of causation in a relationship between employment status and vot-
ing behavior may be questionable. In principle, both employment status and voting
behavior may be influenced by some third factor, for instance, individual attitudes
or risk aversion. This argument questions the exogeneity of employment status as an
explanatory factor in determining voting behavior. However, the propositions of pre-
vious theoretical literature (e.g., Rodrik, 1995; Fidrmuc, 1998; among others) suggest
that voting behavior is directly influenced by employment status. Moreover, Mach
and Jackson (2006) empirically establish a direct effect of changes in employment
status on changes in voting behavior, using individual panel data from Poland. Even
though, due to the cross-sectional nature of data used in this paper, it is more accu-
rate to argue about a correlation, rather than causality, between employment status
and voting behavior, I rely on previous literature when interpreting the results.
The main hypotheses that I test in this paper are as follows.
The hypotheses H1 vs. Ha1 and H2 vs. Ha2 are related to the effects of regional
differences in corruption on voting outcomes of a particular party j = 1..7 and tested
by equation ordinary least squares (Greene, 2003). I justify the choice of SUR model by conducting
the Breusch-Pagan test for independent equations, which rejects the null hypothesis of the indepen-
dence of residuals across the equations.
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for each party separately.
H1: βj1 = 0, for each party j = 1..7, i.e. regional differences in corruption do not
influence the results of the particular party j, versus Ha1: βj1 6= 0, for j = 1..7,
i.e. regional differences in corruption have an influence on voting results;
H2: βj1 = β71, for j = 1..6, i.e. regional differences in corruption have the same
effect on the results of the particular party j and on the results of the "Against
All" option, versus Ha2 : βj1 6= β71, for j = 1..6, that the effect of regional
differences in corruption on the results of the particular party j differs from the
one on the results of the "Against All" option;
The hypothesesH3.1 toH3.4 vs. Ha3.1 toHa3.4, respectively, are the four hypotheses
of the effect of being employed by the state, privately employed, unemployed, or out
of the labor force, respectively, on the results of the particular party j.
H3: (H3.1) βj2 = 0, (H3.2) βj3 = 0, (H3.3) βj4 = 0, (H3.4) βj5 = 0, for j = 1..7,
i.e. when corruption is controlled for in the model, employment status does not
influence the results of the particular party j, versus (Ha3.1) βj2 6= 0, (Ha3.2)
βj3 6= 0, (Ha3.3) βj4 6= 0, (Ha3.4) βj5 6= 0, for j = 1..7, i.e. employment status
has an influence on the results of the particular party j;
The hypothesesH4.1 toH4.4 vs. Ha4.1 toHa4.4, respectively, are the four hypotheses
of the effects of interaction terms on the results of the particular party j .
H4: (H4.1) βj6 = 0, (H4.2) βj7 = 0, (H4.3) βj8 = 0, (H4.4) βj9 = 0, for j = 1..7, i.e.
regional differences in corruption do not influence the voting choice of people
with different employment status versus (Ha4.1) βj6 6= 0, (Ha4.2) βj7 6= 0, (Ha4.3)
βj8 6= 0, (Ha4.4) βj9 6= 0, for j = 1..7, i.e. corruption influences the voting choice
of people with different employment status.
Finally, I test several hypotheses regarding the effects of regional differences in
corruption on participation in elections.
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H5: α1 = 0, i.e. regional differences in corruption do not influence participation in
elections, versus Ha5: α1 6= 0, i.e. regional differences in corruption have an
influence on participation in elections;
H6: (H6.1) α2 = 0, (H6.2) α3 = 0, (H6.3) α4 = 0, (H6.4) α5 = 0, i.e. when corruption is
controlled for in the model, employment status does not influence participation
in elections, versus (Ha6.1) α2 6= 0, (Ha6.1) α3 6= 0, (Ha6.3) α4 6= 0, (Ha6.4) α5 6= 0,
i.e. employment status influences participation in elections, where 6.1-6.4 stand
for the employed by the state, privately employed, unemployed, or out of the
labor force, respectively;
H7: (H7.1) α6 = 0, (H7.2) α7 = 0, (H7.3) α8 = 0, (H7.4) α9 = 0, i.e. regional differ-
ences in corruption do not influence the participation of people with different
employment status, versus (H7.1) α6 6= 0, (H7.2) α7 6= 0, (H7.3) α8 6= 0, (H7.4)
α9 6= 0, i.e. corruption influences the participation of people with different
employment status.
After estimating the SUR system, I also perform statistical simulations of voting
results for different corruption values: average corruption across regions, minimal cor-
ruption in all regions, and maximal corruption in all regions. Monte Carlo simulations
of voting results have been performed using the methodology and software CLARIFY
developed by King et al. (2000) and Tomz et al. (2001, 2002). First, I estimate
parameters of the SUR system and then draw 1000 simulations of those parameters
from the multivariate normal distribution. Second, I set hypothetical values for the
explanatory variables (the Xs). To analyze the different impact of corruption on vot-
ing results, I consequently set each corruption measure to its mean across the regions,
maximum across the regions, and minimum across the regions. All other explanatory
variables are set at their mean. Then, based on chosen values of Xs and on the pa-
rameters that were generated at the first stage, I simulate predicted vote shares for
each party and also calculate the corresponding number of seats in Parliament.
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1.4. Data
Data from several sources are used. The first source is the Central Election Com-
mission of the Russian Federation, which provides detailed results (in Russian) of
the Russian parliamentary elections of 1999 and 2003 from each region and summary
statistics of the election (both in English and Russian). These data give statistics on
each of the 225 electoral districts in Russia: the number of voters on the voter lists,
the number of ballots received, the number of votes received in favor of each party,
and the number of votes "Against All".9
The second source of data is the publication “Regions of Russia”from the Russian
State Statistical Offi ce. This source contains statistical information on the social and
economic development of every region of the Russian Federation (republics, territories,
regions, cities of the federal subordination, autonomous regions and autonomous ar-
eas), including data on employment and unemployment, money income and consumer
expenditures of the population, and other indicators.
I use regional level data on corruption in Russia from two sources.10 The first is
the survey of Transparency International-Russia (TI-Russia) and the Information for
Democracy Foundation (INDEM) on measuring corruption in Russian regions con-
ducted in 2002.11 It is a cross-sectional data set based on subjective perceptions.
Both individuals (representing about 73% of the total Russian population) and entre-
preneurs (mostly small and medium size enterprises; large businesses are underrepre-
sented) are asked about their perceptions of corruption. Integral corruption perception
index (integral CPI) ranges from zero to one with zero reflecting the highest corrup-
tion perceptions.12 Unlike the CPI computed by Transparency International at the
9According to Federal Law #67-FZ an electoral district is determined by electoral commission on
the basis of the number of registered voters on a certain territory. More populated regions typically
include more than one electoral district during elections. The number of electoral districts (225) is,
thus, greater than the number of Russian regions (83).
10Since the data on corruption are avalable for Russian regions, not for electoral districts, I assume
that all electoral districts within one region have the same corruption level.
11The use of data for the year 2002 for the analysis of elections in 2003 is justified, because,
according to Transparency International, the CPI scores and ranking of Russia are the same in 2002
and 2003.
12For the purposes of comparison with results obtained using the state capture index, I transform
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country level, which uses the assessments of corruption from the preceding 2-3 years
for the index computation, the CPI in Russian regions used in this paper includes the
assessments of corruption over one year only (Transparency International and INDEM
Foundation, 2002).
The second measure of corruption is the data on state capture index, the index
for “preferential treatment”of the largest firms in regions, taken from Slinko, et al.
(2005) and Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2009). The index is constructed in the form
of a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration, with zero value standing for low
concentration of preferential treatment of large firms (low corruption), and one for
high concentration (high corruption). The authors count the number of cases when a
regional government legislatively allowed the largest firms in a region to have a soft
budget constraint in the form of soft taxation or soft subsidization. The five largest
firms in each region are selected according to the largest volume of sales in a given
year, and whether a given firm had been treated preferentially at least once. The state
capture index data is a panel constructed from regions of Russia between 1992-2003.
All the descriptive statistics for the data used in the research can be found in
the appendix (Tables 2-5). For estimation purposes, the shares of votes are trans-
formed according to the methodology presented above. Each dependent variable has
225 observations for the 2003 election and 224 observations for the 1999 election,
corresponding to the number of electoral districts in Russia. The data on some ex-
planatory variables are missing: the Chechen Republic (due to the inability to collect
data during a military conflict) and national territories (nacionalnye okruga) within
larger Russian regions. Also, given the availability of the data on corruption, I reduce
the number of electoral districts included in the analysis. Since the data on regional
corruption perception index are not available for 1999, only the data on state capture
are used for analysis of the 1999 parliamentary election.
integral CPI so that its value of one stands for high corruption, and zero for low corruption.
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1.5. Results and Discussion
The results of two empirical specifications for the 2003 election are summarized in
Tables 6-8. Table 6 presents the results of the model where the state capture index
was used as the measure of corruption. Respectively, Table 7 presents the results
of the model where the corruption perception index was used. In both tables the
columns present the results for a particular party. Explanatory variables are given
in rows. Table 8 presents the results when both measures of corruption are included
in order to evaluate them. The results of the 1999 election are presented in Table 9.
Tables 10-14 include artificial voting results for the 1999 and 2003 elections.
While analyzing the post-transition period in Russia, it is diffi cult to distinguish
clearly between "market-oriented" and "not market-oriented" parties as is usually
done in the literature on economic voting in transition countries (for instance, Rodrik,
1995; Fidrmuc, 1998; Jackson et al., 2003). Titkov (2004) proposed an elegant two-
dimensional classification for Russian parties during parliamentary elections. Titkov
suggests that there can be two dimensions: "reformist-conservative" and "conformist
protest". The first dimension includes the "Union of Right Forces" and "Yabloko" as
the reformist parties, and the Communist and Agrarian Parties as the conservatives.
The second dimension includes the "conformist" party of power ("United Russia"
in 2003 and "Otechestvo" in 1999) against the protest Liberal Democratic Party
(LDPR). Titkov’s (2004) classification has also been used by Austin et al. (2005).
For simplicity in the interpretation of results, this paper considers only the second,
i.e. "conformist-protest", dimension.13 I refer to the "party of power", or a status-
quo party, as the party which is associated with the current government before the
elections of new parliament. In 2003, “United Russia”played the role of the "party of
power" and was used as the base party. All other parties I define as "opposition to the
13Titkov (2004), using the main components analysis, argues that the two dimensions explain the
50% variation in the 1999 and 2003 results. The second, "conformist-protest", dimension explains
about 36% of the variation, both in the 1999 and 2003 elections, which is higher than the role of the
first dimension (16% in 1999 and 14% in 2003). Moreover, Titkov (2004) points out that the role of
the "conformist-protest" dimension is increasing. Thus, the choice of "conformist-protest" for closer
analysis in this paper is justified.
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party of power". In 1999, both "Yedinstvo" and "Otechestvo-All Russia" positioned
themselves as pro-government parties, though during the election the Communist
Party received the highest number of votes with "Yedinstvo" coming in second, and
"Otechestvo-All Russia" third. In the analysis of 1999 elections, I use the party
"Otechestvo-All Russia" as the base.
1.5.1. Corruption, Employment Status and Voting Behavior:
Direct Effects
The literature reviewed above suggests some dependence between corruption and vot-
ing results. However, it should be pointed out that previous literature (Rundquist,
Strom and Peters, 1977; Peters and Welch, 1980) focused the analysis on particular
cases of corruption that have been revealed and their effects on the outcome of vot-
ing for particular candidates. This paper takes into account regional differences in
corruption and analyzes their effects on the outcome of state level elections.
As can be seen from Tables 6-7 and 9, in most empirical specifications, regional
differences in corruption do not influence voting results of most parties or of the
“Against All”option. However, there are a few interesting exceptions. As compared to
"United Russia", an increase in corruption increases the outcomes of the Communist
and Liberal Democratic parties in the 2003 election when state capture is used, and
decreases the outcome of "Rodina" in the 2003 election when integral CPI is used.
Along with "United Russia", these are the three parties that were elected to the
Parliament in 2003. This implies that an increase in corruption may change the
distribution of parties in the Parliament not in favor of the party of power. This
finding indirectly associates corruption with the activity of the Parliament.
When state capture (Table 6) is used, I find that the unemployed oppose some
parties during the 2003 election: the Communist Party, "Rodina", and other parties.
The results for the rest of parties are not significant. This finding can be interpreted as
that the unemployed are satisfied with the activity of the current Parliament and, thus,
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support the party of power. When the integral CPI is used to control for corruption in
the 2003 election (Table 7), the unemployed support the "Union of Right Forces" only;
for the rest the result is not significant. In contrast to findings for the 2003 election,
in the earlier election of 1999 (Table 9), the unemployed support most parties. To
re-iterate, previous literature argues that the unemployed oppose pro-reform parties
in early transition period, since the social security net is underdeveloped, but support
those parties in later transition periods (Blanchard, 1997; Fidrmuc, 1998). In our
case, 1999 is in the late transition period and 2003 is in the to post-transition period,
by which the social security net had been already developed to some extent.
Voters employed in the state sector oppose most parties in 1999, while employment
in state sector does not affect voting behavior in 2003. This is an expected result
since, as previous research suggests, state employees are likely to oppose reforms in
late transition (Fidrmuc, 1998).
Voters employed in the private sector support most parties in both the 1999 and
2003 elections. The results also hold for both measures of corruption used. These
results are in line with previous literature (Rodrik, 1995; Fidrmuc, 1998; Jackson et
al., 2003), that suggests the employees of private sector are likely to support reforms
and pro-reform parties.
Being out of the labor force does not affect voting behavior in 1999, while in 2003,
voters who are out of the labor force oppose most parties. Since people who are out
of the labor force are also likely to be dependent on the social security net, their
behavior is similar to the voting behavior of the unemployed.
To summarize, I reject the hypothesis that when corruption is controlled for in
the model, employment status does not influence the results of a given party in favor
of an alternative that corruption influences the voting choice of people with different
employment status. In the 1999 election, the unemployed and private employees
support most non-incumbent parties. State employees oppose non-incumbent and
vote for the party of power. In the 2003 election, the privately employed support
most parties, the unemployed and out of the labor force oppose most parties, and
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state employees do not demonstrate any specific voting behavior.
1.5.2. Corruption, Employment Status and Voting Behavior:
Indirect Effects
In this section I present how corruption across regions influences the voting behavior
of people with different employment status in Russia. When state capture is used
in the estimation of the 2003 election, I find that corruption is likely to affect the
voting behavior of all groups of workers (see the interaction terms StateCapture ∗
EmploymentStatus in Table 6). When integral CPI is used, there is not much signif-
icant evidence (see the interaction terms IntegralCPI ∗EmploymentStatus in Table
7). In the 1999 election, corruption affects the voting behavior of the unemployed and
state employees only (see Table 9).
In particular, the previous section demonstrated that in the presence of corrup-
tion, the unemployed are likely to oppose the Communist Party, "Rodina", and other
parties in case when state capture is used. However, with the indirect effect of corrup-
tion (the sign of the coeffi cient at the interaction term StateCapture ∗ Unemployed
in Table 6) the unemployed are likely to support the Communist Party, "Rodina",
and "Yabloko". In the 1999 election, the unemployed support all parties (except for
"other" parties), but due to the indirect effects of corruption, they are likely to oppose
most of these parties (except for "Yedinstvo" and the Communist Party).
For the state and privately employed, I find a similar picture: if the main coeffi cient
on the variables state employed or privately employed is positive (i. e. state or private
employees support some parties), then because of the indirect effect, they are likely
to oppose these parties, and vice versa. For those who are out of the labor force, this
result holds only when state capture is used for the analysis of the 2003 election; for
all other specifications there is not much significant evidence.
While regional differences in corruption do not affect protest voting for the "Against
All" option, some groups of employees tend to vote for or against this option. In par-
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ticular, in the 2003 election, the privately employed vote more for the "Against All"
option (when state capture is used), as compared to "United Russia", while voters
out of labor force vote for it less (when either state capture or integral CPI are used).
Also, with an increase in state capture, both groups may change their voting behavior
regarding supporting or opposing the "Against All". To provide more insights regard-
ing this form of protest voting, I also test whether the effect of regional differences
in corruption is the same for a particular party and for the "Against All" option. In
most specifications, I have no evidence to reject this hypothesis. It implies that voting
for a particular party, which is not in power, is also a form of protest voting, while
the "Against All" option is an extreme protest.
To summarize, I find that state capture across regions is likely to influence the
voting behavior of people with different employment status. In most cases, I find that
with an increase in state capture, the employees are less likely to support the party
they previously supported. Such changes in the behavior of voters occur when cor-
ruption is revealed and associated with a particular candidate, according to previous
research (Rundquist, Strom and Peters, 1977). While changes in state capture are
associated with changes in voting behavior, corruption perceptions do not have such
effect on most parties.
1.5.3. Participation in Elections
To complete the analysis of voting results, I also simultaneously analyze participation
in elections, because what motivates people to participate in elections may also affect
their decision to vote for a particular party. Results of the analysis of participation
in the 1999 and 2003 elections are also presented in Tables 6-9.
The hypothesis that regional differences in corruption have no direct impact on
voting participation is rejected when state capture is used (though for the 2003 elec-
tions only). Increase in state capture positively influences participation in elections:
this result is intuitive, since with an increase in corruption voters are likely to think
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that they may help to improve the situation by voting.
When integral CPI is used for the analysis of the 2003 election, I do not find
enough statistical evidence to reject the hypothesis that corruption has no effect on
participation in elections. This implies that perceptions of corruption at the individual
level are likely to play no role in voters’decision to participate in elections, while state
capture as an objective measure of possible corruption cases affects participation.
Regional differences in corruption also may have an indirect effect on the decision
of some groups of employees to participate. I reject the hypothesis of no indirect effect
for the unemployed when state capture is used, and for the privately employed in the
2003 election when integral CPI is used.
1.5.4. Evaluation of Hard and Perceived Measures of Corrup-
tion
Since two different measures of corruption are used in the analysis, I provide an
evaluation of perceived and hard evidence about regional differences in corruption.
I use state capture index as the hard measure of corruption. However, state cap-
ture, by definition, does not necessarily mean illegal activity. Slinko et al. (2005)
define state capture as legal privileges given by the regional government to the largest
firms in a region, which take various forms of soft budget constraints and which give
political power to these firms. To use state capture as the corruption measure, I as-
sume that firms with high level of political power are likely to seek the reelection of
the incumbent government in order to maintain preferential treatment. This would
lead such firms to work to influence the voting choices of their employees. While
preferential treatments themselves can be legal activity on the part of a government,
the use of support by firms, which is based on the prospect of receiving preferential
treatment in the case of a party’s reelection or for private gain, may be illegal. How-
ever, voters may also associate increases in regional state capture not with the cases
of corruption, but with the possibility of receiving more privileges. Thus, voters may
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support an incumbent government, which provides these privileges.
Another measure used in this paper, the corruption perception index, is a widely
used measure of corruption. It is based on the subjective responses of individuals
and firms about various indicators of corruption such as perceptions of everyday cor-
ruption, perceptions of amounts and frequency of bribes in individual and business
spheres, etc. Thus, corruption perceptions provide an individual evaluation of the
degree of corruption in a region.
In the analysis, hard and perceived measures of corruption are positively correlated
with each other, though the correlation is not very high (about 18%). As described
above, in the analysis of voting results, when included separately, both corruption
measures provide few significant results, with an exception for major parties (a pos-
itive effect on the Communist and Liberal Democratic parties when state capture is
used, and a negative one on "Rodina" when integral CPI is used). However, both
measures have a similar indirect effect on the voting behavior of people with different
employment status.
In the analysis of participation in elections, state capture better explains the direct
effect of corruption on participation in elections. On the other hand, the corruption
perception index has more explanatory power in the analysis of participation in elec-
tions for different groups of employees.
Since the measures are not strongly correlated with each other, I may assume no
perfect collinearity and include both state capture and integral corruption percep-
tion index together in the analysis of voting results (see Table 8). The estimated
coeffi cients of the two measures are again insignificant for most of the parties, though
participation is affected positively by both measures. I also test whether the estimated
coeffi cients on two corruption measures have the same effect on the voting outcomes
for different parties. I have no evidence to reject this hypothesis for most parties,
excepting "Rodina". The outcome for this party is significantly negatively influenced
by state capture.
Thus, both measures complement each other and provide useful information re-
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garding both the voting behavior of different groups, and participation in elections.
This means that Olken’s (2009) argument that corruption perceptions are not always
helpful in analysis due to subjectivity biases does not necessarily hold in the analysis
of effects of corruption. As suggested by the findings of this paper, using different
measures is likely to help investigate the effects better.
1.5.5. Artificial Voting Results
As the concluding step in the analysis of the effect of corruption on elections, I per-
form Monte Carlo simulations of voting results using the methodology and software
CLARIFY developed by King et al. (2000) and Tomz et al. (2001, 2002). I generate
predicted voting shares for each party using different values of corruption: average,
maximal, and minimal. The results are summarized in Tables 10-14.
In comparison with the actual outcome of voting, different values of regional cor-
ruption suggest changes in the distribution of votes in the 1999 and 2003 elections.
In 2003 with higher corruption (state capture), fewer parties would have been elected
to the Parliament (received more than 5% of votes), with the Communist and Liberal
Democratic Parties receiving more votes than the actual outcome. With lower corrup-
tion (state capture) in 2003, more parties would have been elected to the Parliament.
When integral CPI is used, the results differ. Higher corruption perceptions would
result in a higher number of parties elected to the Parliament, and lower corruption
perceptions would allow the election of the same number of parties as in the actual
outcome. These different distributions with two measures of corruption are intuitive.
With higher regional state capture, voters are likely to seek more privileges for firms
in their region from the current government and therefore tend to vote for this govern-
ment. In contrast, corruption perceptions may reflect voters’preferences for reducing
regional corruption by electing more parties to the Parliament.
In the artificial voting outcomes of the 1999 election, there are no substantial
changes in the distribution of votes, as compared to actual and mean outcomes. How-
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ever, with an increase in state capture, the pro-government parties "Otechestvo" and
"Yedinstvo" receive less seats in the Parliament, while the opposition gains votes.
1.5.6. Sensitivity Analysis
To ensure that the model’s specification is correct, a series of specification tests are
conducted: logs vs levels specification, tests for the presence of nonlinearity and omit-
ted variable problem. As the results indicate, the chosen model is correctly specified
and has no omitted variable problem.14
To check the sensitivity of results obtained in the paper, I group the parties into
four categories: the party of power, anti-reform, pro-reform, protest voting, and es-
timate the model for the 1999 and 2003 elections. As before, the party of power
is used as the base in both elections. In 1999, the party of power includes "Yedin-
stvo" and "Otechestvo"; anti-reform, or conservative, includes the Communist Party;
pro-reform includes the "Union of Right Forces" and "Yabloko"; and protest voting
includes LDPR, other parties, and the "Against All" option. In 2003, the party of
power is "United Russia"; anti-reform and pro-reform groups include the same par-
ties as in 1999; and protest voting group includes LDPR, "Rodina", other parties, and
the "Against All" option. Such a classification is based on a modification of Titkov’s
(2004) grouping and potentially corresponds to the realities of the Russian political
arena.
Results of the sensitivity checks are presented in Tables 1a-4a in the Appendix.
The effects of corruption on voting shares of particular groups and on the voting behav-
ior of people with different employment status remain somewhat similar to previous
findings in the paper. The lower significance of some coeffi cients may be explained by
the aggregation of dependent variables.
14Results of the specification tests are available upon request.
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1.5.7. Corruption, Employer Size and Voting Behavior:
Direct and Indirect Effects
It is also interesting to analyze the impact of the size of the firm on the voting behavior
of its employees, since this may differ from the impact of the sector of employment.
Larger firms have greater opportunities to receive preferential treatments from the
state and support the reelection of the party of power in exchange. As a result,
preferentially treated firms may try to influence the choice of employees in favor of
the party of power. Since small enterprises are not generally treated preferentially,
their employees have more incentives to vote with less influence on the part of their
employer. To account for such differences in voting behavior, I reestimate the model,
including the employees of small and large enterprises rather than the employees of
private and state sectors. In Tables 5a and 6a, the results for the 2003 election with
different measures of corruption are presented. In Table 7a, the results for the 1999
election are presented.
As observed in Tables 5a and 6a, integral CPI has more explanatory power in
explaining the voting behavior in this specification. When integral CPI is used, there
are more differences in the voting behavior of the employees of small and large enter-
prises than when state capture is used. As compared to the party of power, voters
employed by smaller enterprises support all other parties more. The employees of
medium and large enterprises do not have specific voting preferences regarding the
parties that participate in election apart from the party of power. Similar results are
observed for the 1999 election (see Table 7a). Also, in line with the previous findings
of this paper, voters who are out of the labor force oppose most parties in the 2003
election when state capture is used, and the unemployed support most parties in both
elections (in the 2003 election, only when integral CPI is used).
Similarly to previous findings, regional differences in corruption do not directly
affect the voting outcomes of most parties in both elections, except for the Communist
and Liberal Democratic parties when state capture is used in the 2003 election, and
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"Rodina" when integral CPI is used. However, in both elections, corruption has an
indirect effect on the voting behavior of the unemployed and those employed at small
enterprises (in the 2003 election, only when integral CPI is used). I also find that
integral CPI positively affects participation in elections, though there are no indirect
effects of corruption perceptions on the participation of different groups of voters.
Finally, dividing employees by the sector of employment (private or state) and by the
size of employer (small or large) produce similar artificial voting outcomes. Since the
confidence intervals of artificial voting outcomes substantially overlap the ones from
the specification with private and state sectors, I do not present the results for the
specification with the division of employees by the size of the employer separately.15
1.6. Conclusion
While investigating different aspects of political support for economic reforms in differ-
ent transition countries, very few studies were focused on economic voting in Russia.
In this paper, using data from the Russian parliamentary elections in 1999 and 2003,
I develop and estimate an econometric model to investigate whether the voting be-
havior of people with different employment status is affected by the level of regional
corruption. The voters are divided into four groups by employment status: those
employed in private and public sectors, the unemployed, and those who are out of the
labor force. Also, the voting behavior of those employed at enterprises of different
size is explored. Among the contributions of the paper is a combined approach which
includes the analysis of voting results simultaneously with the analysis of participa-
tion in elections, the evaluation of hard and perceived measures of corruption, and
simulations of artificial outcomes of elections using different values of corruption.
I find that people with different employment status are likely to vote differently,
even when controlling for corruption. Corruption has direct impact on the voting
results of major parties and positively influences participation in elections. Regional
15The results are available upon request.
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differences in corruption are likely to have indirect effects on people’s decision to par-
ticipate in elections and on the voting behavior of people with different employment
status. Because of corruption, voters are less likely to support those parties which
they previously supported. Using two different measures of corruption produces com-
plementary results. Artificial vote shares generated by simulations suggest that the
distribution of votes changes when different values of corruption are used. The pa-
per contributes to a better understanding of factors that influence voting outcomes in
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Table 1: Description of Political Parties and the Results of






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Central Electoral Commission of Russia; web pages of political parties. Notes. A party is elected to the
Parliament if it receives more than 5 percent of votes. In total 26 political parties participated in 1999 elections and
23 political parties in 2003 elections. The Russian Parliament (State Duma) has 450 seats: 225 are elected by voting
for particular parties and 225 are elected by voting for particular candidates. The table presents the number of seats
received as a result of voting for particular parties.
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Table 2: Data Description (before transformation, year 2003)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
State capture 215 0.333 0.174 0.200 1.000
Integral CPI 164 0.591 0.220 0.000 1.000
Unemployed (thous. people) 224 26.553 14.229 0.500 79.100
State employed (thous. people) 224 106.845 33.092 7.900 250.700
Privately employed (thous. people) 224 147.078 43.184 2.700 258.700
Out of the labor force (thous. people) 224 26.233 7.360 0.388 43.829
Employed at Small Enterprises (thous. people) 224 33.183 25.729 0.100 113.050
Employed at Medium and Large Enterprises (thous. people) 224 259.971 74.129 11.200 475.600
Real GRP per capita (thous. rubles) 214 63.498 47.699 8.844 307.774
Students (thous. people) 221 29.115 16.571 0.000 85.300
Pensioners (thous. people) 224 169.429 44.557 4.000 281.000
Registered voters (thous. people) 225 484.028 123.902 13.258 777.959
Urban population (% of population in region) 223 0.729 0.151 0.237 1.000
Moscow 225 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000
United Russia (thous. people voted) 225 101.232 56.614 3.514 420.186
Communist Party (thous. people voted) 225 33.990 15.657 0.323 90.570
Liberal Democratic Party (thous. people voted) 225 31.026 13.326 0.705 84.588
”Motherland” (Rodina”) (thous. people voted) 225 24.378 12.256 0.545 76.809
”Apple” (”Yabloko”) (thous. people voted) 225 11.647 7.244 0.138 39.111
Union of Right Forces (thous. people voted) 225 10.726 7.846 0.207 50.543
Against All (thous. people voted) 225 12.674 5.362 0.332 25.869
Other parties (thous. people voted) 225 39.886 15.749 0.875 87.130




Source: Russian State Statistical Offi ce; Central Electoral Commission of Russia; author’s calculations Notes. Electoral
district used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamentary elections there were 225 electoral districts in
total. Observations for the unemployed, state and private employees, out of the labor force, employed at small, medium
and large enterprises, real GRP per capita, number of students, number of pensioners are missing for the Chechen
Republic. Observations for real GRP per capita, number of students are missing for those electoral districts that
correspond to national districts within larger Russian regions.
Table 3: Data Description (after transformation, year 2003)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
United Russia 225 0.911 0.445 -0.439 3.084
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 225 -0.220 0.487 -3.476 1.696
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 225 -0.303 0.476 -3.430 0.583
”Motherland” (Rodina”) 225 -0.587 0.642 -4.038 1.044
”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 225 -1.331 0.780 -2.901 4.600
Union of Right Forces 225 -1.498 0.750 -3.223 0.332
Votes against All Parties 225 -1.188 0.505 -3.535 -0.004
Integral CPI 164 0.409 0.220 0.000 1.000
Ln(Number Participated) 225 5.489 0.555 1.893 6.278
Ln(Unemployed) 224 3.070 0.771 -0.693 4.371
Ln(State Employed) 224 4.597 0.465 2.067 5.524
Ln(Privately Employed) 224 4.892 0.596 0.993 5.556
Ln(Out of the Labor Force) 224 3.172 0.633 -0.947 3.780
Ln(Employed at Small Enterprises) 224 3.189 0.979 -2.303 4.728
Ln(Employed at Medium and Large Enterprises) 224 5.481 0.508 2.416 6.165
Ln(Real GRP per capita) 214 3.979 0.539 2.180 5.729
Ln(Number of Students) 220 3.183 0.787 -2.303 4.446
Ln(Number of Pensioners) 224 5.046 0.564 1.386 5.638
Ln(Number of Registered Voters) 225 6.100 0.549 2.585 6.657
Dependent variables (y)
Exlanatory variables
Source: author’s calculations Notes. Electoral district used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamentary
elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. Observations for Ln(unemployed), Ln(state employed), Ln(privately
employed), Ln(out of labor force), Ln(employed at small enterprises), Ln(employed at medium and large enterprises),
Ln(real GRP per capita), Ln(number of students), Ln(number of pensioners) are missing for the Chechen Republic.
Observations for Ln(real GRP per capita), Ln(number of students) are missing for those electoral districts that
correspond to national districts within larger Russian regions.
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Table 4: Data Description (before transformation, year 1999)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
State Capture 215 0.361 0.212 0.200 1.000
Unemployed (thous. people) 224 41.620 17.339 0.700 120.350
State employed (thous. people) 224 108.777 32.648 7.400 245.600
Privately employed (thous. people) 224 133.163 40.625 1.800 236.900
Out of the labor force (thous. people) 224 27.138 17.985 0.579 274.829
Employed at Small Enterprises (thous. people) 224 28.883 20.804 0.300 88.060
Employed at Medium and Large Enterprises (thous. people) 224 256.778 72.688 9.500 464.600
Real GRP per capita (thous. rubles) 214 20.209 14.347 3.371 78.096
Students (thous. people) 216 18.856 11.008 0.500 60.700
Pensioners (thous. people) 224 170.799 46.436 4.000 290.000
Registered voters (thous. people) 224 482.466 124.395 12.759 782.019
Urban population (% of population in region) 223 72.831 15.178 25.400 100.000
Moscow 224 0.067 0.251 0.000 1.000
IRP ”Unity” (”Yedinstvo”) (thous. people voted) 224 69.414 33.559 0.855 172.167
Communist Party (thous. people voted) 224 72.302 35.326 0.959 219.602
Liberal-Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky’s block) (thous. people voted) 224 17.723 8.199 0.424 48.063
Otechestvo-All Russia (thous. people voted) 224 39.672 43.504 0.434 264.837
”Apple” (”Yabloko”) (thous. people voted) 224 17.663 10.487 0.357 59.477
Union of Right Forces (thous. people voted) 224 25.344 14.464 0.309 75.824
Against All (thous. people voted) 224 9.815 3.807 0.269 20.810
Other parties (thous. people voted) 224 39.814 13.949 1.349 83.982




Source: Russian State Statistical Offi ce; Central Electoral Commission of Russia; author’s calculations. Notes. Elec-
toral district used as an unit of observation. During the 1999 parliamentary elections there were 224 electoral districts
in total. Observations for real GRP per capita, number of students, urban population are missing for those electoral
districts that correspond to national districts within larger Russian regions.
Table 5: Data Description (after transformation, year 1999)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IRP ”Unity” (”Yedinstvo”) 224 0.493 0.530 -1.205 2.778
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 224 0.515 0.538 -0.919 3.021
Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky’s block) 224 -0.863 0.394 -3.154 0.094
Otechestvo-All Russia 224 2.731 1.323 -1.677 5.488
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 224 -0.951 0.589 -2.598 0.377
The Union of Right Forces 224 -0.577 0.534 -2.399 0.708
Votes against All Parties 224 -1.427 0.333 -2.736 -0.466
Ln(Number Participated) 224 5.589 0.550 2.042 6.239
Ln(Unemployed) 224 3.605 0.610 -0.357 4.790
Ln(State Employed) 224 4.616 0.464 2.001 5.504
Ln(Privately Employed) 224 4.781 0.645 0.588 5.468
Ln(Out of the Labor Force) 224 3.187 0.576 -0.546 5.616
Ln(Employed at Small Enterprises) 224 3.085 0.927 -1.204 4.478
Ln(Employed at Medium and Large Enterprises) 224 5.466 0.520 2.251 6.141
Ln(Real GRP per capita) 214 2.838 0.546 1.215 4.358
Ln(Number of Students) 216 2.762 0.671 -0.693 4.106
Ln(Number of Pensioners) 224 5.052 0.567 1.386 5.670
Ln(Number of Registered Voters) 224 6.095 0.554 2.546 6.662
Exlanatory variables
Dependent variables (y)
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district used as an unit of observation. During the 1999 parliamentary
elections there were 224 electoral districts in total. Observations for Ln(real GRP per capita) and Ln(number of
students) are missing for those electoral districts that correspond to national districts within larger Russian regions.
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Table 6: SUR Estimation of the 2003 Voting Results
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-1.220   
(0.813)
Number of observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
”R-squared” 0.387 0.443 0.504 0.377 0.371 0.317 0.478 0.828
BIC
Hypothesis:                      
βstate capture (party) =      
βstate capture (against all)
can’t reject reject** can’t reject can’t reject reject** can’t reject - -
1286.297
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party "United Russia" is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for
10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for
independent equations (chi2(28) = 1570.249***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 7: SUR Estimation of the 2003 Voting Results


























-3.365   
(23.631)
-5.346   
(19.521)
4.537   
(9.639)
-17.395   
(11.817)







0.260   (0.470)




0.110   
(0.307)
-0.045   
(0.376)









-1.261   
(1.040)
-0.963   
(0.859)
0.311   
(0.424)
-0.699   
(0.520)







-0.460   
(0.698)




0.663   
(0.456)
-0.409   
(0.559)
-0.066   
(0.159)















0.552     
(0.352)






-1.175    
(1.079)




-0.811   
(0.705)
0.261   
(0.865)
-0.097   
(0.246)








3.210   
(2.717)
2.669   
(2.446)
-0.502   
(1.108)
1.121   
(1.359)
-0.291   
(0.387)






2.694*   
(1.410)
-1.331   
(2.259)
-1.509   
(1.866)
-0.435   
(0.921)




Integral CPI*                    





0.900     
(2.757)
1.174   
(4.419)
3.113   
(3.650)
0.939   
(1.802)
1.189   
(2.210)
0.811     
(0.629)






















0.154     
(0.141)








-0.020   
(0.032)












































































-7.223   
(10.074)
-4.258   
(8.322)
0.022   
(4.109)




Number of observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
”R-squared” 0.492 0.425 0.442 0.308 0.483 0.350 0.304 0.694
BIC
Hypothesis:               
βintegral CPI (party) =     
βintegral CPI (against all)
can’t reject can’t reject reject* can’t reject can’t reject reject** - -
710.960
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party "United Russia" is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for
10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for
independent equations (chi2(28) = 1280.953***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 8: SUR Estimation of the 2003 Voting Results


























-0.731   
(0.703)
-0.584   
(0.585)
-0.051   
(0.288)
-0.675*   
(0.344)







0.321      
(0.200)
0.283     
(0.325)













0.034      
(0.177)
0.238    
(0.288)















-0.081   
(0.650)
0.073   
(0.541)
0.224   
(0.266)









0.782*    
(0.406)
































-0.024     
(0.193)






0.007   
(0.154)
0.012     
(0.045)





-0.065    
(0.178)
-0.405   
(0.289)
-0.027   
(0.241)
0.191   
(0.118)
-0.081   
(0.141)
-0.041     
(0.041)











-0.720   
(0.468)
-0.193   
(0.559)
0.219     
(0.162)

























































-3.213    
(2.965)
-4.771   
(4.820)
-2.936   
(4.011)




-0.904     
(0.685)
Number of observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
”R-squared” 0.462 0.424 0.448 0.294 0.465 0.333 0.312 0.676
BIC
Hypothesis:                        
βstatecapture=                      
βintegral CPI
can’t reject can’t reject reject*** can’t reject can’t reject can’t reject can’t reject can’t reject
664.356
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party "United Russia" is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for
10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for
independent equations (chi2(28) = 1177.431***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 9: SUR Estimation of the 1999 Voting Results

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State Capture














-0.072    
(0.687)
Ln(Unemployed)
















































-0.086     
(0.063)
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)


































State Capture*           
Ln(State Employed)














-0.229   
(0.245)
State Capture*           
Ln(Privately Employed)














0.081    
(0.173)
State Capture*               
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)














-0.280   
(0.240)
Ln (Real GRP per capita)


















































Ln (Number of Registered 
Voters)














0.013     
(0.013)
Share of Urban Population































0.067     
(0.055)
Constant
















Number of observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
”R-squared” 0.492 0.389 0.506 0.319 0.374 0.405 0.372 0.859
BIC
Hypothesis:                  
βstate capture (party) = 
βstate capture (against all)
can’t reject can’t reject reject** can’t reject can’t reject can’t reject - -
1063.03
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 1999 parliamen-
tary elections there were 224 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party "Otechestvo" is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and
1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for independent
equations (chi2(28) = 3258.442***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the equations.
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Table 10: Artificial Outcomes of the 2003 Elections
for Different Values of State Capture
Political party Mean St. error
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.1262 0.0306 0.0731 0.1943
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 0.1031 0.0341 0.0516 0.1817
National-Patriotic Union ”Motherland” (”Rodina”) 0.0978 0.0336 0.0455 0.1778
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0499 0.0288 0.0133 0.1236
The Union of Right Forces 0.0448 0.0255 0.0134 0.1055
Other Parties 0.1473 0.0325 0.0907 0.2158
Votes against All Parties 0.0462 0.0124 0.0259 0.0740
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.1625 0.0532 0.0786 0.2920
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 0.2451 0.0869 0.1038 0.4353
National-Patriotic Union ”Motherland” (”Rodina”) 0.0376 0.0189 0.0128 0.0861
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0279 0.0251 0.0445 0.0954
The Union of Right Forces 0.0114 0.0101 0.0018 0.0380
Other Parties 0.1482 0.0441 0.0721 0.2467
Votes against All Parties 0.0492 0.0194 0.0215 0.0977
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.1374 0.0341 0.0810 0.2150
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 0.1091 0.0363 0.0548 0.1963
National-Patriotic Union ”Motherland” (”Rodina”) 0.1176 0.0398 0.0560 0.2107
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0552 0.0331 0.0149 0.1381
The Union of Right Forces 0.0411 0.0231 0.0120 0.0996
Other Parties 0.1480 0.0344 0.0880 0.2203
Votes against All Parties 0.0451 0.0123 0.0243 0.0728
State Capture at mean, All other explanatory variables at their mean
State Capture at max, All other explanatory variables at their mean
State Capture at min, All other explanatory variables at their mean
95% Confidence Interval
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. The party "United Russia" is used as a base party. Simulations have been
done using CLARIFY software. First, SUR system has been estimated and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients has
been drawn. Predicted shares of votes for each party have been calculated based on sets of simulated coeffi cients and
different values of corruption measure and the means of other explanatory variables.
Table 11: Artificial Outcomes of the 2003 Elections
for Different Values of Integral CPI
Political party Mean St. error
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.1174 0.0254 0.0765 0.1688
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 0.1179 0.0236 0.0758 0.1720
National-Patriotic Union ”Motherland” (”Rodina”) 0.1071 0.0357 0.0520 0.1905
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0520 0.0343 0.0112 0.1450
The Union of Right Forces 0.0365 0.0183 0.0126 0.0852
Other Parties 0.1461 0.0284 0.0991 0.2099
Votes against All Parties 0.0550 0.0126 0.0335 0.0830
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.0652 0.0218 0.0316 0.1190
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 0.0941 0.0278 0.0502 0.1555
National-Patriotic Union ”Motherland” (”Rodina”) 0.0656 0.0315 0.0199 0.1413
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0712 0.0627 0.0080 0.2531
The Union of Right Forces 0.0492 0.0350 0.0089 0.1372
Other Parties 0.2277 0.0539 0.1318 0.3414
Votes against All Parties 0.0306 0.0107 0.0140 0.0558
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.1405 0.0317 0.0883 0.2099
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 0.1263 0.0258 0.0830 0.1816
National-Patriotic Union ”Motherland” (”Rodina”) 0.0823 0.0277 0.0376 0.1519
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0440 0.0291 0.0094 0.1176
The Union of Right Forces 0.0300 0.0159 0.0091 0.0709
Other Parties 0.1273 0.0236 0.0856 0.1767
Votes against All Parties 0.0618 0.0152 0.0370 0.0955
Integral CPI at min, All other explanatory variables at their mean
95% Confidence Interval
Integral CPI at mean, All other explanatory variables at their mean
Integral CPI at max, All other explanatory variables at their mean
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. The party "United Russia" is used as a base party. Simulations have been
done using CLARIFY software. First, SUR system has been estimated and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients has
been drawn. Predicted shares of votes for each party have been calculated based on sets of simulated coeffi cients and
different values of corruption measure and the means of other explanatory variables.
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Table 12: Aggregate Results of Simulations for the 2003 Elections















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Actual outcomes are from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, the results of simulations
are author’s calculations. Notes. Simulations have been done using CLARIFY software. First, SUR system has been
estimated and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients has been drawn. Predicted shares of votes for each party have been
calculated based on sets of simulated coeffi cients and different values of corruption measure and the means of other
explanatory variables. Artificial outcomes are the means of predicted shares of votes and corresponding numbers of
seats. It is assumed that "Against All’cannot be elected to Parliament even if its share of votes exceeds 5 percent.
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Table 13: Artificial Outcomes of the 1999 Elections
for Different Values of State Capture
Political party Mean St. error
IRP ”Unity” (”Yedinstvo”) 0.2367 0.0689 0.1167 0.3889
Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky’s block) 0.0645 0.0225 0.0288 0.1142
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.2550 0.0632 0.1442 0.3893
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0639 0.0329 0.0208 0.1454
The Union of Right Forces 0.0898 0.0355 0.0380 0.1749
Other Parties 0.1374 0.0291 0.0834 0.1979
Votes against All Parties 0.0355 0.0086 0.0200 0.0554
IRP ”Unity” (”Yedinstvo”) 0.2364 0.0700 0.1106 0.3843
Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky’s block) 0.0636 0.0232 0.0255 0.1115
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.2756 0.0667 0.1580 0.4191
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0697 0.0352 0.0230 0.1571
The Union of Right Forces 0.1013 0.0377 0.0431 0.1918
Other Parties 0.1133 0.0253 0.0698 0.1693
Votes against All Parties 0.0319 0.0082 0.0184 0.0504
IRP ”Unity” (”Yedinstvo”) 0.2429 0.0691 0.1242 0.3855
Liberal Democratic Party (Zhirinovsky’s block) 0.0643 0.0230 0.0274 0.1151
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) 0.2520 0.0597 0.1449 0.3755
Russian Democratic Party ”Apple” (”Yabloko”) 0.0604 0.0301 0.0198 0.1368
The Union of Right Forces 0.0857 0.0329 0.0360 0.1602
Other Parties 0.1423 0.0301 0.0897 0.2101
Votes against All Parties 0.0362 0.0089 0.0214 0.0554
State Capture at mean, All other explanatory variables at their mean
95% Confidence Interval
State Capture at max, All other explanatory variables at their mean
State Capture at min, All other explanatory variables at their mean
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. The party "Otechestvo" is used as a base party. Simulations have been done
using CLARIFY software. First, SUR system has been estimated and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients has been
drawn. Predicted shares of votes for each party have been calculated based on sets of simulated coeffi cients and
different values of corruption measure and the means of other explanatory variables.
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Table 14: Aggregate Results of Simulations for the 1999 Elections







































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source:Actual outcomes are from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, the results of simulations
are author’s calculations. Notes. Simulations have been done using CLARIFY software. First, SUR system has been
estimated and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients has been drawn. Predicted shares of votes for each party have been
calculated based on sets of simulated coeffi cients and different values of corruption measure and the means of other




Table 1a: Sensitivity Check for the Estimation Results from the 2003
(State Capture Index is Used to Control for Corruption)
Anti-Reform Pro-Reform Protest Voting Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State Capture




-1.982     
(15.245)







-0.850*   
(0.440)
0.175      
(0.111)
Ln(State Employed)




-1.539     
(1.691)
0.614     
(0.427)
Ln(Privately Employed)
0.323       
(0.916)
4.316**    
(1.695)
-1.242      
(1.163)
0.328      
(0.294)
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
1.967        
(2.059)
-8.200**   
(3.811)
5.220**   
(2.615)
-1.406**     
(0.660)
State Capture*Ln(Unemployed)









-6.311      
(5.062)
-26.980***   
(9.371)
-2.372      
(6.429)
-0.597        
(1.624)
State Capture*Ln(Privately Employed)




0.966      
(3.586)
-1.200    
(0.906)
State Capture*Ln(Out of the Labor Force)




-1.660        
(8.487)
2.335       
(2.144)
Ln (Real GRP per capita)
-0.193       
(0.123)
0.159    
(0.229)
0.145       
(0.157)




















Ln (Number of Registered Voters)













0.321       
(0.427)
-0.572*** 
(0.108)      
Moscow
1.733***   
(0.628)







2.621        
(4.008)
-17.258**   
(7.420)




Number of observations 205 205 205 205
”R-squared” 0.361 0.356 0.319 0.808
BIC
Hypothesis:                                      
βˆstate capture (party) =                   
βˆstate capture (protest)
can’t reject reject** - -
585.768
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party of power ("United Russia") is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand
for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test
for independent equations (chi2(6) = 313.906***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 2a: Sensitivity Check for the Estimation Results from the 2003
(Integral CPI is Used to Control for Corruption)
Anti-Reform Pro-Reform Protest Voting Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Integral CPI
20.087       
(13.584)
-11.158       
(28.298)
-8.386        
(14.080)
10.929**     
(4.536)
Ln(Unemployed)
-0.908**     
(0.375)
1.129       
(0.781)
-0.496       
(0.389)
-0.145      
(0.125)
Ln(State Employed)
1.756        
(1.620)
-3.711       
(3.374)
0.174      
(1.679)
1.044*      
(0.541)
L (P i t l E l d)
3.199* -0.696 0.531 0.846
n r va e y mp oye
      
(1.682)
         
(3.504)
      
(1.743)
        
(0.562)
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
-3.088         
(3.146)
6.390       
(6.553)
-0.679     
(3.260)
-1.854*        
(1.050)
Integral CPI*Ln(Unemployed)
1.937**       
(0.932)
-3.309*      
(1.941)
0.960       
(0.966)
0.217        
(0.311)
Integral CPI*Ln(State Employed)
-4.780       
(3.784)
10.525     
(7.882)
-0.739        
(3.921)
-2.038        
(1.263)
5 177 4 774 0 071 2 242*
Integral CPI*Ln(Privately Employed)
- .         
(3.491)
.         
(7.273)
- .       
(3.619)
- .       
(1.166)
Integral CPI*Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
6.781        
(6.361)
-15.907      
(13.250)
2.878      
(6.593)
2.877       
(2.124)
Ln (Real GRP per capita)
-0.464***       
(0.159)
-0.844**      
(0.332)
-0.513***   
(0.165)
0.147***   
(0.053)
Ln (Number of Students)
0.227**      
(0.109)
-0.548**       
(0.227)
-0.092      
(0.113)
0.081**     
(0.036)
Ln (Number of Pensioners)
-1.250**       
(0.594)
-4.059***     
(1.238)
-1.667***   
(0.616)
0.808***   
(0.198)
Ln (Number of Registered Voters)
0.257        
(0.472)
3.044***    
(0.984)
0.855*       
(0.489)
0.927***   
(0.158)
Share of Urban Population
-0.990**     
(0.450)
4.026***     
(0.938)





-0.447*     
(0.270)
0.738       
(0.563)
0.145       
(0.280)
0.120     
(0.090)
Constant
-5.632      
(7.284)
-0.751       
(15.175)
5.344       
(7.550)
-7.505***   
(2.432)
Number of observations 157 157 157 157
”R-squared” 0.337 0.437 0.155 0.624
BIC
Hypothesis:                                      
βˆintegral CPI (party) =                       
βˆi l CPI ( )
reject** can’t reject - -
332.094
ntegra   protest
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party of power ("United Russia") is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand
for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test
for independent equations (chi2(6) = 299.273***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 3a: Sensitivity Check for the Estimation Results from the 2003
(Both State Capture Index and Integral CPI are Included)
Anti-Reform Pro-Reform Protest Voting Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State Capture
-0.377      
(0.330)
-0.612      
(0.695)
-0.742**    
(0.338)
0.194*       
(0.111)
Integral CPI
0.044        
(0.154)
0.423        
(0.324)
0.170      
(0.158)
0.153***    
(0.052)
Ln(Unemployed)
-0.058         
(0.142)
0.114       
(0.299)
-0.008       
(0.146)
-0.053         
(0.048)
0 389 0 427 0 146 0 045
Ln(State Employed)
- .         
(0.535)
- .          
(1.125)
- .        
(0.548)
.       
(0.179)
Ln(Privately Employed)
0.700        
(0.461)
1.113          
(0.970)
0.682      
(0.472)
-0.293*      
(0.155)
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
1.142         
(1.061)
1.924       
(2.230)
0.297       
(1.085)
0.109     
(0.356)
Ln (Real GRP per capita)
-0.440***     
(0.147)
-0.636**      
(0.310)
0.213      
(0.151)
0.028       
(0.049)
Ln (Number of Students)
-0.082      
(0.141)
-0.686**    
(0.295)
-0.346**     
(0.144)
0.032       
(0.047)
Ln (Number of Pensioners)
-1.932***    
(0.577)




0.450**      
(0.193)
Ln (Number of Registered Voters)
0.303         
(0.463)
2.427**    
(0.973)
1.044**    
(0.474)
0.895***    
(0.155)
Share of Urban Population
-1.364***   
(0.410)
3.404***   
(0.861)
0.376       
(0.419)
-0.693***    
(0.137)
Moscow
-0.125      
(0.260)
0.740      
(0.547)
0.448*      
(0.267)
0.106      
(0.087)
Constant
5.056*        
(2.869)
1.362      
(6.031)
0.340      
(2.936)
-1.056     
(0.962)
Number of observations 154 154 154 154




ypo es s:                        
βˆstatecapture=                      
βˆintegral CPI
can’t reject can’t reject reject** can’t reject
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party of power ("United Russia") is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand
for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test
for independent equations (chi2(6) = 273.269***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 4a: Sensitivity Check for the Estimation Results from the 1999
(State Capture Index is Used to Control for Corruption)
Anti-Reform Pro-Reform Protest Voting Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
State Capture
0.639       
(2.280)
-7.975**    
(3.906)
-7.773***       
(2.873)
0.461       
(0.667)
Ln(Unemployed)
0.448*     
(0.233)
0.995**    
(0.399)





-1.270***   
(0.439)
-1.908**     
(0.752)




0 150 0 237 0 351 0 028
Ln(Privately Employed)
- .       
(0.230)
.        
(0.395)
.       
(0.290)
- .        
(0.067)
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
1.676**    
(0.676)
0.920       
(1.158)
1.947**      
(0.852)
-0.083      
(0.198)
State Capture*Ln(Unemployed)
-1.028*       
(0.536)
-3.225***   
(0.917)
-2.603***     
(0.675)
0.409***   
(0.157)
State Capture*Ln(State Employed)
0.024       
(1.071)
3.598*      
(1.835)
3.893***   
(1.350)
-0.402        
(0.313)
State Capture*Ln(Privately Employed)
0.123       
(0.545)
0.259        
(0.934)
0.159       
(0.687)
-0.067      
(0.159)
State Capture*Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
0.853        
(1.099)
0.659         
(1.882)
-0.532        
(1.384)
0.056       
(0.321)
Ln(Real GRP per capita)
-0.198**     
(0.080)
0.259*       
(0.137)
0.059      
(0.101)
-0.001       
(0.023)
Ln(Students)
-0.138*     
(0.081)
-0.114        
(0.138)
-0.601***   
(0.102)
0.043*      
(0.024)
Ln(Pensioners)
-0.647**      
(0.298)






Ln(Number of Registered Voters)
-0.010      
(0.045)
-0.003       
(0.077)
-0.014      
(0.057)
0.013        
(0.013)
Share of Urban Population
-1.282***    
(0.250)







-0.462**    
(0 190)
-0.799**    
(0 325)
-0.907***    
(0 239)
0.074      
(0 055). . . .
Constant
4.606***   
(1.469)




0.680         
(0.429)
Number of observations 205 205 205 205
”R-squared” 0.394 0.593 0.414 0.858
BIC
Hypothesis:                                      
βˆstate capture (party) =                   reject*** can’t reject - -
379.799
βˆstate capture (protest)
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 1999 parliamen-
tary elections there were 224 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The parties positioned as parties of power ("Otechestvo" and "Yedinstvo") are used as a base party. Standard errors
are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is
justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for independent equations (chi2(6) = 166.154***) rejects the null hypothesis of
independence of residuals across the equations.
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Table 5a: SUR Estimation of the 2003 Voting Results by Size






















18.935*   
(11.035)
8.097    
(12.271)
-4.974    
(18.545)
-20.266    
(17.141)
4.211    
(9.612)
-1.625    
(11.124)







-0.272    
(0.439)
-0.634     
(0.664)
-1.141*    
(0.613)
-0.424    
(0.344)
0.471    
(0.398)
0.039      
(0.104)
Ln(Employed at Small 
Enterprise)




0.881**     
(0.417)
0.153     
(0.630)
-1.070*    
(0.582)
0.385    
(0.326)
1.129***   
(0.378)
-0.061       
(0.099)




2.339**   
(0.969)
-0.865    
(1.078)
0.752    
(1.629)




-0.180     
(0.977)
0.227      
(0.255)







-1.072    
(1.061)












-0.364    
(1.292)
1.557    
(1.437)
2.891    
(2.171)
2.829    
(2.010)
0.956    
(1.125)
-1.356    
(1.302)
-0.448      
(0.340)
State Capture*                  
Ln(Employed at Small 
Enterprise)
0.841    
(1.210)
-3.154**   
(1.338)
-1.014     
(1.488)
1.319     
(2.249)
4.520**   
(2.078)
0.239    
(1.166)
-2.411*    
(1.349)
-0.348      
(0.352)
State Capture*             




-4.238    
(3.465)
-3.172     
(3.854)
-1.907     
(5.823)
0.883    
(5.382)
-2.777     
(3.018)
1.223    
(3.493)
-0.314       
(0.911)
State Capture*                   





2.249    
(1.782)
0.360      
(2.693)
-3.109    
(2.489)
2.291    
(1.396)
2.216   
(1.616)
0.210      
(0.421)
Included:
Number of observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
”R-squared” 0.332 0.564 0.559 0.379 0.378 0.366 0.497 0.837
BIC
Hypothesis:                      
βstate capture (party) =      
βstate capture (against all)
reject** reject** can’t reject can’t reject can’t reject can’t reject - -
Ln (Real GRP per capita); Ln (Students); Ln (Pensioners); Ln (Number of Registered Voters); Share of 
Urban Population; Moscow; Constant   
1228.835
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party "United Russia" is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for
10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for
independent equations (chi2(28) = 1526.315***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 6a: SUR Estimation of the 2003 Voting Results by Size


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Integral CPI
-9.522    
(10.653)




37.810*      
(22.908)
12.569      
(19.369)
11.910     
(9.315)
-6.282     
(11.401)
5.965*     
(3.154)
Ln(Unemployed)
0.922***    
(0.339)
1.247***   
(0.269)
0.751*    
(0.448)
2.560***     
(0.729)
2.244***    
(0.616)
0.802***   
(0.296)
0.835**   
(0.363)
-0.180*   
(0.100)
Ln(Employed at Small 
Enterprise)
1.372***   
(0.336)




3.037***     
(0.722)
2.150***   
(0.611)
1.207***     
 (0.294)
1.210***   
(0.359)
-0.216**     
(0.099)
Ln(Employed at Medium and 
Large Enterprise)
-0.665    
(0.601)
0.104    
(0.477)
-4.433***   
(0.795)
-1.385      
(1.293)
-1.103   
(1.093)
0.293      
(0.526)
-1.779***   
(0.644)
0.325**   
(0.178)
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
-3.443*** 
(0.941)












0.624**     
(0.279)
Integral CPI*                   
Ln(Unemployed)
-2.085***    
(0.746)
-2.153***   
(0.591)
-1.888*    
(0.985)




-2.342***   
(0.652)
-1.945**   
(0.798)
0.099    
(0.221)
Integral CPI*                    
Ln(Employed at Small 
Enterprise)
-2.464***   
(0.817)
-3.738***   
(0.648)
-0.933    
(1.079)
-6.530***    
(1.757)
-4.208***   
(1.486)




-0.095     
(0.242)
Integral CPI*                    
Ln(Employed at Medium and 
Large Enterprise)
1.431    
(1.582)
1.591    
(1.255)
8.209***     
(2.091)
0.028     
(3.403)
2.223      
(2.877)
-0.384     
(1.384)




Integral CPI*                    





0.035       
(2.205)
0.508      
(3.588)
2.056     
(3.034)
1.857     
(1.459)
2.291     
(1.786)
0.621     
(0.494)
Included:
Number of observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
”R-squared” 0.501 0.600 0.506 0.367 0.505 0.409 0.370 0.738
BIC
Hypothesis:               
βintegral CPI (party) =     
βintegral CPI (against all)
can’t reject can’t reject reject*** reject** can’t reject reject* - -
Ln (Real GRP per capita); Ln (Students); Ln (Pensioners); Ln (Number of Registered Voters); Share of 
Urban Population; Moscow; Constant   
534.772
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 2003 parliamen-
tary elections there were 225 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party "United Russia" is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for
10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for
independent equations (chi2(28) = 1236.342***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the
equations.
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Table 7a: SUR Estimation of the 1999 Voting Results by Size

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State Capture
4.342     
(10.983)
1.658   
(9.355)
-2.830    
(11.758)
-9.190    
(9.777)




1.288   
(8.810)
-1.454    
(1.283)
Ln(Unemployed)
















Ln(Employed at Small 
Enterprise)














-0.081   
(0.055)
Ln(Employed at Medium or 
Large Enterprise)
1.031      
(1.586)
0.083   
(1.351)




-0.142    
(1.343)
0.586    
(1.368)
-0.023   
(1.272)
0.185      
(0.185)
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)




1.479   
(1.954)
1.663 (1.625)
0.215   
(1.545)
-0.072   
(1.574)
0.102   
(1.464)




















State Capture*                  
Ln(Employed at Small 
Enterprise)
-4.346***    
(1.108)












0.159   
(0.129)
State Capture*             
Ln(Employed at Medium or 
Large Enterprise)
4.837      
(3.880)








3.616    
(3.347)
5.892*   
(3.112)
0.093     
(0.453)
State Capture*                   
Ln(Out of the Labor Force)
-1.797    
(3.278)
-1.813    
(2.792)
-2.981   
(3.506)
-3.536    
(2.918)




-0.403   
(2.630)
-0.461   
(0.383)
Included:
Number of observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
”R-squared” 0.525 0.428 0.522 0.326 0.413 0.400 0.412 0.841
BIC
Hypothesis:                  
βstate capture (party) =          
βstate capture (against all)
can’t reject can’t reject can’t reject reject** can’t reject can’t reject - -
1079.402
Ln (Real GRP per capita); Ln (Students); Ln (Pensioners); Ln (Number of Registered Voters); Share of 
Urban Population; Moscow; Constant   
Source: author’s calculations. Notes. Electoral district is used as an unit of observation. During the 1999 parliamen-
tary elections there were 224 electoral districts in total. The number of observations is reduced due to the absence
of data on corruption. Participation in elections and the results for parties are estimated simultaneously. Columns
present the results for a particular party and for a participation in elections. Explanatory variables are given in rows.
The party "Otechestvo" is used as a base party. Standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and
1 percent significance levels, respectively. The choice of SUR is justified since the Breusch-Pagan test for independent
equations (chi2(28) = 3288.041***) rejects the null hypothesis of independence of residuals across the equations.
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Chapter 2
Can Religion Insure against Aggregate Shocks to
Happiness? The Case of Transition Countries
Abstract
This paper focuses on the effects of reforms and religion on happiness in transition
economies. Previous literature suggests that religiousness insures happiness against
various individual stressful life events. This phenomenon is well-explored in devel-
oped countries but rarely studied in Post-Communist countries where religion was
offi cially suppressed for a long period. These countries have undergone significant
economic transformations over the past two decades. Using cross-sectional Life in
Transition Survey data and historical data on religions, I examine if religion insures
against aggregate shocks to happiness during the transition period. Additionally, the
endogeneity of religion is taken into account. The findings suggest that economic re-
forms may have both positive and negative effects on happiness. Religiousness indeed
insures happiness against positive and negative effects of economic reforms during
the transition period. Also, religiousness affects perceptions of economic and political
situations in these countries positively.
Keywords: happiness, life satisfaction, religion, reforms, transition
JEL Classification: C21, I31, P20, Z12
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2.1. Introduction1
It is accepted that religiousness affects happiness positively (see Ellison, 1991; Clark
and Lelkes, 2006 and 2009, among others). Previous literature also suggests that
religiousness insures happiness against various individual stressful life events. These
idiosyncratic shocks such as changes in individual income, employment or social status
decrease a person’s happiness, and religious people are likely to recover from such
shocks faster because of different values, attitudes, and norms in their life (see Clark
and Lelkes, 2006; Dehejia et al., 2007, among others). This phenomenon is well-
explored in developed countries but rarely studied in Post-Communist countries where
religion was offi cially suppressed for a long period. The role of religion on happiness
in these countries is yet underexplored.2
Transition countries have undergone significant economic transformations over the
past two decades. Nowadays individuals in these economies still report lower levels of
life satisfaction than people from developed market economies (see Table 1 and Sanfey
and Teksoz, 2007; Easterlin, 2009; among others). This suggests that although transi-
tion economies demonstrate stable economic growth and progress in the market reform
process (EBRD, 2006), the adaptation of people to the transition period and to the
new conditions of a market economy is not yet complete. The reasons for a decrease
in life satisfaction during the transition period have not been studied extensively in
previous literature. Existing studies relate the decrease with high inflation, income
inequality and poor quality of governance (Sanfey and Teksoz, 2007), the fall in real
GDP per capita during transition (Easterlin, 2009), high macroeconomic instability,
insuffi cient provision of public goods, and human capital depreciation in transition
countries (Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2009). The research on developed countries also
1The terms "life satisfaction" and "happiness" are used in the paper interchangebly. Throughout
the paper I refer to the definition of happiness as given by Veenhoven in the World Database of
Happiness: "happiness is the degree to which an individual judges the overall quality of her/his life
as-a-whole favorably" (http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl; Bibliography, Ch.2).
2One of the few studies, which examine the effects of religion on happiness in transition is Lelkes
(2006), who uses data from Hungary and argues that. freedom in ideology does not affect the
happiness of religious people.
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underlines the idea that life satisfaction is negatively affected by economic instabil-
ity. For example, high unemployment, income inequality and inflation tend to have
negative effects on life satisfaction (see Clark and Oswald, 1994; Di Tella et al., 2001,
among others).
Using cross-sectional Life in Transition Survey data and historical data on reli-
gions, I examine if religion insures happiness against the aggregate shocks. In this
paper, under aggregate shocks I understand the reforms during the transition period
such as privatization, price liberalization, enterprise restructuring and others. To
overcome the problem of potential endogeneity in the relationship between happiness
and religion, I use historical religious propensity as an instrumental variable for reli-
gion. The potential endogeneity problem in the relationship between happiness and
religion has been discussed in recent studies, for instance, by Dehejia et al. (2007),
Clark and Lelkes (2009), but not yet addressed in research. Thus, major contribution
of this paper is twofold: (i) the endogeneity of religion is addressed and controlled for;
(ii) the insurance effect of religion in case of aggregate shocks is explored.
The findings suggest that economic reforms may have both positive and negative
effects on happiness. However, religiousness insures happiness against these effects.
Also, religiousness affects perceptions of the current economic and political situation
in these countries positively. Different responses of religious and non-religious people
to aggregate happiness shocks may imply their different attitudes toward reforms.
This may cause differences in the implementation of reforms between countries with
different religious propensity. The analysis of this paper sheds light on the differences
in happiness levels between developed market economies and transition countries, and
differences in the speed of reform implementation in transition countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of
relevant literature. In further sections I describe the methodology and identification
strategy, data and discuss estimation results.
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2.2. Literature
Traditionally, economists have not given much weight to self-reported individual well-
being, leaving this area for philosophical, psychological, and sociological research.
Data on self-reported happiness were used for the first time in economic research by
Easterlin (1974, 1995) who investigated the relationship between income, economic
growth, and well-being. The economics of happiness as a discipline began to develop
rapidly after Kahnemann’s (1997) paper, which underlined the usefulness of data on
self-reported happiness for measuring individual experienced utility. Nowadays, hap-
piness data are widely used in empirical economic research as a measure of individual
utility, which was previously investigated mostly from a theoretical standpoint.
To date, different aspects of life satisfaction and its determinants in developed
countries have been investigated within economics. The most prominent research an-
alyzes happiness and relative income, income inequality, religiousness, unemployment,
the role of democracy, crime, health, education, urbanization, inflation, GDP and
GDP growth; climate changes and environmental pollution.3 According to existing
literature, socio-demographic and economic determinants of happiness are typically
the same for transition as for developed countries: among other determinants, hap-
piness is found to have a U-shape in age; women and wealthier, educated, employed,
married people are likely to be happier.4
The first theoretical model of religious participation was by Azzi and Ehrenberg
(1975), who constructed a multi-period utility maximization problem where a house-
hold (both wife and husband) makes decisions about work, leisure, and a non-market
3For details about the mentioned effects, see Alesina et al., 2004; Clark and Oswald, 1994; Di
Tella et al, 2001 and 2003; Dynan and Ravina, 2007; Easterlin, 1995 and 2001; Ellison, 1991; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005; Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Gerdtham and Johannesson, 2001; Hadaway, 1978; Luttmer,
2005; Michalos and Zumbo, 2000; Morawetz et al., 1977; Powdthavee, 2005; Rehdanz and Maddison,
2005; Welsch, 2007; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998, among others.
4The determinants of happiness during economic transition in a cross-country setting are explored
by Hayo and Seifert (2003), Hayo (2007), Sanfey and Teksoz (2007), Easterlin (2009), and Guriev and
Zhuravskaya (2009). The determinants of happiness to be similar to developed countries are found
by studies that use a single transition country for the analysis (for instance, Russia by Veenhoven,
2001 and Graham et al., 2004; Kyrgyzstan by Namazie and Sanfey, 2001; Hungary in Lelkes, 2006;
Kazakhstan by Kalyuzhnova and Kambhampati, 2008; among others).
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activity such as participation in religious activities. The authors also discuss the de-
terminants of religious participation and reasons for becoming religious. First, as the
authors point out, an individual believes that participation in religious activities to-
day brings him/her additional after-life satisfaction. Second, an individual may enjoy
socializing with people who attend religious organizations. Religious participation
in this case brings him/her additional life satisfaction today. Third, an individual
may attend a religious organization because of social pressure from the community in
which he/she lives. In this case it is not determined what effect religious participation
has on today’s happiness.
After a theoretical paper by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), researchers began empir-
ical investigation of the link between happiness and religiousness. One of the earliest
empirical studies is from Ellison (1991), who tests different aspects of religious activ-
ity. The author finds that the effect of church attendance on happiness is indirect.
Church attendance strengthens religious belief, which directly influences happiness.
Religiousness also decreases a loss in happiness during negative life events. This find-
ing was further tested by scholars (Clark and Lelkes, 2006; Dehejia et al., 2007; among
others), and Clark and Lelkes (2006) defined it as the "insurance effect" of religious-
ness. As Clark and Lelkes (2006) argue, religiousness insures against idiosyncratic life
events such as unemployment or marital separation, though the strength of insurance
effect of religiousness on happiness may differ across different religious denominations.
The authors explain the insurance role of religion by arguing that during stressful life
events, the support that a person receives from a religious organization, or from re-
ligious belief itself, is a substitute for social support. Dehejia et al. (2007) discuss
the insurance effects of religion further. The authors using U.S. data argue that re-
ligious participation, particularly contributions to religious organizations and church
attendance, partially helps to insure consumption and happiness against changes in
individual income. The authors underline that this has an important policy implica-
tion for public social insurance: in regions with high religious participation, people
may need less public insurance. Again the insurance effect of religion is found to be
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effective for idiosyncratic shocks to happiness only.
Recent empirical studies address various aspects of the relationship between re-
ligion, happiness and economic indicators. For instance, Guiso et al. (2003) find
a positive correlation between religiousness and attitudes towards economic growth.
Mookerjee and Beron (2005), using data on happiness across 60 countries (both de-
veloped and developing), find that greater religious diversity in a country decreases
average happiness in a country. This implies that mono-religious countries report on
average higher happiness levels than poli-religious countries.
One of the studies on the relationship between religion and happiness in transition
is Lelkes (2006) who uses data from a Hungarian survey. As the author argues,
more economic freedom increases the happiness of entrepreneurs, but more freedom
in ideology does not affect the happiness of religious people. Another finding of
this paper is that religious people are, on average, happier than those who are not
religious, and the religious are less affected by changes in their individual income
because income is not as highly placed among the main sources of their happiness.
Clark and Lelkes (2009), while discussing the relationship between religiosity and life
satisfaction, take into account both individual religiosity (churchgoing, praying, self-
identification with some religious denomination) and average religiosity in a region
(percentage of religious people in a region). The authors find positive correlation not
only between individual religiosity and individual life satisfaction, but also between
average religiosity in a region and individual life satisfaction. As Clark and Lelkes
(2009) point out, both religious people and atheists are likely to be happier in more
religious regions.
However, a potential endogeneity problem exists in the relationship between hap-
piness and religion that has not yet been closely investigated in the literature. Indeed,
being religious includes socialization and the support of the religious community (as
pointed out by Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975), some time constant personal unobservable
characteristics, including, for instance, optimism or pessimism, love for socializing ac-
tivities, trustfulness, and other characteristics that may influence personal happiness
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are likely to be correlated with personal religiousness too. There is also a potential
temporal endogeneity: when facing tragic life events that reduce individual happi-
ness, people are likely to become religious in an effort to support themselves during
these events. There are few studies that address the religion endogeneity problem in a
context different from studying the relationship between happiness and religion. For
instance, Gruber (2005) studies the relationship between religious participation and
various economic and social indicators, such as education, income, disability, mar-
riage, and divorce, and uses the ancestral density in a given region as an instrument
for religious density, which is the number of people in a given area who share the
same religious denomination with the respondent. This instrument predicts religious
density well: predicted religious density is strongly correlated with religious partici-
pation. Therefore, this instrument is valid for the estimation of the effects of religious
participation on economic outcomes. Recently Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010) also
employed a simultaneous equations approach to correct for endogeneity of religion in
studying the effect of religion on income. The potential endogeneity problem in the
relationship between happiness and religion has been discussed in recent studies, for
instance, by Dehejia et al. (2007), Clark and Lelkes (2009), but not yet addressed in
research.
2.3. Methodology
2.3.1. Features of Subjective Data
The analysis of previous research underlines several potential econometric problems
than should be taken into account while conducting this research. Some scholars
doubt the use of subjective data for analysis due to possible measurement errors and,
thus, biased estimates. Frey and Stutzer (2002a,b) suggest the following main criteria
for happiness data that should be used in research: reliability, validity, consistency,
and possibility of comparisons across nations. Reliability stands for stable correla-
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tion between different measurements of happiness. As shown by previous studies,
different measures of happiness (life satisfaction) are correlated well with each other
(Di Tella et al., 2003; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Konow and Earley, 2007).
Self-reported subjective well-being very closely approximates individuals’experienced
utility (Kahnemann, 1997). That is, happiness measures are valid because a person
is able to identify and compare his or her own happiness without errors. Consistency
in happiness implies that not only does a person judge him/herself as happy, but
social interactions confirm it. Happiness can be compared across nations (Di Tella
and MacCulloch, 2006). Previous research has shown that all the criteria are satisfied
for the self-reported data on happiness (for review and details, see Frey and Stutzer,
2002a,b).
Happiness and life satisfaction is usually assessed by these types of questions:
‘Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very
happy, or not at all happy?’; ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your
life as a whole these days on the ten-point scale: 1 = dissatisfied, and 10 = satisfied;
percent ‘satisfied’. Thus, true individual happiness is not observed; it is a latent
variable. Instead, we observe a discrete categorical variable which is measured on a
ranking scale. For such cases, ordered probit or ordered logit estimation techniques are
applied (Maddala, 1983). In the LiTS data used for this research, the question about
happiness is as follows: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following statement: All
things considered, I am satisfied with my life now, Strongly disagree = 1, Disagree=2,
Neither disagree nor agree =3, Agree=4, Strongly agree=5’.
The other concern is that happiness can not be compared across individuals be-
cause everyone judges his or her own happiness according to his or her own valuation
scale (for instance, 8 out of 10 points on a happiness scale for one individual may have
a different value for another individual). However, most happiness studies, including
this research, tend to investigate various determinants of happiness, but do not seek
to express the absolute value of individual happiness. Frey and Stutzer (2002b) point
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out that for such a purpose, self-reported data on individual happiness are suitable.5
Moreover, as described above, a growing body of literature suggests meaningful rela-
tionships between happiness and major individual and country level factors.
2.3.2. Model
In this research I am interested in the effects of reforms and religion on happiness and
perceptions of economic and political situations. The system of structural equations in
which happiness and religion are considered as latent variables is formulated similarly
to Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010). In contrast to Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010),
I include happiness, not income, as one of the endogenous variables. The resulting
system of structural equations expressed using the matrix notation (as in Kmenta,
1997) is
Byitc+Γxitc= uitc, (2.1)
where subscript i stands for individual, subscript t stands for time, and subscript c
stands for country. B is a G×G matrix of coeffi cients on endogenous variables; yitc
is a G × 1 vector of endogenous variables; Γ is a G × K matrix of coeffi cients on
exogenous variables; xitc is a K × 1 vector of exogenous variables; and uitc is a G× 1
vector of stochastic disturbances. A detailed representation of the system is included
in the Appendix. There are G = 11 endogenous variables and K = 34 exogenous
variables. The vector yitc includes happinessitc which is self-reported individual life
satisfaction; religioni which is self-reported individual religiousness; and 9 interaction
terms religioni × reformtc. The vector xitc includes 9 variables reformtc accounting
for aggregate shocks in transition, including large scale privatization, small scale pri-
vatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange
5Clark et al. (2008) question homogeneity in the effect of income on financial satisfaction. The
authors model intercept and slope heterogeneity in this relationship and suggest that marginal utility
of income is different across individuals. However, accounting for both intercept and slope hetero-
geneity and distinguishing between them is yet technically diffi cult in the analysis of the determinants
of happiness and is left for future research.
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system reform, competition policy reform, banking reform and interest rate liberaliza-
tion, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and overall infrastructure
reform; histreligc which is historical religious propensity in country c; 9 interaction
terms histreligc× reformtc; and observable individual socioeconomic characteristics,
such as age, gender, education, marital and employment status, etc.
True variable happiness∗itc is latent and its ordered alternatives are observed: with
low happiness∗itc a person is not satisfied with life; with happiness
∗
itc > µ1 a person
is more satisfied with life; with happiness∗itc > µ2 a person is even more satisfied with
life, and so on. Thresholds µj are increasing and unknown:
happinessitc = j if µj−1 < happiness
∗
itc ≤ µj; µ0 = −∞ and µm =∞, j = 1..J
(2.2)
The observed choice of being religious, religioni, is a discrete variable, while true
religiousness, religion∗i , is latent:
religioni =
{
1 if religion∗i > 0
0, otherwise
(2.3)
To study the direct effects of reforms and religion, I include variables reformtc
and religioni into the equation for happiness. The interaction terms between religioni
and reformtc are introduced to study indirect or insurance effects of religion and to
test whether religion insures individuals against aggregate shocks. This approach is
similar to the one suggested by Clark and Lelkes (2006) and Dehejia et al. (2007)
for studying the insurance effect of religion in the case of idiosyncratic shocks. If
the direct effect of a particular aggregate shock, i.e., the coeffi cient on reformtc, is
negative, then a positive sign on the respective interaction term implies an insurance
effect of religion; if the direct effect of the event is positive, then, symmetrically, the
sign on its interaction term with religion should be negative. Three specifications are
used to account for three different dependent variables: life satisfaction, perception
of current economic situation, and perception of current political situation.
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To receive the system of reduced form equations, I solve the structural form equa-
tions for the values of endogenous variables (Kmenta, 1997). The resulting system
is
yitc = Πxitc + νitc, (2.4)
where Π is a G×K matrix of reduced form coeffi cients and νitc is a G× 1 vector
of reduced form disturbances.
2.3.3. Estimation Strategy
The estimation of the happiness equation, which is the first one in the system of the
structural equation without controlling for the endogeneity of religioni and interac-
tion terms religioni∗reformtc, may result in biased and inconsistent estimators. The
main source of this potential bias is in simultaneity and unobserved individual het-
erogeneity. As found in previous literature, religiousness affects happiness. But there
is also a potential temporal effect of happiness on religiousness: unhappy people are
likely to become religious, especially during stressful life events. Thus, reverse causal-
ity has a negative impact and the estimates, without controlling for endogeneity, are
biased downwards. Some of the individual unobservable time constant characteristics
captured by the error term u1itc may also bias the estimators due to a correlation with
religioni and thus with interaction terms religioni ∗ reformtc. Intuitively, this cor-
relation may be positive (e.g., a more trustful person is likely to be religious) leading
to estimators being biased downwards. However, a variety of individual psychological
characteristics may affect both religiousness and happiness at the same time to differ-
ent degrees. These characteristics may also affect differently the propensity to belong
to a particular religious denomination. Therefore, the sign of correlation and thus
the direction of bias may be ambiguous. For example, it is hard to determine who
(pessimists or optimists, less sociable or more sociable persons) are likely to become
religious and whether or not these characteristics affect different religious denomina-
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tions differently.
The approach to the estimation of the model is as follows. First, the Hausman
(1978) endogeneity test is performed to check whether religioni and, thus, interaction
terms religioni ∗ reformtc are indeed endogenous. I separately estimate the "reduced
form" for religioni and every interaction term religioni ∗ reformtc by regressing
it on all exogenous variables, obtain the residuals, and then include the vector of
obtained residuals into the happiness equation and test for significance. I perform the
test for joint significance of residuals with the null hypothesis that religion and all
interaction terms with it are exogenous, and with the alternative hypothesis that at
least one suspected variable is endogenous. I also separately test the significance of
each residual term included in the structural equation. If the coeffi cients on residuals
are significant, then the null hypothesis of respective variable exogeneity is rejected.
To solve the problem of religioni endogeneity, an appropriate measure for re-
ligiousness that is not person specific is needed. As an instrument for individual
religiousness religioni, I propose historical religious propensity in a given country,
histreligc, which is the number of people of a given religion in a given country at
the beginning of the 20th century. As IVs for the interaction terms I use the in-
teraction terms of the mentioned IV for religioni and the variables reformtc, i.e.,
histreligc ∗ reformtc. A valid instrument should be correlated with personal reli-
giousness, i.e., cov(religioni, histreligc) 6= 0, but not correlated with unobservable
happiness characteristics, i.e., cov(histreligc, u1itc) = 0.
The historical religious propensity is likely to be correctly excluded from the hap-
piness equation. According to the psychological study by Lyubomirsky et al. (2005),
personal happiness depends on genetics, individual activities and life circumstances,
including current demographic and environmental factors, life status and personal life
history. Thus, current happiness is not altered by historical environmental charac-
teristics, such as historical religious propensity in our case. Historical presence of
religious people in a region is also unlikely to be correlated with unobservable current
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individual happiness characteristics.6 Since it is not possible to test for IV validity in
an exactly identified case (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), I assume that chosen
IVs are valid by construction. Tomka (1994) and Need and Evans (2001) point out
that personal religiousness in post-communist countries was suppressed by commu-
nism to a lesser extent than the functioning of religious institutions. Thus, historical
and current religious propensity are likely to be correlated and the instruments are
not weak.7 To insure that instrumental variables are chosen correctly, I also check
that partial correlations of chosen instruments and endogenous variables are non-zero
and perform the first stage F-test for weak IV as proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005).
Given that proposed instruments are not weak and valid, it the first stage I esti-
mate the system of reduced form equations to get the predicted value of religioni ,
∧
religioni and the predicted values for each of the 9 interaction terms
∧
religioni ∗ reformtc.
In the second stage, I use
∧
religioni and all the
∧
religioni ∗ reformtc to estimate the
structural form of happiness equation by ordered logit (as described by, e.g., Cameron





religioni ∗ reformtc instead of religioni and religioni ∗ reformtc.
In a cross-country analysis, the variance of the error term is never the same across
different countries due to the different effects of explanatory variables, i.e., the ho-
moskedasticity assumption fails (Wooldridge, 2002). To account for this, I use het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors. Standard errors are also clustered by region to
account for possible similarities in the characteristics of people living in the same re-
gion. This results in 60 clusters according to the number of regions in the data which
6It could be expected that the repression of religion under communism or transfers of people from
religious to non-religious regions made formerly religious regions less happy. In this case the fall of
communism could potentially bring extra happiness to formerly religious regions. Thus, historical
religious propensity may not be correctly excluded from equation (1) in this case or be endogenous
as is personal religiousness. However, as pointed out by Easterlin (2009), all transition countries
experienced a similar decline in happiness after the fall of communism. Therefore, the potential
depressive effect of communism on happiness in formerly religious regions and happiness recovery
after the fall of communism may be neglected.
7As Putnam (1993) shows, trust across Italian regions today is perfectly explained by trust cen-
turies ago. This argument may also explain the correlation between current and historical religious
propensity since the propensity to trust and the propensity to be religious are likely to be related to
each other.
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is large enough (more than 50) to have no inference problem (Donald and Lang, 2007).
First, all the models are estimated without interaction terms, then interaction
terms are added. It should be noted, however, that dropping interaction terms out of
the model could result in biased and inconsistent estimators due to misspecification.
Also, the model without interaction terms has a different interpretation of coeffi cients
on the main effects (Ozer-Balli and Sorensen, 2010). To check the robustness of
the results to the choice of estimation method, I redefine the dependent variable
into a zero/one (all dissatisfied/all satisfied) scale and estimate the linear probability
model (LPM) with the same IVs. In a correctly specified LPM with interaction
terms, the coeffi cients on the main effects of reforms are the partial derivatives of the
respective variable evaluated when religion is equal to zero, while in a model without
the interaction terms the partial derivatives are evaluated when religion is equal to
its mean.
2.4. Data
The main dataset used in this research is the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS). It was
jointly conducted in 2006 by the EBRD and World Bank and covers all 29 transition
countries.9 The survey is based on nationally representative samples with 1000 re-
spondents selected randomly from each transition country and contains information
on attitudes, values and socioeconomic characteristics of respondents. A further ad-
vantage of this survey is the possibility to treat it as a panel because the information
is collected in such a way that individuals are asked about their past experiences and
attitudes, about their lives before, throughout, and after the transition. The survey
initially contains 29000 observations. I exclude Tajikistan from research since the
sample for Tajikistan in LiTS contains 70 percent of Christians, which is not consis-
9In line with general classification the transition countries are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedo-
nia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia,
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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tent with the WCD data, which shos that the major denomination in Tajikistan is
Muslim. I also exclude Turkey from the initial sample due to the unavailability of
EBRD transition indicators for this country. Finally, I exclude observations where
a respondent refused to answer the question or where values for major variables are
missing (mainly, for the variables that serve as dependent in my specifications). Fi-
nally, the sample used in this study is made up of approximately 19 to 27 thousand
observations, depending on specification and dependent variable used.
The data on historical IV for religion are from the World Christian Database
(WCD), which provides statistical information on all world religions. Particularly,
the variables of interest are the number of adherents of a given religion in a given
country in the year 1900, and the adherents of a given religion in a given country
in 1900 as a per cent of total population. The data are collected on the basis of
church statistics, government censuses, United Nations statistics, and the estimates
of informed experts and published by Brill, Netherlands.
I also use the EBRD transition indicators as the data on reforms (aggregate shocks)
in transition countries. The EBRD transition indicators have the range from 1 to
4.3 (4+) where a higher index reflects greater progress in the corresponding area
of reforms, including large scale privatization, small scale privatization, enterprise
restructuring, price liberalization, reforms of trade and foreign exchange system, a
reform of competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, reforms
of securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and overall infrastructure
reform.
All the summary statistics for the data and detailed description of variables used
for analysis are presented in Tables 2-4. Table 2 describes all the variables used for the
estimation. Dependent variables are life satisfaction, perception of economic situation
and perception of political situation. Explanatory variables are a respondent’s religion
(or its IV, the number of people of a given religion in a given country in 1900), EBRD
transition indicators, a respondent’s age and age squared divided by 100, gender,
variables for education, number of children, variables accounting for idiosyncratic
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shocks (adopted children, marriage and divorce during the transition period 1990-
2006), household size, household consumption expenditures, and employment status.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the data. Table 4 gives the distribution of
answers for the dependent variables. For all dependent variables more than 7 percent
of respondents answer that they are strongly satisfied with life or the economic and
political situation in their country, 27 to 36 percent are satisfied, 15 to 23 percent are
neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, 21 to 29 percent are not satisfied, 10 to 20 percent
are not satisfied at all. In the case when dependent variables are redefined into a
zero/one scale, 41 to 57 percent are satisfied.
2.5. Results and Discussion
This section discusses the direct and indirect effects of religion and reforms on life
satisfaction, perceptions of the economic and political situation, and the robustness
check of obtained results. The main results for all three specifications are presented
in Tables 5 to 10. Table 5 presents estimation results when life satisfaction has been
used as a dependent variable. Tables 6 and 7 present the results for perceptions of
the current economic and political situation as dependent variables, respectively. For
each specification I present the estimation results of ordered logit without instruments
for religion and interaction terms and ordered logit with instruments to account for
endogeneity of religion and interaction terms. As the robustness check, Tables 8 to
10 include the results of three specifications estimated by a linear probability model
with and without IVs.
Since the results of endogeneity tests (see Table A1 in the Appendix) reject the
exogeneity hypothesis of religion and interaction terms in all three specifications,
ordered logit estimation without instruments produces biased and inconsistent results
due to the endogeneity problem. Notably, the results of joint endogeneity tests hold for
both ordered logit and LPM. For this reason I do not discuss in detail the estimation
results without instruments. According to the results of the first stage F-test, the
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proposed instruments are also not weak (see Table A2 in the Appendix). Thus, the
results of the ordered logit and LPM with instruments are unbiased and consistent.
In Tables A3 to A5 in the Appendix, the changes in predicted probabilities of
different replies to questions about life satisfaction and perceptions of economic and
political situations for different values of religiousness are presented.
The positive coeffi cient’s estimates in the ordered logit imply that with an in-
crease in the respective regressor, the probability of the lowest category ("strongly
disagree") decreases and the probability of the highest category ("strongly agree")
increases. The signs of the ordered logit coeffi cient’s estimates are inconclusive re-
garding the effects of regressors on the predicted probabilities of middle categories
(Greene, 2003; Hayo, 2007). To understand the effects of the explanatory variables on
the predicted probabilities of middle categories, I also compute the marginal effects
of the explanatory variables. The marginal effects for the ordered logit without con-
trolling for endogeneity of religion and interaction terms are presented in Tables A6a
to A8a in the Appendix. The marginal effects for the ordered logit with the use of
instruments to control for endogeneity of religion and interaction terms are presented
in Tables A6b to A8b in the Appendix.
2.5.1. Religion, Reforms and Life Satisfaction: Direct Effects
The estimation of the model without interaction terms produces biased and incon-
sistent estimators due to the misspecification of model. Particularly, in all the spec-
ifications without interaction terms, the coeffi cient on religion is significantly biased
downwards and the effect of religion on life satisfaction and perceptions of the eco-
nomic and political situation is negative. As shown in Tables 5 to 7, while controlling
for endogeneity of religion and interaction terms, the effect of religion is positive in
all three specifications: life satisfaction, and perceptions of economic and political
situations. As described above, a positive effect of religion on life satisfaction has
been found in previous literature, but without controlling for endogeneity (see Elli-
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son, 1991; Clark and Lelkes, 2006 and 2009; Lelkes, 2006, among others). Higher
religiousness increases the predicted probabilities of being satisfied and strongly sat-
isfied (see Tables A3 to A5 in the Appendix). As such, a hypothetical move from 0 to
100 percent religious increases the probability of being satisfied and strongly satisfied,
on average, by 3 and 2 percentage points, respectively. This result is even stronger for
perceptions of the political situation: higher religiousness implies about a 6 percent
increase in satisfaction with the political situation. The increase in religiousness by
1 standard deviation increases the probability of being strongly satisfied with life by
8.9% and satisfied with life by 25.1%. The marginal effects of religion in other speci-
fications are less than in the case of life satisfaction, but still sound: 7.7% and 21.8%
for perceptions of the economic situation and 5.3% and 14.6% for perceptions of the
political situation (see Tables A6b to A8b in the Appendix).
Previous literature suggests negative effects of some macroeconomic variables (e.g.,
unemployment, income inequality or inflation) on happiness (see Clark and Oswald,
1994; Di Tella et al., 2001, among others). The effects of economic reforms on life
satisfaction have not been yet investigated in previous studies. Since transition period
reforms affected various dimensions of economic, political and social life in transition
countries and life satisfaction is affected by macroeconomic instabilities, I expect that
reforms in transition countries are likely to affect life satisfaction too. Such expectation
is also in line with the data and arguments of previous research (for instance, Sanfey
and Teksoz, 2005; Lelkes, 2006, Easterlin, 2009) that in the transition period life
satisfaction decreased.
As the results of this study indicate, while life satisfaction and perceptions of
economic and political situations are negatively affected by large scale privatization
and positively by price liberalization (the effect of price liberalization is not significant
in the case of life satisfaction), other reforms differ in their effects on life satisfaction
and perceptions of economic and political situations. Life satisfaction is negatively
affected by competition policy reform and infrastructure reform and positively by
small scale privatization, governance reform and enterprise restructuring. Perceptions
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of the economic situation are negatively affected by small scale privatization and
positively by trade and foreign exchange system reform, competition policy reform
and infrastructure reform. Perceptions of the political situation are negatively affected
by trade and foreign exchange system reform and the results are not significant for
the remaining reforms.
Consistently with most findings in happiness literature, I find that life satisfac-
tion has an U-shape in age; life satisfaction increases with the degree of education;
household size positively affects life satisfaction; divorce decreases life satisfaction
and marriage increases it (this result is not significant for perceptions of the economic
and political situation); and the unemployed are less satisfied than those who are
employed.
2.5.2. Religion, Reforms and Life Satisfaction: Interaction
Effects
As highlighted above, some reforms may have negative effects on life satisfaction and
perceptions of economic and political situations and others may have positive effects.
As expected, most interaction effects are positive if the direct effect of reform is nega-
tive, and negative if the direct effect of reform is positive. It implies that religion can
insure life satisfaction against negative effects of large scale privatization, competition
policy reform and overall infrastructure reform. Perceptions of economic and political
situations can be insured against the negative effect of small scale privatization.
However, the effect holds in opposite direction as well. In the case of life sat-
isfaction, the interaction effects of small scale privatization, governance reform and
enterprise restructuring are negative, while the direct effects of these reforms are
positive. In the case of perceptions of the economic situation, significant negative in-
teraction effects are found for trade and foreign exchange system reform, competition
policy reform, and overall infrastructure reform. In the case of perceptions of the
political situation, significant negative interaction effects are found for price liberal-
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ization and competition policy reform. For other reforms, the sign of the interaction
term is typically opposite the sign of the direct effect but is not significant.
Thus, the main finding of this paper is that religion indeed insures against some
aggregate shocks: religious people experience lesser decreases in life satisfaction and
perceptions than those who are not religious people. The effect holds in the opposite
direction as well. If the main effect of reform is positive, the life satisfaction and
perceptions of religious persons tend to benefit less than non-religious. Therefore,
when aggregate shocks occur, religion generally tends to reduce the vulnerability of
life satisfaction and perceptions.
2.5.3. Robustness Check
To demonstrate that the results are not driven by the choice of estimation method,
I also present the results obtained by using the linear probability model. Redefining
the dependent variables into a zero/one scale (all dissatisfied/all satisfied) reduces the
variation in life satisfaction and perceptions of economic and political situations, but
allows the robustness of results obtained by using ordered logit to be checked. The
coeffi cients of the linear probability model are comparable to the joint marginal effects
obtained by using ordered logit for the categories. However, given the aggregation
of the dependent variable, one would expect noisier and lower coeffi cient estimates
obtained by using the linear probability model in comparison to ordered logit.
As shown in Tables 8 to 10, the results obtained by using the linear probability
model are in fact less significant than in the case of ordered logit, especially in the
specifications for perceptions of economic and political situations. The magnitude of
coeffi cient estimates from the LPM for most variables is lower than the marginal effects
of explanatory variables on the probabilities of being satisfied and strongly satisfied
when summed up. In the case when instrumental variables are used, the size of this
difference between LPM and ordered logit is typically comparable with the marginal
effect on the middle category "neither disagree, nor agree". The observations on this
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category are excluded when a dependent variable for LPM is constructed (see Tables
A6b to A8b in the Appendix). Thus, the magnitudes of the effects of explanatory
variables on dependent variables are robust to the estimation method used.
As the results indicate, in all three specifications the signs of estimated coeffi cients
obtained by using the linear probability model are the same as the signs of marginal
effects obtained by using ordered logit for the categories "agree" and "strongly agree"
with a few exceptions, where, nonetheless, the coeffi cients are not significant in either
methods. Thus, the insurance effect of religion against aggregate shocks to life sat-
isfaction and perceptions of economic and political situations is also found when the
linear probability model is used.
2.5.4. Effects of Controlling for Endogeneity
The estimation of the model without controlling for endogeneity of religion and in-
teraction terms produces biased and inconsistent estimators. As shown in Tables 5
and 8, the estimation of ordered logit and LPM without controlling for endogene-
ity produces the estimate of the coeffi cient on religion which is, as expected, biased
downwards in the specification for life satisfaction. Also, in the specifications for
perceptions of economic and political situations, marginal effects of religion become
greater after controlling for endogeneity. Thus, without controlling for endogeneity,
the estimate of the coeffi cient on religion is biased downwards. It implies that the
source of endogeneity may not solely be in the time constant unobservables that may
affect both happiness and religiousness, as described above, but also in simultaneity
between happiness and religion. There may also be a temporal reaction: unhappy
people are more likely to become religious during stressful life events. Thus, when en-
dogeneity is not controlled for (in both ordered logit and LPM), this negative reverse
causality between happiness and religiousness biases the coeffi cients downwards.
The interaction coeffi cients in all specifications also change after controlling for
endogeneity. For most interaction terms, the absolute value of coeffi cients increases
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in all specifications in both ordered logit and LPM. Thus, controlling for endogeneity
makes the insurance effects stronger. This is an expected change since direct effects
of religion also increase.
Controlling for endogeneity of religion and interaction terms changes the estimated
coeffi cients in LPM and marginal effects in ordered logit in the same direction, though
the size of the change for some variables is less when LPM is used. This difference
may again be because of the aggregation of the dependent variable.
2.6. Conclusion
Religiousness insures happiness against individual stressful life events and, therefore,
religious people are likely to adapt more easily to idiosyncratic shocks and to feel
happier in periods of change (Clark and Lelkes, 2006; Lelkes, 2006; Dehejia et al.,
2007). This paper accounts for the endogeneity of religion in the happiness equation
and considers major economic reforms in transition countries as aggregate shocks to
happiness. As underlined in the paper, the insurance effect of religion found in pre-
vious literature for idiosyncratic shocks is also applicable to overcoming the effects of
aggregate shocks. I argue that religion may also help to insure against negative aggre-
gate shocks to life satisfaction and perceptions of economic and political situations.
Religion also helps to reduce the vulnerability of life satisfaction and perceptions in
the case of positive shocks. This result is robust to the choice of estimation method
and holds in all three specifications in the paper.
As this paper argues, individuals in more religious countries are likely to be gen-
erally more satisfied with life, and with the economic and political situation. Higher
religiousness is associated with a strong increase in the probability of being satisfied
or strongly satisfied: an increase in religiousness by 1 standard deviation increases
the probability of being strongly satisfied with life by 8.9% and satisfied with life by
25.1%. In a hypothetical case, in which the entire population of a country shifts from 0
to 100 percent religious, the share of satisfied and strongly satisfied individuals would
74
increase, on average, by 3 and 2 percentage points, respectively. Thus, the happiness
ranking of countries in which more people are religious is likely to be higher.
A decrease in happiness observed in transition countries over the transition period
may be due to the negative effects of reforms, e.g., large scale privatization and overall
infrastructure reform. Because of the insurance effect of religion found in this paper,
life satisfaction and perceptions of economic and political situations in transition
countries with higher shares of religious people are likely to be less vulnerable as a
result of reforms. This may also imply that reforms in more religious countries have
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Table 1: World Happiness
Country Very Happy (%) Satisfied (%) Country Very Happy (%) Satisfied (%)
Denmark 44.9 90.8 Japan 27.8 51.4
Finland 24.1 88.3 Peru 30.8 49.8
Colombia 47.1 88.1 Republic of Korea 9.6 46.3
Iceland 46.6 86.7 Poland 17.4 45.6
Puerto Rico 53.3 85.2 Viet Nam 48.6 44.1
Switzerland 39.9 84.8 Egypt 18.1 43.4
Netherlands 45.9 84.2 Portugal 18.0 43.4
Northern Ireland 46.1 84.0 Algeria 16.1 43.3
Sweden 36.6 82.1 South Africa 38.5 42.0
Austria 35.4 81.7 Hungary 16.7 41.8
Canada 44.0 80.7 Slovakia 8.0 41.7
Belgium 42.4 80.4 Estonia 6.5 41.6
Germany West 18.9 79.6 Turkey 34.5 40.6
Ireland 42.0 79.0 Romania 3.6 40.2
Luxembourg 35.4 78.9 Montenegro 8.1 39.7
United States 39.0 78.7 Serbia 12.0 39.4
Norway 30.0 78.4 Morocco 30.8 38.4
Germany East 20.3 78.0 Bosnia and Herzegovina 21.7 37.9
Mexico 56.5 77.7 Jordan 12.8 37.0
Australia 42.9 76.9 Uganda 26.2 35.9
New Zealand 33.3 75.9 Latvia 6.6 34.8
Great Britain 32.5 75.7 Bangladesh 14.8 31.9
Spain 20.1 74.7 Azerbaijzan 11.3 31.2
Italy 18.2 74.6 Iraq 13.2 30.9
Malta 31.1 72.5 Lithuania 3.8 30.9
Singapore 28.7 70.6 Macedonia 19.1 30.7
Venezuela 56.8 69.9 Armenia 6.3 28.5
Slovenia 15.2 68.7 Russian Federation 6.0 28.0
Argentina 33.0 68.4 Georgia 11.7 24.6
France 31.3 65.1 Ukraine 5.8 23.7
Israel 27.2 65.0 Belarus 4.9 23.4
Saudi Arabia 44.3 64.5 Tanzania 56.2 20.6
Nigeria 66.8 63.7 Moldova 6.0 18.5
Chile 36.0 62.6 Zimbabwe 19.9 18.0
Brazil 22.0 62.5 Bulgaria 7.8 16.8
Greece 18.2 62.3 Pakistan 19.6 8.3
Indonesia 20.4 60.9 Albania 9.7 n/a







Sources: World Values Survey (2005), World Database of
Happiness (2005). Notes: Countries are ranked according
to the percentage of those satisfied with life. Transition
countries are shaded. Happiness measure: ‘Taking all
things together, would you say you are very happy, quite
happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?’ Life
satisfaction measure: ‘All things considered, how satisfied
are you with your life as a whole these days?’ Ten-point
scale: 1 = dissatisfied, and 10 = satisfied; percent
‘satisfied’-scores 7-10. 
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Table 2: Variables Description
Variable Detailed Description
Life Satisfaction
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: All things considered, I am
satisfied with my life now, Strongly disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither disagree nor agree
=3, Agree=4, Strongly agree=5. Source: LiTS
Perception of Current Economic Situation
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The economic situation in this
country is better today than around 1989, Strongly disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither
disagree nor agree =3, Agree=4, Strongly agree=5. Source: LiTS
Perception of Current Political Situation
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: The political situation in this
country is better today than around 1989, Strongly disagree = 1, Disagree=2, Neither
disagree nor agree =3, Agree=4, Strongly agree=5. Sourse: LiTS
Life Satisfaction, redefined into 0/1
Dummy variable =1 if the respondent answered Agree=4, Strongly agree=5 on the
question about life satisfaction, and 0 if the answer was Strongly disagree = 1,
Disagree=2. Observations with the answer Neither disagree nor agree=3 are dropped.
Source: author’s calculations
Perception of Current Economic Situation,
redefined into 0/1
Dummy variable =1 if the respondent answered Agree=4, Strongly agree=5 on the
question about the perception of current economic situation, and 0 if the answer was
Strongly disagree = 1, Disagree=2. Observations with the answer Neither disagree nor
agree=3 are dropped. Source: author’s calculations
Perception of Current Political Situation,
redefined into 0/1
Dummy variable =1 if the respondent answered Agree=4, Strongly agree=5 on the
question about the perception of current political situation, and 0 if the answer was
Strongly disagree = 1, Disagree=2. Observations with the answer Neither disagree nor
agree=3 are dropped. Source: author’s calculations
Ln (Number of people of given religion in
a given country in 1900)
Data based on church statistics, government censuses, United Nations statistics, and
estimates of informed experts. Source: WCD, author’s calculations.
Religion
Dummy variable =1 if the respondent answered Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, Muslim,
Other to the question ”What is your religion?”, and 0 if the answer was
Atheistic/Agnostic/None. Source: LiTS, author’s calculations
Age Age of respondent. Source: LiTS
Age Squared/100 Source: LiTS, author’s calculations
Male Dummy for the gender of respondent: Male 1, Female 0. Source: LiTS
Basic School
Dummy variable =1 if the highest degree that respondent obtained is basic education,
and 0, otherwise. Source: LiTS
Secondary School
Dummy variable =1 if the highest degree that respondent obtained is secondary
education, and 0, otherwise. Source: LiTS
Vocational/Professional School
Dummy variable =1 if the highest degree that respondent obtained is professional,
vocational school/training, and 0, otherwise. Source: LiTS
Higher Degree (University, College)
Dummy variable =1 if the highest degree that respondent obtained is higher professional
degree (university, college), and 0, otherwise. Source: LiTS
Postgraduate Degree
Dummy variable =1 if the highest degree that respondent obtained is postgraduate
degree, and 0, otherwise. Source: LiTS
Children Number of children less than 14 years old. Source: LiTS
Children Born/Adopted 1990-2006
Dummy variable =1 if respondent had a child (birth or adoption) during 1990-2006, and
0, otherwise. Source: LiTS, author’s calculations
Married 1990-2006
Dummy variable=1 if respondent got married (lived in a couple) during 1990-2006, and 0,
otherwise. Source: LiTS, author’s calculations
Divorced 1990-2006
Dummy variable = 1 if respondent divorced during 1990-2006, and 0, otherwise. Source:
LiTS, author’s calculations
Household Size Source: LiTS
Household Consumption Expenditures
Equalized Using the Modified OECD
Scales
Household consumption per month in USD. OECD-modified scales assign to each
household a value in proportion to needs of every member: a value of 1 to the household
head, of 0.5 to each additional adult member and of 0.3 to each child. Source: LiTS
Employment
Dummy variable =1 if respondent worked at least one hour during last 7 days, and 0,
otherwise. Source: LiTS
Change in corresponding EBRD transition index calculated as a difference between index
score in 2006 and index score in 1989 for each transition country. EBRD transition
indices have the range from 1 to 4.3 (4+) where the higher the index reflects higher
progress in corresponding area of reforms (large scale privatization, small scale
privatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange
system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities
markets and non-bank financial institutions, overall infrastructure reform). Source: EBRD
transition indicators, author’s calculations
Large, Small Scale Privatization,
Enterprise Restructuring, Price
Liberalization, Trade and Foreign
Exchange System, Competition Policy,
Banking Reform and Interest Rate
Liberalization, Securities Market and Non-
Bank Financial Institutions, Overall
Infrastructure Reform
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Life Satisfaction 27381 3.101 1.148 1 5
Perception of Current Economic Situation 25136 2.737 1.268 1 5
Perception of Current Political Situation 24312 2.811 1.227 1 5
Life Satisfaction, redefined into 0/1 20995 0.579 0.494 0 1
Perception of Current Economic Situation, redefined into 0/1 21187 0.416 0.493 0 1
Perception of Current Political Situation, redefined into 0/1 19157 0.445 0.497 0 1
Religion 27392 0.898 0.302 0 1
Ln (Number of people of given religion in a given country in 1900) 26403 14.018 2.209 3.912 17.9353
Large Scale Privatization 27392 2.179 0.786 0 3.000
Small Scale Privatization 27392 2.406 1.026 0 3.330
Governance and Enterprise Restructuring 27392 1.469 0.723 0 2.670
Price Liberalization 27392 2.510 0.957 0 3.330
Trade and Foreign Exchange System 27392 2.629 0.892 0 3.330
Competition Policy 27392 1.349 0.676 0 2.670
Banking Reform and Interest Rate Liberalization 27392 1.994 0.734 0 3.000
Securities Markets and Non-Bank Financial Institutions 27392 1.458 0.727 0 3.000
Overall Infrastructure Reform 27392 1.504 0.640 0 2.340
Age 27390 46.906 17.720 17 97
Age Squared/100 27390 25.142 17.655 2.890 94.090
Male 27392 0.416 0.493 0 1
Basic School 27392 0.185 0.389 0 1
Secondary School 27392 0.264 0.441 0 1
Vocational/Professional School 27392 0.304 0.460 0 1
Higher Professional Degree (University, College) 27392 0.184 0.387 0 1
Postgraduate Degree 27392 0.009 0.092 0 1
Number of children 27392 0.513 0.912 0 9
Children Born/Adopted between 1990-2006 27392 0.310 0.462 0 1
Married between 1990-2006 27392 0.246 0.431 0 1
Divorced between 1990-2006 27392 0.046 0.210 0 1
Household Size 27392 1.987 0.775 1 6.5
Household Consumption Expenditures Equalized Using the Modified OECD Scales 27329 7.529 0.894 0.9808 10.2519
Employment 27392 0.484 0.500 0 1
Source: LiTS, EBRD transition indicators, WCD, author’s calculations. Notes: LiTS database initially contains
29000 observations from 29 countries. Observations with missing or uncertain answers to the questions about Life
Satisfaction, Perception of Current Economic Situation, and Perception of Current Political Situation were removed
from the database. Observations for Tajikistan were removed from the database due to inconsistency in religion data
with WCD. Observations for Turkey were removed from the database due to absence of EBRD transition indicators.
The number of observations slightly differs for different variables due to missing values.
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Table 4: Distribution of answers for dependent variables
Answer Frequency (obs.) Percent Cumulative
(1) Strongly disagree 2836 10.36 10.36
(2) Disagree 6003 21.92 32.28
(3) Neither disagree nor agree 6386 23.32 55.60
(4) Agree 9876 36.07 91.67
(5) Strongly agree 2280 8.33 100
Total 27381 100
(0) Strongly disagree and Disagree 8839 42.10 42.10
(1) Agree and Strongly agree 12156 57.90 100
Total 20995 100
(1) Strongly disagree 5032 20.02 20.02
(2) Disagree 7335 29.18 49.20
(3) Neither disagree nor agree 3949 15.71 64.91
(4) Agree 6863 27.30 92.21
(5) Strongly agree 1957 7.79 100
Total 25136 100
(0) Strongly disagree and Disagree 12367 58.37 58.37
(1) Agree and Strongly agree 8820 41.63 100
Total 21187 100
(1) Strongly disagree 4310 17.73 17.73
(2) Disagree 6314 25.97 43.70
(3) Neither disagree nor agree 5155 21.20 64.90
(4) Agree 6736 27.71 92.61
(5) Strongly agree 1797 7.39 100
Total 24312 100
(0) Strongly disagree and Disagree 10624 55.46 55.46
(1) Agree and Strongly agree 8533 44.54 100
Total 19157 100
Life Satisfaction
Perception of Current Economic Situation
Perception of Current Political Situation
Life Satisfaction, redefined
Perception of Current Economic Situation, redefined
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
The economic situation in this country is better today than around 1989
Perception of Current Political Situation, redefined
To what extent do you agree with the following statement:
The political situation in this country is better today than around 1989
84
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Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Estimated coeffi cients are reported in columns. In columns [2] and [3] no
instruments are used; in column [4] religion is instrumented; in column [5] religion and all interaction terms are
instrumented. The natural logarithm of the number of people of a given religious domination in a given country in
1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV for religion are used as IVs for
interaction terms. Robust standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses; for ordered logit with IV, standard
errors are bootstrapped. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Estimated coeffi cients are reported in columns. In columns [2] and [3] no
instruments are used; in column [4] religion is instrumented; in column [5] religion and all interaction terms are
instrumented. The natural logarithm of the number of people of a given religious domination in a given country in
1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV for religion are used as IVs for
interaction terms. Robust standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses; for ordered logit with IV, standard
errors are bootstrapped. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Estimated coeffi cients are reported in columns. In columns [2] and [3] no
instruments are used; in column [4] religion is instrumented; in column [5] religion and all interaction terms are
instrumented. The natural logarithm of the number of people of a given religious domination in a given country in
1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV for religion are used as IVs for
interaction terms. Robust standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses; for ordered logit with IV, standard
errors are bootstrapped. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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-
Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Life satisfaction redefined into zero (all dissatisfied)/one (all satisfied) scale is
used as dependent variable. The natural logarithm of the number of people of a given religious domination in a given
country in 1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV for religion are used as
IVs for interaction terms. Robust standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses; *,**, and *** stand for 10,
5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Perception of economic situation redefined into zero (all dissatisfied)/one (all
satisfied) scale is used as dependent variable. The natural logarithm of the number of people of a given religious
domination in a given country in 1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV
for religion are used as IVs for interaction terms. Robust standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses; *,**,
and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Perception of political situation redefined into zero (all dissatisfied)/one (all
satisfied) scale is used as dependent variable. The natural logarithm of the number of people of a given religious
domination in a given country in 1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV
for religion are used as IVs for interaction terms. Robust standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses; *,**,
and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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2.A.3. Supplementary Tables














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Regressions contain the whole set of explanatory variables. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered by region are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels,
respectively. Residuals are obtained from separate OLS regressions of each respective variable on the whole set of
explanatory variables. Residuals for religion and interaction terms with religion are jointly significant for all three
model specifications for both ordered logit and LPM; therefore, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected.
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Table A2: Testing for Weak IV
First Stage Dependent Variable
First Stage F-statistics 
for Joint Significance of 
Instruments




Religion 2458.29*** (0.000) 0.554
Religion*Large Scale Privatization 2380.81*** (0.000) 0.732
Religion*Small Scale Privatization 2230.73*** (0.000) 0.769
Religion*Governance and Enterprise Restructuring 2569.69*** (0.000) 0.797
Religion*Price Liberalization 2211.39*** (0.000) 0.732
Religion*Trade and Foreign Exchange system 2283.63*** (0.000) 0.706
Religion*Competition Policy 2644.81*** (0.000) 0.818
Religion*Banking Reform and Interest Rate Liberalization 2433.43*** (0.000) 0.720
Religion*Securities Markets and Non-Bank Financial Institutions 2368.71*** (0.000) 0.790
Religion*Overall Infrastructure Reform 2308.03*** (0.000) 0.739
Source: author’s calculations. Notes: each first stage regression contains the whole set of instrumental variables
(one for religion and 9 for interaction terms with religion) and explanatory variables. The natural logarithm of the
number of people of a given religious domination in a given country in 1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions
of respective variables with the IV for religion are used as IVs for interaction terms. P-values are in parentheses. *,**,
and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Weak Instrument Test proposed by Stock and
Yogo (2005) has been used. First stage F-statistics are significant for all 10 first stages; therefore, the null hypothesis
of the weak IV is rejected. Partial correlations also suggest a nonzero correlation between the proposed instrument
and respective endogenous variable.
Table A3: Life Satisfaction, Predicted Probabilities of Giving Different Replies
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.090 0.005 0.081 0.100
Pr(disagree) 0.220 0.007 0.208 0.233
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.254 0.005 0.243 0.265
Pr(agree) 0.366 0.009 0.349 0.384
Pr(strongly agree) 0.070 0.002 0.066 0.075
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.101 0.014 0.075 0.132
Pr(disagree) 0.235 0.021 0.195 0.278
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.256 0.007 0.238 0.269
Pr(agree) 0.345 0.029 0.286 0.401
Pr(strongly agree) 0.064 0.011 0.044 0.087
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.081 0.007 0.068 0.095
Pr(disagree) 0.205 0.011 0.183 0.227
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.249 0.005 0.240 0.259
Pr(agree) 0.387 0.015 0.358 0.416
Pr(strongly agree) 0.078 0.004 0.070 0.087
Religion and All Other Variables at Mean
Religion at Min, All Other Variables at Mean
Religion at Max, All Other Variables at Mean
Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Simulations are performed using CLARIFY software. First, the model is
estimated by ordered logit, controlling for endogeneity and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients are drawn. Predicted
probabilities of different replies are calculated based on the sets of simulated coeffi cients and different values of religion
and means of other explanatory variables.
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Table A4: Perceptions of Economic Situation,
Predicted Probabilities of Giving Different Replies
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.174 0.008 0.157 0.190
Pr(disagree) 0.321 0.007 0.307 0.334
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.177 0.005 0.167 0.188
Pr(agree) 0.267 0.008 0.251 0.283
Pr(strongly agree) 0.061 0.003 0.057 0.066
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.184 0.029 0.135 0.249
Pr(disagree) 0.325 0.022 0.280 0.365
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.174 0.007 0.158 0.184
Pr(agree) 0.258 0.034 0.189 0.324
Pr(strongly agree) 0.059 0.012 0.039 0.085
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.158 0.010 0.138 0.179
Pr(disagree) 0.307 0.008 0.293 0.322
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.180 0.006 0.168 0.191
Pr(agree) 0.286 0.010 0.269 0.306
Pr(strongly agree) 0.068 0.004 0.061 0.077
Religion at Min, All Other Variables at Mean
Religion at Max, All Other Variables at Mean
Religion and All Other Variables at Mean
Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Simulations are performed using CLARIFY software. First, the model is
estimated by ordered logit, controlling for endogeneity and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients are drawn. Predicted
probabilities of different replies are calculated based on the sets of simulated coeffi cients and different values of religion
and means of other explanatory variables.
Table A5: Perceptions of Political Situation,
Predicted Probabilities of Giving Different Replies
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval]
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.174 0.008 0.157 0.190
Pr(disagree) 0.321 0.007 0.307 0.334
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.177 0.005 0.167 0.188
Pr(agree) 0.267 0.008 0.251 0.283
Pr(strongly agree) 0.061 0.003 0.057 0.066
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.184 0.029 0.135 0.249
Pr(disagree) 0.325 0.022 0.280 0.365
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.174 0.007 0.158 0.184
Pr(agree) 0.258 0.034 0.189 0.324
Pr(strongly agree) 0.059 0.012 0.039 0.085
Pr(strongly disagree) 0.158 0.010 0.138 0.179
Pr(disagree) 0.307 0.008 0.293 0.322
Pr(neither disagree nor agree) 0.180 0.006 0.168 0.191
Pr(agree) 0.286 0.010 0.269 0.306
Pr(strongly agree) 0.068 0.004 0.061 0.077
Religion at Min, All Other Variables at Mean
Religion at Max, All Other Variables at Mean
Religion and All Other Variables at Mean
Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Simulations are performed using CLARIFY software. First, the model is
estimated by ordered logit, controlling for endogeneity and 1000 sets of simulated coeffi cients are drawn. Predicted
probabilities of different replies are calculated based on the sets of simulated coeffi cients and different values of religion
and means of other explanatory variables.
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Table A6a: Marginal Effects of Ordered Logit Model













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables are
reported in columns. For dummy variables the effects of change from zero to one are presented. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table A6b: Marginal Effects of Ordered Logit Model























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables are
reported in columns. For dummy variables the effects of change from zero to one are presented.Religion and all
interaction terms are instrumented. The natural logarithm of the number of people of a given religious domination in
a given country in 1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV for religion are
used as IVs for interaction terms. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and
1 percent significance levels, respectively.
95
Table A7a: Marginal Effects of Ordered Logit Model

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables are
reported in columns. For dummy variables the effects of change from zero to one are presented. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table A7b: Marginal Effects of Ordered Logit Model












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables are
reported in columns. For dummy variables the effects of change from zero to one are presented. Religion and all
interaction terms are instrumented. The natural logarithm of the number of people of agiven religious domination in
a given country in 1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV for religion are
used as IVs for interaction terms. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and
1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table A8a: Marginal Effects of Ordered Logit Model



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables are
reported in columns. For dummy variables the effects of change from zero to one are presented. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table A8b: Marginal Effects of Ordered Logit Model


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: author’s calculations. Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables are
reported in columns. For dummy variables the effects of change from zero to one are presented. Religion and all
interaction terms are instrumented. The natural logarithm of the number of people of agiven religious domination in
a given country in 1900 is used as the IV for religion; interactions of respective variables with the IV for religion are
used as IVs for interaction terms. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. *,**, and *** stand for 10, 5, and
1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Life Satisfaction and the Euro Adoption1
Abstract
This paper analyzes the perceived impact of the euro introduction on the life satis-
faction of individuals in 17 European economies. Using data from the Eurobarometer
surveys and applying the difference-in-differences approach, we explore which groups
were primarily affected by the euro introduction and whether the life satisfaction of
individuals adapted to the euro introduction within two years. Additionally, we test
the association between changes in life satisfaction and perceived changes in prices
after the euro introduction. The empirical findings suggest that in most EU12 coun-
tries, individuals perceived the euro introduction negatively, while individuals from
most new member countries were either not affected or were affected positively. Our
results also provide evidence of adaptation to the euro introduction within two years
for some groups. These findings are particularly relevant for analyzing public opinion
regarding the euro introduction.
Keywords: life satisfaction, economic integration, euro, currency changeover
JEL Classification: F15, I31, R11
1This chapter is a joint work with Vladimir Otrachshenko
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3.1. Introduction
By signing the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the members of the European Commu-
nity agreed to establish the European Union including later introduction of a single
European currency. As an accounting currency, the euro was introduced to financial
markets in 1999 and complete replacement of the national currencies occurred in 2002
in EU12 countries.2 As widely discussed in the economic literature, the adoption of
the single currency is associated with both benefits and disadvantages. For instance,
countries in an optimal currency area benefit from a reduction in transaction costs,
increase in trade intensity, new jobs, lower currency risks, symmetricity of supply and
demand shocks, and the opportunity to jointly overcome these shocks. However, the
costs of the adoption of the common currency are associated with the inability to
conduct monetary policy independently.3
Most economic studies analyze the consequences of the common currency adoption
by using objective economic indicators, such as inflation and unemployment rates,
GDP, etc. However, as pointed out by Deroose et al. (2007), Ehrmann (2006), and
Mastrobuoni (2004), among others, objective economic indicators may differ from the
perceptions of these indicators by individuals. For instance, these authors argue that
the perceived inflation rate increased dramatically after the euro introduction, even
though there was almost no change in the actual inflation rate in most EU12 countries.
According to Deroose et al. (2007) and Ehrmann (2006), the difference between the
actual and perceived inflations may be due to the dramatic change in the prices of some
goods and services, such as alcohol, tobacco, the prices of restaurants, cinemas, and
hairdressers. Given the sharp rise in the prices of these goods and services, individuals
may have the impression that prices increased in general.4 Thus, it is important to
2The EU12 countries that introduced the euro in 2002 are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Slovenia intro-
duced euro in 2007; the Cyprus Republic and Malta in 2008; Slovakia in 2009; Estonia in 2011.
3For the analysis of various macroeconomic effects of common currency introduction see Beetsma
and Giuliodori (2010), Fagan and Gaspar (2008), Frankel and Rose (2002), Hobijn et al. (2006),
Lane (2006), Schadler et al. (2005), among others.
4See Brachinger (2005), Del Giovane and Sabbatini (2005).
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consider not only macroeconomic consequences of the euro introduction, but also how
individuals perceive this introduction.
Life satisfaction has been used in the literature in order to evaluate the effect of
particular events on the individual well-being. Life satisfaction is defined as an indi-
vidual judgement regarding the quality of his or her own life (see Veenhoven, 1984).
As suggested by Kahneman et al. (1997), life satisfaction represents experienced util-
ity. That is, an individual utility is defined as a hedonic quality of an individual’s
life, derived from his or her perceptions of past and current experiences. The main
advantage of this approach is that this utility is measurable. Recent studies by Di
Tella and MacCulloch (2006), Loewenstein and Ubel (2008), and Fleurbaey (2009)
also underline the role of life satisfaction in evaluating the welfare effects of economic
policies.5 A first attempt to evaluate the impact of the euro introduction at the indi-
vidual level was made by Wunder et al. (2008). The authors find the negative effect of
the euro introduction on the financial satisfaction of the individuals in Germany and
associate it with the mental challenges related to a daily need to convert prices into
a new currency. Also, the authors explain intuitively that financial dissatisfaction is
related to the perception of high inflation.
In the economic and psychological literature, the reaction of life satisfaction to
events as well as the persistence of this reaction has been studied by using a set point
theory (see Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Headey and Wearing, 1992). According to
this theory, life satisfaction returns to its initial level (set point) some time after the
event. This complete adaptation has been tested in the case of different individual
events, e.g. marriage, childbirth, layoff, etc.; however, it has not yet been applied to
the analysis of national events.6
In this paper we evaluate the perceived impact of the euro introduction on the life
5The role of life satisfaction for the evaluation of economic policies comes from the relationship
between life satisfaction and macroeconomic conditions. For instance, studies by Alesina et al.
(2004), Clark and Oswald, (1994), Di Tella et al. (2001) and (2003), Clark and Senik (2010), among
others, examine the relationship between life satisfaction and various macroeconomic variables, such
as GDP growth, inflation and unemployment rates, and income inequality.
6See Brickman et al. (1978), Suh et al. (1996), Lucas et al. (2003 and 2004), Easterlin (2004),
Clark et al. (2008), Oswald and Powdthavee (2008), Di Tella et al. (2010).
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satisfaction of individuals in 17 European countries, including the EU12 countries that
introduced the euro in 2002, and the countries that joined the eurozone more recently,
including the Cyprus Republic, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia.7 We assign
individuals to different groups based on gender, employment status, education, age,
and income level, since these groups may perceive the impact of the euro introduction
differently. We also contribute to the literature on the set point theory of happiness
by testing whether life satisfaction returns to its initial level within a two year period
after the euro introduction. Also, we analyze whether the perceived impact of the
euro is associated with individuals’perceptions of changes in prices, in the financial
situation of a household, and a general economic situation in a country.
To analyze the impact of the euro introduction, we employ the difference-in-
differences estimation. This approach has been widely used for policy evaluation
and is based on comparing the outcomes of a group affected by the new policy, the
treatment group, and a group unaffected by this policy, the control group. In our case,
the treatment group is represented by individuals living in a country that introduced
the euro, while the control group represents individuals from a country that did not
adopt the euro. In order to make results more robust, we introduce several countries
as a control group. For each country, data for two years before and two years after the
euro introduction are used.8 The results suggest that individuals in EU12 and new
member countries were affected by the euro introduction differently. We find that in
2002, in most EU12 countries, females, individuals over 65 years old, the unemployed,
and the lowest income group perceived the euro introduction negatively, that is, the
euro introduction decreased their life satisfaction, while other groups were either not
affected or affected positively. The empirical findings suggest that for females and the
unemployed, there is a negative association between the perceived impact of the euro
and perceived price increases, while other groups as well as the individuals from most
7With an exception of Estonia, data used in our paper are prior to the European sovereign debt
crisis and results are not driven by the recent developments in the eurozone.
8As highlighted by Bertrand et al. (2004), standard errors are understated when the longer period
of data is used for a difference-in-differences estimation. To avoid this issue, we use the shorter time
span.
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new member countries do not have such associations. We also find evidence that some
groups in both new and old members of the eurozone adapted to the introduction of
the common currency within two years.
The empirical findings may be of interest to countries that are obliged to join the
euro area, such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland
and Romania, or countries in other parts of the world which may undertake similar
regional financial integration, such as the West African Monetary Zone or the Asian
Monetary Unit.9
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review of relevant
literature. In further sections we describe the methodology, identification strategy,
and data used, and discuss our results.
3.2. Literature
There are many studies in political economics devoted to European integration, for
instance, Gabel and Palmer (1995), Gabel and Whitten (1997), Gärtner (1997),
Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001), Banducci et al. (2003), among others. These
studies analyze the relationship between public support for a common currency and
economic and political conditions. In this section we briefly review some of these
studies.
Gabel andWhitten (1997) examine the relationship between public support for Eu-
ropean integration and economic conditions. Using the data from the Eurobarometer
for 7 EUmember states for 1984-1989, their findings suggest that perceptions/attitudes
of EU citizens towards their national economies are more important than objective
economic indicators for European integration. As a result, the authors argue, govern-
ments should consider the perceptions of the public along with the consideration of
ways to strengthen economic conditions.
9The West African Monetary Zone which includes Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and
Sierra Leone plans to introduce a common currency, the Eco, by 2015. The Asian Monetary Unit is
a basket composed of 16 currencies of the ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and South Korea.
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Gärtner (1997) analyzes the public attitudes of Europeans towards the single cur-
rency in 14 EU member countries. Using data from the Eurobarometer, the author
finds that the public has rational expectations related to the single monetary union.
This conclusion is based on the macro level analysis of past inflation and failures
of fiscal policy and public acceptance of the single currency. Also, the author finds
that the highest ratio of acceptance is found in the countries that have been in the
European Monetary System longer.
Macroeconomic effects of financial integration receive much attention from both
researchers and policy makers. However, the effect of common currency introduction
and its relationship with individual well-being has not yet been widely analyzed in
the economic literature. One of the few studies on the implications of economic
integration for individual well-being was conducted by Welsch and Bonn (2008). The
authors argue that the macroeconomic convergence in the EU countries leads to the
convergence in life satisfaction in these countries. This finding provides a rationale
for the analysis of the effects of euro introduction on life satisfaction in addition to
the analysis of the macroeconomic effects of the euro introduction.
Another study by Wunder et al. (2008) provides a first assessment of the short-
term effects of the euro introduction on the individual well-being in Germany. Using
data fromGermany and the UK, the authors employ difference-in-differences approach
and find a negative relationship between the euro introduction and financial satisfac-
tion. As the authors argue, this result is associated with the mental challenges related
to a daily need to convert prices into a new currency, which can be overcome within
one year. Also, the authors point out that the effects of euro introduction in Germany
are not directly comparable with the rest of Europe due to Germany’s stronger eco-
nomic situation and its stronger national currency. This invites a further discussion
about the effects of the euro on individual perceptions of well-being in other European
countries.
In the economic and psychological literature, the reaction of life satisfaction to
events as well as the persistence of such reactions has been studied by using a set
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point theory (see Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Headey and Wearing, 1992, among
others). According to this theory, life satisfaction is relatively stable over time. When
individual events occur, there are three periods for the average life satisfaction of the
same individual over time. The first one corresponds to a stable period prior to the
event, also known as a baseline period. The second is a reaction period when life
satisfaction is temporary altered by the event. Finally, the third period is known as
an adaptation period in which life satisfaction returns to the initial stable level. This
return to the initial level corresponds to the complete adaptation of the individual to
the events.
Brickman et al. (1978) provide a first empirical assessment of the set point theory
and argue that the increase in life satisfaction after winning a lottery is temporary,
and after one year the life satisfaction of the lottery winners is the same as that of
non-winners. Further psychological studies have examined the set point theory in
the case of various individual events. For example, Suh et al. (1996) highlight that
the complete adaptation time takes at most three years for major positive individual
events, such as admission to graduate school, marriage, or improvement in individual
financial situation, and negative individual events, for instance, crime accident, or
financial diffi culties. Lucas et al. (2003) suggest that individuals, on average, adapt
to marriage and widowhood completely, while Lucas et al. (2004) argue that the
complete adaptation does not occur in the case of unemployment.
However, some economic studies have questioned the findings from the psycho-
logical literature. For instance, Easterlin (2004) argues that the adaptation period
usually takes longer than psychological studies suggest, and is not necessarily always
completed at all. Oswald and Powdthavee (2008) also find empirical support to the
incomplete adaptation: in the case of disability, life satisfaction does not return to its
initial level. On the other hand, Clark et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence of the
complete adaptation in the case of major individual events (e.g., marriage, divorce,
widowhood, childbirth, layoff, and, with a less certainty, unemployment), but admit
that the adaptation period is different for different events. Recently, Di Tella et al.
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(2010) also find empirical support for the complete adaptation of life satisfaction in
the case of changes in income. Overall, economic studies suggest that life satisfaction
adapts to individual events, but not necessarily completely. This paper applies the
set point theory to a national event.
3.3. Methodology
3.3.1. Economic Model
In this section we present the theoretical framework underlying the individual reaction
to price changes after the euro adoption. An individual i chooses among bundles in a
consumption set X ⊂ Rk+. Preferences ordering is represented by a continuous strictly
concave utility function Ui(x1, ..., xk) : Rk+ → R. The budget set of the individual is
given by B = {x in X : px ≤ I}, where I is the individual income and p = (p1, ..., pk)
is the vector of perceived prices of goods, 1, ..., k. We assume that after the euro
introduction, the individual forms his or her own perceptions of prices. As discussed
later in this section, the level of perceived prices may or may not correspond to actual
prices. Thus, the individual maximization problem is as follows:
vi(p, I) = max
x
Ui(x) (3.1)
subject to px = I
x ∈ X
For simplicity, consider k = 2, that is, the individual optimizes over two goods,
x1 and x2. The vector p = (p1, p2) represents prices before the euro adoption, while
the vector of perceived prices after the euro adoption is p′ = (p′1, p
′
2). Without loss of
generality we assume that the vectors p and p′ are such that p1 ≥ p′1 and p2 < p′2.10
As a result of these perceived price changes, the individual either is not affected or
10The perception of prices after the euro introduction may also change in the same direction for
both goods. However, our conclusions remain the same.
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becomes better off/worse off. In appendix, Figures 1.1 to 1.3 illustrate these individual
reactions. As can be seen from these figures, the perceived impact of the euro adoption
depends on preferences for particular goods and the perceived change in prices of these
goods.
In Figure 1.1, the consumption bundle A represents the individual optimum before
the euro introduction, while A′ is the new optimal bundle. The individual moves to
a higher indifference curve UA
′
after the euro introduction and, thus, becomes better
off.
On the other hand, the individual who prefers x2 over x1, x2  x1 is worse off (see
Figure 1.2). Since x2 perceived as relatively more expensive, the individual substitutes




Finally, Figure 1.3 illustrates the situation for an individual if he/she is not affected
by the new currency. In this case the optimal consumption bundle moves from C to
C ′ along the same indifference curve UC = UC
′
.
In the context of the set point theory, the initial level of life satisfaction corresponds
to utility received by an individual prior the euro introduction, UA, UB, or UC . The
individual reaction to the euro introduction, that is increase, decrease, or no change in
utility, is driven by preferences as well as by individual perceptions of price changes.
The individual adapts to the euro introduction completely once he/she returns to
the initial level of utility UA, UB, or UC some time after the euro introduction.
This complete adaptation may in a relatively short period of time after the euro
introduction or may take longer.11 In our empirical specification, we analyze the
two years after the euro introduction and study whether complete adaptation occurs
during this period. Analysis of the long term adaptation is beyond the scope of our
paper.
11As discussed in previous literature, the timing of individual adaptation varies in case of individual
events. For instance, full adaptation takes two years after marriage, four years after changes in
income, seven or eight years after widowhood, or may not occur at all as in case of disability (see




In order to estimate the impact of the euro adoption on life satisfaction, we use
the difference-in-differences approach. This approach is described by Greene (2008),
among others, and is used for evaluating the effects of policies (treatments) on certain
outcomes. The evaluation of policy effects is based on the comparison of the outcomes
of a group affected by the policy, that is the treatment group, and a group unaffected
by the policy, the control group, before and after the policy introduction. In our case
the treatment group is represented by individuals living in a country that introduced
the euro, while the control group represents individuals from a country that did not
adopt the euro.
The empirical specification is described below. It is estimated separately for each
country by ordered logit with heteroskedasticity robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at the individual level.
satis∗itc = β1year1t + β2year2t + β3treatmentc+ (3.2)
+ β4treatmentc ∗ year1t + β5treatmentc ∗ year2t+
+ x′itcγ + εitc
where subscripts i, t, c stand for individual, time, and country, respectively. treatmentc
is a dummy variable equal to one for a treatment country, that is country which in-
troduced the euro, and zero, otherwise. The dummies year1t and year2t are equal to
one for the first and second year after the euro introduction, respectively.12 satisitc
is self-reported individual life satisfaction. The responses of satisitc are categorically
ordered and given on a Likert scale, taking values from one to four. These responses
are as follows:
12One could be also interested in evaluating a long term effect of the euro introduction on life
satisfaction. However, as highlighted byWelsch and Bonn (2008), macroeconomic convergence tightly
connected with economic integration leads to convergence in average life satisfaction across countries
Therefore, in the long run it is diffi cult to distinguish the effect of euro introduction from the effects




4, if τ 3 < satis∗itc;
3, if τ 2 < satis∗itc < τ 3
2, if τ 1 < satis∗itc < τ 2
1, if satis∗itc < τ 1,
(3.3)
where τ j, j = 1, .., 3, is the threshold of switching from category (j − 1) to category
j and satis∗itc corresponds to a latent individual response regarding life satisfaction.
The coeffi cients, β1 and β2, measure the common time trend in the treatment
and control countries, while β3 corresponds to the time constant difference between
treatment and control countries. The parameters of particular interest are β4 and β5
capturing the average treatment effect on life satisfaction. These parameters represent
the perceived impact of the euro introduction on life satisfaction during the first and
second years after the introduction of the new currency. The estimate of parameter β4
is used for testing the relationship between the perceived price changes and perceived
impact of the euro.
Independent variables xitc that enter the equation (3.2) include income quartiles,
incomeitc; respondent’s age and age squared, ageitc and agesqitc; a dummy for gender,
maleic; respondent’s education, educitc, marital and employment statuses, marrieditc
and semplitc is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual either employed or
self-employed and zero otherwise. γ is a vector of estimated parameters of explana-
tory variables, xitc. εitc is a stochastic disturbance term which follows the logistic
distribution.
In our analysis the ordered logit is applied. We calculate the probabilities for
each level of life satisfaction for an average individual in our sample in the treatment
country c in the period t as:
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Prob(satisitc = 1|x) =Λ(τ 1 − z′β − x′itcγ), (3.4)
Prob(satisitc = 2|x) =Λ(τ 2 − z′β − x′itcγ)−Λ(τ 1 − z′β − x′itcγ),
Prob(satisitc = 3|x) =Λ(τ 3 − z′β − x′itcγ)−Λ(τ 2 − z′β − x′itcγ),
Prob(satisitc = 4|x) =1−Λ(τ 3 − z′β − x′itcγ).
where Λ(.) represents the logistic distribution function from the equation (3.2). z and
x are vectors of explanatory variables from equation 1 and x stands for the average
value of explanatory variables.
Also, the partial effect of explanatory variables for each category of life satisfaction
can be computed as:
∂ Prob(satisitc = 1|x, year = t)
∂ xitc
= −γΛ(τ 1 − z′β − x′itcγ), (3.5)
∂ Prob(satisitc = 2|x, year = t)
∂ xitc
= γ [Λ(τ 1 − z′β − x′itcγ)−Λ(τ 2 − z′β − x′itcγ)] ,
∂ Prob(satisitc = 3|x, year = t)
∂ xitc
= γ [Λ(τ2 − z′β − x′itcγ)−Λ(τ 3 − z′β − x′itcγ)] ,
∂ Prob(satisitc = 4|x, year = t)
∂ xitc
= γ [1−Λ(τ 3−z′β − x′itcγ)] .
These partial effects are also known as the marginal effects and indicate the change
in predicted probabilities in response to a change in the particular explanatory vari-
able, xitc, for an individual i for the specific year, t, after the euro adoption in the
treatment group.13
To check the robustness of the results to the choice of estimation method, we
redefine the dependent variable into a zero/one (all dissatisfied/all satisfied) scale and
estimate the linear probability model (LPM). Also, in addition to country by country
estimations, pooled regressions are performed.14
13For details on calculation of marginal effects in ordered response models see Mallick (2009).
14For the new member countries pooled regressions were not performed due to diffferent timing of
the euro introduction by these countries as well as due to the use of different controls for each new
member country.
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3.3.3. Choice of Control Countries
To provide the results robust to the choice of control country, several control countries
are introduced. For the EU12 countries the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden
are used as control countries, since these countries while being EU members, did not
introduce the euro in 2002. In the appendix, Figures 2a.1 and 2a.2 represent the
distribution of life satisfaction in our sample in EU12 treatment countries and control
countries, respectively. As can be seen from Figure 2a.1, in most treatment countries
the changes in the fraction of the "not at all satisfied" and "very satisfied" respondents
are observed, while in control countries, according to Figure 2a.2, such changes are
substantially lower. Also, as Welsch and Bonn (2008) pointed out, all EU countries
had similar macroeconomic and life satisfaction trends in the period before the euro
introduction. Therefore, the choice of control groups that belong to the EU, but are
not in the eurozone, is justified, since the difference-in-differences estimator is valid
under the assumption of similarity in average trends for treatment and control groups
in the absence of the treatment (Abadie, 2005, among others).
However, the use of the same controls for the new members of the eurozone is
not justifiable because of the differences in the economic development and average
life satisfaction between the new members of the eurozone and the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Sweden. Therefore, for each of the new members of the eurozone,
Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, specific control countries are used.
The selection of control groups for each new member country is based on regional
proximity, linguistic similarities and common historical roots. For instance, Cyprus
offi cially gained its independence from British administration in 1960 after the Zurich
and London Agreement between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. The offi cial
languages of Cyprus are Greek and Turkish, however, most citizens of Cyprus speak
English as well. Therefore, the UK and Turkey are selected as control countries.15
15It should be noted that Turkey experienced changes in life satisfaction in 2008 because of eco-
nomic crisis (see Figure 2b.2). This questions the use of Turkey as a control country. Thus, the
results for the Cyprus Republic with Turkey as a control should be interpreted with a caution.
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Malta was a British colony until 1964. Maltese and English are offi cial languages
in Malta. Given these historical links, the UK is selected as a control for Malta. For
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are selected as controls. Slovakia
and the Czech Republic together made up the country of Czechoslovakia from 1918
until 1993. The languages of the two countries are similar. Also, Slovakia has common
borders with Poland and Hungary. These countries are also known as the Visegrád
Group.
The historical similarity criterion can also be applied to Slovenia and Croatia as
both countries were the part of Yugoslavia until almost the end of XXth century.
Bulgaria is also used as a control country for Slovenia, since both countries belong
to the Balkan region. The same criteria of regional proximity and common historical
roots are applied to choose Latvia and Lithuania as the controls for Estonia.
The distribution of life satisfaction in the new member treatment and control
countries is presented in Figures 2b.1 and 2b.2 in appendix, respectively.
3.4. Data
The data for this study are combined from several waves of the Eurobarometer, a
repeated cross-sectional survey of individuals in Europe. For each country, the data
for two years before the euro introduction and two years after the introduction are
used. Our sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain for the years 2000-
2003; the Cyprus Republic and Malta for the years 2006-2008; Slovenia for the years
2005-2008; Slovakia for the years 2007-2010; and Estonia for the years 2009-2011.
The data used for all the new member countries, except Estonia, are prior to the
European debt crisis. Data surveys are country representative. National samples
include approximately 1,000 or more respondents per country per year.
The data contain all the relevant information for the study: self-responses about
individual life satisfaction and various personal socioeconomic characteristics, such as
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age, gender, years of education, marital and employment status. Individual income
quartiles harmonized across EU countries range from 1 to 5 for the years 2000-2003.
Since the income variable is not available for the new member countries, we construct
a proxy variable for income for the years 2005-2011. This proxy variable represents
the responses of individuals regarding the ownership of durables and takes the range
from 1 (none) to 5 (owning a house).
The respondents are asked how satisfied they were with their life, using a Likert
scale from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). Descriptive statistics for treat-
ment and control groups used in our paper is presented in Table 1a and Table 1b in
appendix for EU12 and new member countries, respectively.
The perception indices are provided by the European Commission Consumer Sur-
vey and represent the public opinion regarding the changes in household financial
situation, in prices, and in the general economic situation.16 These indices are calcu-
lated by aggregating the responses to the following questions: 1)"How has the financial
situation of your household changed over the last 12 months? It has (+ +) got a lot
better, (+) got a little better, (=) stayed the same, (-) got a little worse, (- -) got a lot
worse, N do not know"; 2) "How do you think that consumer prices have developed
over the last 12 months? They have (++) risen a lot, (+) risen moderately, (=) risen
slightly, (-) stayed about the same, (- -) fallen, N do not know"; 3) "How do you think
the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past 12 months?
It has (+ +) got a lot better, (+) got a little better, (=) stayed the same, (-) got a
little worse, (- -) got a lot worse, N do not know". The perception indices in each
case represent the difference between the percentage of respondents who have chosen
the positive options, (++) and (+), and the negative options, (-) and (- -). The range
of the index is [-100;100], where -100 represents that all respondents in the particu-
lar country perceived the decrease in prices / worsening of own financial situation /
worsening of general economic situation, while 100 represents that all respondents in
the particular country perceived the increase in prices / improvement in own financial
16Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/time_series/
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situation / general economic situation.
3.5. Results and Discussion
3.5.1. EU12 Countries
In this section we analyze the perceived impact of the euro introduction on the life
satisfaction of individuals in the EU12 countries. Three control countries are used:
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden. Estimation results are robust to the
choice of control group, but less significant when Sweden is used as a control country.
The country by country estimations are presented in Table 2a. For simplicity, the
empirical findings are summarized in Table 3a. The columns of this table correspond
to "increase", "decrease", and "no change" in life satisfaction of an average individual
in a specific country in 2002, while the rows represent the effects on life satisfaction in
2003. When interpreting the results, we first concentrate on the immediate perceived
impact of the euro introduction in 2002 and further we discuss this impact in 2003 in
the context of the set point theory.
In Table 3a the countries can be divided into two main groups by the perceived
impact of the euro introduction. The first group corresponds to countries in which
the life satisfaction of individuals increased after the introduction of the new currency
(Austria, Finland, Luxembourg), while the second group corresponds to countries
in which the life satisfaction decreased (the rest of EU12 countries, except Italy).
One may point out that the perceived impact of the euro is driven by the economic
performance of the particular country, e.g. by the levels of GDP per capita, unem-
ployment, government debt, etc. Following this argument, the individual perceptions
in northern countries, such as Austria, Belguim, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and
Netherlands will differ from the individual perceptions in Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain, since northern countries are better developed economically. However, our
findings in Table 3a suggest that the grouping by the perceived impact of the euro
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does not correspond to the grouping by economic performance. For instance, France
and Germany are in the same group by the perceived impact of the euro with Portugal
and Spain, though the economic performance of these countries differs substantially.
Thus, individual perceptions of the euro in different countries are affected not only
by the economic performance, but also by other factors. Among such factors may be
patriotism and national pride (Pepermans and Verleye, 1998), attitudes towards com-
petitiveness (Van de Vliert et al., 2000), attitudes towards business, price controls,
social welfare, economic effi cacy and fairness (Allen et al., 2005).
The groups of individuals within a country may also be affected by the euro in-
troduction differently. To account for these differences, we disentangle the perceived
impact of the euro by groups, such as gender, age, education, employment status,
and income. The results for each group are summarized in Tables 4a.1 to 4a.5.17 We
find that in almost every country, females, individuals over 65 years old, the unem-
ployed, and lower income groups perceived the euro introduction negatively, while
other groups were either not affected (males, young and middle aged individuals, in-
dividuals at all levels of education, and middle income groups) or affected positively
(the employed, self-employed, and higher income groups).
The perceived negative impact of the euro on the life satisfaction of some groups
may be associated with individual risks and uncertainty arising after its introduction.
For instance, gender differences in risk aversion, uncertainty, and overconfidence are
well documented in the literature (see Jonung, 1986; Arch, 1993; Prince, 1993; Byrnes
et al., 1999; Schubert et al., 1999; Barber and Odean, 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009;
among others). The findings in literature suggest that risks/uncertainty for females
may be considered more as a possible threat, while for males it may be considered
more as a possible opportunity; females are likely to anticipate negative outcomes
with more nervousness, while males tend to be more confident. Also, females often
perceive money in terms of things that can be purchased, while males may value more
the power and status that money brings (Prince, 1993). This suggests that in case
17Ordered logit results for each group for each country are available upon request.
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of the euro introduction, as compared to males, females may be more uncertain and
have stronger fears that money change the value after the euro, and thus perceive the
euro negatively.
Also, older people are more likely to perceive the euro introduction as a stress
because of challenges handling conversion of prices into a new currency (Wunder
et al., 2008), fears for their savings (Lunt and Livingstone, 1991), more reliability
on mass media and lower ability to process new information easily (Laroche et al.,
2004). The unemployed and low income groups are more likely to perceive economic
insecurity more intensively (Linz and Semykina, 2008 and 2010). In case of the euro
introduction this results in higher uncertainty regarding their own life, linked to their
negative perceptions of the euro.
However, the most important factor that is likely to affect the life satisfaction of all
groups after the euro introduction is sensitivity to perceived price changes. As argued
by Mussweiler and Englich (2003), among others, the euro introduction induced an
illusion that prices in the euro are higher than prices in old national currency. Indeed,
the perceived inflation rate increased dramatically after the euro introduction, even
though there was almost no change in the actual inflation rate in most EU12 countries
(Deroose et al., 2007; Ehrmann, 2006; Mastrobuoni, 2004; among others). In order to
test the association between the impact of the euro on life satisfaction and perceived
increase in prices, we apply the Freeman-Halton extension of Fisher’s exact test which
is also known as a contingency table. The main advantage of this test is that it is
applicable for a small sample. The test is based on the hypergeometric distribution and
provides the p-value for testing hypotheses.18 According to the European Commission
Consumer Survey, the perceived increase in prices is observed in most EU12 countries.
The null hypothesis of the test (H0) is that there is no association between the impact
of the euro and perceived increase in prices above the median EU12 level in 2002, while
the alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that there is such an association.
The results are summarized in Tables 5.1 to 5.5. Rows labeled "below the me-
18For more technical details for this test see Freeman and Halton (1951).
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dian level of EU12" and "above the median level of EU12" correspond to below and
above the median perception of the prices in the EU12 countries. Columns labeled
"increase", "no change", and "decrease" correspond to the impact of the euro intro-
duction on life satisfaction of the individuals in a particular country. The classification
of countries into columns is based on the estimated effects of the euro on life satisfac-
tion obtained from the ordered logit regressions for each country in 2002, as described
above. The number in each cell of these tables corresponds to the number of countries
where individuals reacted specifically to the euro introduction and have perceptions
regarding change in prices below or above the median EU12 level.
The results suggest that for females and unemployed, there is a negative associa-
tion between the perceived impact of the euro and the perceived price increase while
for males we do not have enough evidence for such an association. Also, we find
evidence that the lower middle income group associates the perceived impact of the
euro adoption with perceived price. However, the direction of this association for this
group is not clear.
Similarly to ordered logit results, the main findings of binary linear regressions are
summarized in Table 6a.19 For all countries, except Luxembourg in 2003, the signs
of the effects are robust to the choice of estimation method. However, the results are
less significant in the case of LPM. As can be seen from Table 6a, the individuals from
higher number of countries are not affected by the euro, according to LPM results.
This can be due to the aggregation of the dependent variable. Also, according to
the LPM results, individuals from Belgium, Finland, and Spain were not affected
by the euro in 2003. That is, individuals from these countries adapted to the euro
introduction within short time, as the set point theory suggests.
Finally, pooled estimation results, for both ordered logit and linear probability
model, are presented in Table 7. The results suggest that the impact of the euro on
life satisfaction in treatment countries was negative in 2002 and (less robustly) in 2003
as well.
19The results of binary linear regressions for each country are available upon request.
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3.5.2. Set Point Theory
Previous experimental and survey studies of adaptation to the new currency have been
focused on testing the so-called "money illusion" hypothesis, that is the existence of
perceived differences between prices in the euro and the previous national currency
and the dissipation of these differences over time (see Mussweiler and Englich, 2003;
Ranyard et al., 2005; Amado et al., 2007). As suggested by this literature, "money
illusion" dissipates within six months, and this period is suffi cient for the adaptation
of all individuals to the new currency. In contrast to previous studies, we investigate
adaptation from the perspective of set point theory. We estimate the impact of the
euro adoption in 2003 and explore whether the life satisfaction of affected individuals
returned to the same level as prior to the euro introduction. This analysis provides
partial empirical evidence of the set point theory.
The effects of the euro introduction on life satisfaction in 2003 are summarized
in Tables 4a.1 to 4a.5. The negative perception of the euro remains for females, the
unemployed, and the lowest income group individuals in 2003, while the individuals
over 65 years old returned to their initial levels of life satisfaction in 2003 on average.
This means that the older aged individuals adapted to the euro introduction within
two years.
Regarding the employed or self-employed, and the highest income group, we ob-
serve a positive perception of the euro in 2002, and this continues through 2003. Such
positive perceptions by the employed and self-employed can be explained by their
stronger emotional stability and self-confidence, as compared to the unemployed (see
Brandstatter, 1997; Goldsmith et al., 1997; Waters and Moore, 2001; Koellinger et
al., 2007; among others). The positive effects of the euro introduction may persist
longer, since these groups are less uncertain and more confident regarding their own
life and their national economic outcomes. Also, we find that the highest income
group individuals adapt to the euro more easily because it had no impact on their life
satisfaction in 2003.
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Life satisfaction of some groups of individuals (males, young and middle aged
individuals, at all levels of education, and middle income groups) did not change in
2002. While males still held the same perceptions in 2003, the lower middle income
group, between 16 and 29 years old individuals perceive the euro positively in 2003.
It may signal the delayed reaction of these groups to the euro introduction.
Thus, according to our results, only two groups adapted completely to the euro
introduction within two years: the older aged individuals and high income groups.
That is, the set point theory holds for these groups even in the short run. Although we
find that other groups mainly reacted to the euro introduction either during the first
or during the second year, we have insuffi cient evidence of the return of life satisfaction
to its initial level in two years. It may also be the case that the adaptation of these
groups takes a longer period.
3.5.3. New Members of the Eurozone
During 2007-2011 several new members, including Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia,
and Slovenia, introduced the euro. To separate the impact of the euro introduction
from the impact of the economic crisis in 2008, the data before the autumn wave of
2008 are used for Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia.20 That is, for Slovenia the data are
from 2005-2008, for Cyprus and Malta - 2006-2008. Since Slovakia adopted the euro
in 2009, our estimations for this country may still accumulate the effect of the 2008
economic crisis. The analysis in this paper is prior to the European debt crisis, with
the exception of Estonia, for which data are used from 2009-2011. Due to a small
number of new member countries, we do not use the contingency table approach to
test the association between the perceived impact of the euro and the perception of
prices but we briefly summarize the statistics for perceived prices.
The estimation results for new member countries are presented in Table 2b and
summarized in Table 3b. In Table 3b, we observe that individuals from Cyprus,
20The Eurobarometer survey typically contains two waves per year, the first one is during spring
and the second one is during autumn.
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Malta, and Slovakia perceived the euro introduction positively, the Estonians were
not affected, while the individuals from Slovenia perceived it negatively. It is likely
that national economic performance prior to the euro introduction plays a greater
role for citizens of the new member countries than for citizens of EU12 countries,
since they are obliged to join the ERMII (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) and
meet the Maastricht criteria prior to entering the eurozone. In line with this, Slovenia
which has a stronger economic performance, as compared to the rest of new members,
received less benefits from introducing the euro.
As in the previous section, we also disentangle the individuals into groups. As
compared to EU12 countries, we find greater heterogeneity in results by groups be-
tween new member countries. As can be seen from Tables 4b.1 to 4b.5, in Slovenia,
similarly to EU12 countries, females, individuals over 65 years old, and lower income
groups perceived the euro introduction negatively and young and highly educated in-
dividuals were not affected. Other groups in Slovenia (males, middle aged individuals,
the employed and self-employed, individuals with 15 to 18 years of education, upper
middle and high income groups) perceived the euro negatively as well. The decrease
in the life satisfaction of these groups is in contrast with the findings for EU12 coun-
tries. Given the Eurobarometer survey, increase in prices is the most important issue
for Slovenians (71% in 2007). According to this survey, 57% and 71% Slovenians felt
that all prices increased in 2007 and 2008, respectively. 86% and 92% of respondents
attribute the increase in prices to the euro introduction in 2007 and 2008, respectively.
Also, as suggested by Allen et al. (2005), economic beliefs in Slovenia, as compared to
other countries in Europe, are characterized by stronger opposition to price controls
and stronger support for social welfare. As the authors argue, rapid modernization in
Slovenia combined with a generally low level of education and underdevelopment of
social security system affects the economic beliefs of individuals. The negative percep-
tion of Slovenians may also be attributed to higher uncertainty regarding the market
reforms.
Contrary to Slovenia, as can be seen from Tables 4b.1 to 4b.5, in Cyprus, Malta
121
and Slovakia, as compared to EU12 countries, more groups of individuals perceived the
euro either positively or were not affected by its introduction. That is, an increase
in life satisfaction is observed for females, young and middle aged individuals, the
unemployed (no change in Slovakia), the employed and self-employed (no change in
Malta), the individuals with 15 to 18 years of education, the lowest income groups
in Malta, the upper middle income group in Slovakia, upper middle and the highest
income groups in Cyprus, while other groups in Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia were
not affected by the euro introduction. These positive effects may be explained by
the lower level of uncertainty in these new member countries regarding to market
reforms. According to the Eurobarometer survey, the citizens of these countries in
comparison with Slovenians think that these reforms are beneficial for them. Since
the individuals from new countries observed the experience of the euro introduction
by EU12 countries and expected the euro introduction by their own countries well in
advance, it is likely that at the time of the euro introduction they were less uncertain
about the outcomes of this reform, as compared to individuals from EU12 countries.
Moreover, according to the Eurobarometer survey, the public in Cyprus (52%), Malta
(41%), and Slovakia (25%) felt that all prices increased after the euro introduction.
These percentages are much lower than in Slovenia (71%).
In Estonia, most groups of individuals were not affected by the euro introduction,
except for the lowest income group and the youngest age group who were affected
negatively. Since the effect of the euro on life satisfaction in this country may be
incorporated with the effect of the European debt crisis, the results for Estonia are
preliminary.
Since only one period after the euro introduction is used for the analysis of Cyprus,
Estonia, and Malta, we do not assess the extent of the individual adaptation in these
countries. The results for Slovenia and Slovakia in the second period are presented in
Tables 4b.1 to 4b.5. Most Slovenians did not adapt to the euro introduction within
two years, except for the individuals from the upper middle income group for whom
no effect of the euro on life satisfaction is observed in the second year. In Slovakia,
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increase in life satisfaction during the second year is observed only for males and
highly educated individuals. Thus, for the most groups of the individuals from new
member countries the adaptation to the euro introduction was likely to take longer
than two years.
Similarly to ordered logit results, the main findings of binary linear regressions
are summarized in Table 6b. The effects of the euro intoduction on life satisfaction
of individuals from all new member countries are robust to the choice of estimation
method.
3.5.4. Preliminary Implications for the Potential Eurozone
Members
The analysis of the euro adoption by Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia, and Slovakia
allows us to make preliminary conclusions regarding the effects of the euro on life
satisfaction of individuals from potential eurozone members. New member states
of the EU, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and
Romania are obliged to adopt the euro upon fulfilling the ERMII conditions and
the Maastricht criteria. On the one hand, the expected introduction of the euro is
likely to affect individuals from these countries in a similar way as the new eurozone
members that have recently joined. That is, life satisfaction in potential eurozone
member countries is likely to be affected either positively or not affected by the euro
introduction. On the other hand, recent developments in the eurozone, primarily
the European sovereign debt crisis, may negatively impact the effect of the euro on
life satisfaction in these countries. In this context, the case of Estonia is especially
relevant for the analysis, since this country adopted the euro during the debt crisis.
Our findings suggest that the life satisfaction of the Estonians has not been affected
by the euro introduction. Interestingly enough, public support for the euro in Estonia
constantly increased and reached a peak in the year of the euro adoption. In line with
our results, the information on public support may be used to predict the impact
123
of the euro on the life satisfaction of individuals from the potential members of the
eurozone.
In Table 8, data on public support for the euro in all EU member countries are
presented. As can be seen from this table, public support increased in the year of
the euro introduction in all new members of the eurozone. In the potential eurozone
member states, such as Latvia and Lithuania, support for the euro has always been
only slightly lower than in Estonia. Given similar level of support for the euro, com-
mon historical roots, and regional proximity of these countries, we expect that the
effects of the euro introduction by Latvia and Lithuania may be similar to the effects
in Estonia, having little to no impact on life satisfaction.
Romania has the highest support for the euro among all the potential eurozone
member states. Once this country joins the ERMII, it is likely that this support
may increase at similar rates to those noted when the euro was introduced to other
new members. Thus, the euro introduction is likely to have a positive effect on life
satisfaction of the individuals in Romania. Similar effects may also be observed in
Bulgaria and Hungary, whose citizens also show relatively high levels of support for
the euro. However, this support has weakened during the debt crisis. Thus, the effect
of the euro on life satisfaction in these countries may depend on further development
of the eurozone crisis.
Due to common historical roots and close economic relations with Slovakia, one
may expect similarly positive effects of the euro introduction on life satisfaction in
the Czech Republic and Poland. However, the support for the euro in Slovakia,
the Czech Republic, and Poland differs substantially. While in Slovakia support has
traditionally been quite high, support for the euro has decreased dramatically in
the Czech Republic and Poland over recent years. Due to weak public support, the
possible effects of potential euro introduction on life satisfaction in these countries is
not clear.
Price perceptions and perceptions of the general national economic situation are
also important factors that will affect life satisfaction in potential eurozone member
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states. As the analysis of current eurozone members suggests, inflationary price per-
ceptions lead to a negative impact of the euro on life satisfaction, while perceived
improvements in the general economic situation affect life satisfaction positively (see
Table 9). Unless individuals from the potential members of the eurozone perceive
higher inflation attributed to the euro introduction and low support for this introduc-
tion, the euro is likely to affect life satisfaction in these countries either positively or
not at all. However, the effect may have a strong relationship with overall economic
performance of potential member states.
3.6. Conclusion
This paper provides an assessment of the impact of the euro introduction on the life
satisfaction of individuals in all countries of the eurozone during the first and second
years after its adoption. The results suggest that individuals in EU12 and newmember
countries (the Cyprus Republic, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia) were affected
by the euro introduction differently. In EU12 countries, the life satisfaction of females,
older individuals, the unemployed, and the lowest income group decreased. This
negative impact of the euro on life satisfaction in EU12 countries may be associated
with individual risks and uncertainty arising after its introduction, as well as with the
perceived increase in prices. As compared to EU12 countries, individuals from most
new member countries, except Slovenia, perceived the euro either positively or were
not affected by its introduction.
This paper provides the first evidence regarding the adaptation of life satisfaction
to countrywide policy, since all the previous studies have tested the set point theory
with respect to individual events only. In line with the set point theory, our empir-
ical findings suggest that the changes in the life satisfaction of individuals measure
reactions not only to individual events, but to countrywide events as well. However,
we find that only two groups from EU12 countries adapted to the euro introduction
within two years (older individuals and those with higher income). The adaptation of
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other groups is likely to take a longer period. Regarding the new members, Slovakia
and Slovenia, we observe that the adaptation to the euro introduction for all groups
was not completed within two years.
The empirical findings of this paper may be of interest to countries that expect to
enter the eurozone or countries in other parts of the world which may undertake similar
regional financial integration, e.g. theWest AfricanMonetary Zone or AsianMonetary
Unit. The analysis of perceptions of the euro introduction by particular groups as
well as the persistence of these effects may be useful for policy communication. It
is of particular interest for policy makers to address the groups affected by the new
currency, since these individuals/groups may be politically active, voting in national
elections. If the overall perception of individuals regarding the euro adoption in the
particular country is negative, the politicians who supported it may be penalized
during the next national elections.
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics on Life Satisfaction for EU12
(Treatment and Control Countries)
Obs. Mean St.Dev.
Percentage of  
”Not at All 
Satisfied”
Percentage of  
”Not Very 
Satisfied”
Percentage of  
”Fairly 
Satisfied”
Percentage of  
”Very 
Satisfied”
before 3935 3.090 0.678 2.19 12.35 59.72 25.74
after 2979 3.108 0.706 2.85 11.55 57.54 28.06
before 4129 3.029 0.683 3.10 12.64 62.56 21.70
after 3071 2.971 0.714 4.43 13.64 62.29 19.64
before 4024 3.105 0.620 1.57 9.82 65.13 23.48
after 3027 3.148 0.635 2.25 7.07 64.29 26.40
before 3970 2.910 0.679 4.31 15.09 65.94 14.66
after 2983 2.810 0.728 6.57 18.07 63.16 12.20
before 8084 2.860 0.676 3.81 19.38 63.76 13.05
after 6040 2.779 0.743 6.84 20.58 60.38 12.20
before 4004 2.588 0.829 11.54 28.85 48.88 10.74
after 3002 2.533 0.865 14.19 29.05 46.00 10.76
before 3900 3.247 0.661 1.72 7.41 55.36 35.51
after 2952 3.149 0.689 3.12 8.03 59.72 29.13
before 3960 2.869 0.679 4.19 17.85 64.77 13.18
after 3048 2.879 0.676 4.40 16.47 66.01 13.12
before 4006 3.358 0.630 1.02 5.27 50.55 43.16
after 3016 3.277 0.673 2.12 6.27 53.42 38.20
before 2396 3.253 0.636 1.17 7.03 56.64 34.89
after 1772 3.278 0.689 2.26 6.94 51.52 39.28
before 3978 2.631 0.690 6.89 28.33 59.53 5.25
after 2970 2.423 0.771 14.58 31.41 51.11 2.90
before 3975 3.015 0.629 1.51 14.54 64.91 19.04
after 2984 2.969 0.711 3.82 15.42 60.79 19.97
before 5369 3.167 0.682 2.46 8.92 58.06 30.56
after 4011 3.160 0.717 3.54 8.35 56.72 31.39
before 3973 3.575 0.576 0.53 2.79 35.31 61.36
after 2991 3.537 0.618 1.04 3.54 36.11 59.31
before 3991 3.341 0.590 0.65 4.23 55.47 39.64






































Source: constructed by the authors using the Eurobarometer survey.
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Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics on Life Satisfaction for New Members
(Treatment and Control Countries)
Obs. Mean St.Dev.
Percentage of  
”Not at All 
Satisfied”
Percentage of  
”Not Very 
Satisfied”
Percentage of  
”Fairly 
Satisfied”
Percentage of  
”Very 
Satisfied”
before 1505 3.096 0.753 3.65 13.02 53.36 29.97
after 502 3.118 0.672 2.39 10.16 60.76 26.69
before 3917 2.752 0.654 4.49 23.39 64.59 7.53
after 917 2.743 0.683 5.23 23.77 62.49 8.51
before 1492 3.027 0.720 2.88 15.95 56.70 24.46
after 500 3.144 0.687 1.20 13.80 54.40 30.60
before 4305 2.731 0.714 5.53 25.95 58.42 10.10
after 4101 2.811 0.707 4.29 24.88 57.67 13.16
before 2077 3.100 0.600 1.20 9.87 66.63 22.29
after 3023 3.111 0.630 1.49 10.42 63.61 24.48
before 3961 3.212 0.676 1.97 8.61 55.67 33.75
after 1303 3.201 0.695 2.53 8.52 55.26 33.69
before 4460 2.908 0.912 9.60 17.87 44.71 27.83
after 1473 2.652 0.975 16.09 22.67 41.21 20.03
before 2006 2.000 0.789 29.06 43.82 25.12 1.99
after 2961 2.169 0.808 22.46 41.34 33.03 3.17
before 1991 2.737 0.815 8.74 23.56 52.94 14.77
after 2983 2.805 0.783 6.30 23.43 53.77 16.49
before 4168 2.910 0.600 2.09 16.63 69.46 11.83
after 4093 2.889 0.629 2.94 17.23 68.07 11.76
before 3999 2.363 0.816 16.45 35.98 42.34 5.23
after 3976 2.325 0.820 18.86 36.75 39.44 4.95
before 3948 2.828 0.699 4.94 19.71 63.02 12.34
after 3745 2.854 0.705 5.13 18.15 63.43 13.29
before 3920 2.525 0.809 12.19 31.15 48.60 8.06
after 918 2.583 0.770 9.69 30.07 52.51 7.73
before 3913 2.530 0.846 12.47 32.94 43.75 10.84





































Source: constructed by the authors using the Eurobarometer survey.
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Source: authors’calculations. Notes: Dependent variable is life satisfaction. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at individual level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels,
respectively.
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Source: authors’calculations. Notes: Dependent variable is life satisfaction. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at individual level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels,
respectively.
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Source: authors’calculations. Notes: Dependent variable is life satisfaction. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at individual level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels,
respectively.
138
Table 2b: Ordered Logit Estimation Results for the New Member Countries
Control Country: Control Country:
-4.513 *** -3.288 *** -4.108 *** -4.858 *** -4.896 ***
(0.203) (0.133) (0.257) (0.164) (0.173)
-2.785 *** -1.976 *** -2.214 *** -2.838 *** -2.869 ***
(0.193) (0.137) (0.248) (0.152) (0.167)
0.039 0.126 ** 0.594 *** 0.611 *** 0.301 **
(0.193) (0.138) (0.237) (0.153) (0.163)
-0.0004 -0.556 *** -0.004 0.266 *** 0.294 ***
(0.071) (0.063) (0.069) (0.059) (0.066)
-0.484 *** 0.387 *** -0.648 *** 0.540 *** 0.562 ***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.066) (0.038) (0.054)
0.023 0.578 *** 0.311 ** -0.113 -0.151
(0.114) (0.103) (0.140) (0.103) (0.096)
-0.036 -0.026 ** -0.142 *** -0.169 *** -0.139 ***
(0.054) (0.041) (0.050) (0.044) (0.044)
-0.075 *** -0.058 *** -0.048 *** -0.157 *** -0.156 ***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.121 0.058 *** 0.007 -0.786 *** -0.605 ***
(0.085) (0.051) (0.061) (0.101) (0.079)
0.476 *** 0.207 *** 0.354 *** -0.360 *** -0.196 **
(0.075) (0.057) (0.077) (0.107) (0.083)
0.376 *** 0.086 *** 0.273 *** 0.177 *** 0.093 *
(0.060) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.054)
-0.484 *** -0.653 *** -0.553 *** -0.278 *** -0.345 ***
(0.098) (0.207) (0.111) (0.095) (0.086)
-0.122 -0.549 *** -0.200 * -0.183 ** -0.325 ***
(0.100) (0.119) (0.120) (0.093) (0.096)
-0.002 *** -0.150 *** 0.126 ** 0.675 *** 0.566 ***
(0.065) (0.056) (0.060) (0.040) (0.048)
0.250 *** 0.130 *** 0.239 *** 0.434 *** 0.401 ***
(0.037) (0.030) (0.041) (0.026) (0.030)
Number of observations Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared Pseudo R-squared




































































































Source: authors’calculations. Notes: Dependent variable is life satisfaction. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at individual level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels,
respectively.
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Table 2b (cont.): Ordered Logit Estimation Results for the New Member Countries
Control country: Control country:
-5.062 *** -3.328 *** -4.564 *** -3.002 *** -4.780 ***
(0.194) (0.137) (0.148) (0.181) (0.181)
-2.834 *** -1.396 *** -2.513 *** -0.976 *** -2.881 ***
(0.184) (0.132) (0.150) (0.193) (0.184)
0.503 *** 1.592 *** 0.665 *** 2.390 *** 0.164
(0.186) (0.131) (0.146) (0.190) (0.179)
0.207 *** -0.034 0.168 *** 0.411 *** 0.260 ***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.054) (0.060) (0.063)
0.140 * 0.378 *** 0.462 *** 0.454 *** 0.191 **
(0.074) (0.070) (0.063) (0.073) (0.041)
-0.611 *** 0.691 *** -0.345 *** 2.988 *** 0.938 ***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.066) (0.057)
0.065 0.293 *** 0.081 -0.268 *** -0.132
(0.079) (0.086) (0.088) (0.083) (0.087)
0.533 *** 0.242 ** 0.154 -0.365 *** -0.110
(0.102) (0.096) (0.098) (0.094) (0.095)
-0.039 -0.050 * -0.036 0.019 -0.082 **
(0.032) (0.042) (0.038) (0.043) (0.040)
-0.105 *** -0.120 *** -0.104 *** -0.117 *** -0.116 ***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.353 *** 0.090 * -0.151 *** 0.029 -0.012
(0.081) (0.051) (0.053) (0.059) (0.074)
0.109 0.599 *** 0.344 *** 0.483 *** 0.421 ***
(0.080) (0.046) (0.059) (0.075) (0.066)
0.230 *** 0.194 *** 0.196 *** 0.112 * 0.302 ***
(0.065) (0.045) (0.054) (0.058) (0.057)
-0.443 *** -0.404 *** -0.434 *** -0.191 -0.147 **
(0.084) (0.068) (0.100) (0.129) (0.133)
-0.148 -0.192 ** -0.296 *** -0.404 *** -0.411 ***
(0.093) (0.075) (0.079) (0.084) (0.086)
0.338 *** 0.345 *** 0.327 *** 0.278 *** 0.100 *
(0.049) (0.037) (0.041) (0.048) (0.061)
0.276 *** 0.280 *** 0.266 *** 0.191 *** 0.191 ***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.021) (0.033) (0.087)
Number of observations Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared Pseudo R-squared


























Treatment country*         
year 2007














































Treatment country*          
year 2009













Source: authors’calculations. Notes: Dependent variable is life satisfaction. Robust bootstrapped standard errors
clustered at individual level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels,
respectively.
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Table 3a: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results for the EU12 Countries
increase decrease no change
increase
Austria      
Finland   
Luxembourg
Belgium       
Greece
decrease
France   
Germany  
Ireland   
Netherlands   















































The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance.
Table 3b: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results for
the New Member Countries





Cyprus        
Malta
Estonia
The impact of the euro introduction on life 















































The effect on average 
individual
Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance. The label "inconclusive" stands for Cyprus, Estonia, and Malta during the
second year, since there are no second year estimation results for these countries.
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Table 4a.1: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the EU12 Countries by Gender
increase decrease no change
increase Greece Austria
decrease
Ireland   
Portugal
Germany      
Italy
no change
Finland   
Luxembourg
Belgium
France   
Netherlands   
Spain
increase decrease no change
increase
Austria      




France   
Germany      
Italy   
Netherlands   
Portugal
no change
Belgium     
Ireland        
Spain
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002




















































































Source: authors’calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results by groups. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance.
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Table 4a.2: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the EU12 Countries by Employment Status
increase decrease no change
increase Greece
decrease
France   
Germany   
Ireland   
Netherlands   




Belgium   
Luxembourg
Austria
increase decrease no change inconclusive
increase
Austria      
Finland      
France   
Netherlands   
Luxembourg   
Spain   
Belgium Greece
decrease
Germany      
Italy
no change


















































































The employed or         
self-employed
The impact of the euro introduction on life satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002The unemployed
Source: authors’calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results by groups. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance.
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Table 4a.3: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the EU12 Countries by Income
increase decrease no change
increase
decrease
Ireland   
Netherlands   
Protugal
Austria   
Germany   
Luxembourg
no change Finland
Belgium       
France        
Greece        
Spain  
Italy
increase decrease no change
increase Austria
Belgium   
Finland       
Greece   
Netherlands   
Luxembourg
decrease
Ireland        
Italy         
Portugal
no change France
Germany      
Spain
increase decrease no change
increase Luxembourg Greece
decrease Italy
Belgium       
France
no change
Austria      
Finland
Ireland   
Portugal
Germany   
Netherlands   
Spain




Finland       
Ireland        
Italy   
Netherlands
France        
Greece   
Portugal
Germany   







































































































































































The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
Source: authors’calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results by groups. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance.
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Table 4a.4: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the EU12 Countries by Age
increase decrease no change
increase
Finland   
Luxembourg
Belgium   
Germany   
Greece   
Netherlands   
Spain
decrease Portugal
Austria      
France        
Italy
no change Ireland




Belgium   
Portugal
Ireland        
Italy   
Netherlands   
Luxembourg
France
increase decrease no change
increase Finland
decrease
Germany   
Portugal  
no change Luxembourg
Austria       
Belgium       
France       
Greece      
Ireland        
Italy         
Spain
increase decrease no change
increase




Belgium       
Portugal
France   
Germany   
Ireland        
Italy   
Netherlands   



















































































Age 30-49 years old

















































































Age more than 65 years old
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
Source: authors’calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results by groups. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance.
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Table 4a.5: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the EU12 Countries by the Level of Education




Netherlands   
Portugal      
Spain
Austria      
France   
Germany   
Ireland        
Italy   
Luxembourg
increase decrease no change
increase Finland




France       
Ireland   
Netherlands   
Portugal
Germany      
Italy
no change Belgium Spain
increase decrease no change
increase
Austria   
Netherlands
Belgium       




Finland   
Luxembourg
France       
Ireland        
Italy
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002





























































































































Source: authors’calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results by groups. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance.
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Table 4b.1: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the New Member Countries by Gender





Cyprus      
Estonia       
Malta









The impact of the euro introduction on life 

















































The impact of the euro introduction on life 
















































Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance. The label "inconclusive" stands for Cyprus, Estonis, and Malta during the
second year, since there are no second year estimation results for these countries.
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Table 4b.2: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the New Member Countries by Employment Status





Cyprus        
Malta
Estonia





















































The impact of the euro introduction on life 















































The employed or        
self-employed
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in the first year
Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators for a particular year
are positive/negative and statistically significant and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance. The label "inconclusive" stands for Cyprus, Estonia, and Malta during the
second year, since there are no second year estimation results for these countries.
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Table 4b.3: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the New Member Countries by Income









Slovakia   
Slovenia
inconclusive Malta
Cyprus        
Estonia





Estonia       
Malta























































The impact of the euro introduction on life 

















































The impact of the euro introduction on life 

















































The impact of the euro introduction on life 

















































The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in the first year
Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance. The label "inconclusive" stands for Cyprus, Estonia, and Malta during the
second year, since there are no second year estimation results for these countries.
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Table 4b.4: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the New Member Countries by Age




inconclusive Cyprus Estonia Malta





Estonia       
Malta





Cyprus       
Estonia  






















































Age 16-29 years old
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
















































Age 30-49 years old
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
















































Age 50-64 years old
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
















































Age more than 65 years 
old
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in the first year
Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance. The label "inconclusive" stands for Cyprus, Estonia, and Malta during the
second year, since there are no second year estimation results for these countries.
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Table 4b.5: Summary of Ordered Logit Estimation Results
for the New Member Countries by the Level of Education





Estonia       
Malta





Cyprus        
Malta
Estonia





Estonia       
Malta
More than 19 years of 
education
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
















































Less than 15 years of 
education
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
















































15-18 years of education
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
















































Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of ordered logit results. The label
"increase"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance. The label "inconclusive" stands for Cyprus, Estonia, and Malta during the
second year, since there are no second year estimation results for these countries.
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Table 5.1: Fisher’s Test Results for the EU12 Countries by Gender
Male decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 2 2 2 6
above the median level of EU12 2 4 0 6
total 4 6 2 12
Female decrease increase total
below the median level of EU12 3 3 6
above the median level of EU12 6 0 6
total 9 3 12
The impact of the euro introduction 




















Source: authors’calculations. Notes: The test associates the impact of the euro introduction on life satisfaction with
the perception of prices. The impact of the euro for each country is taken from ordered logit results. The perceptions
of prices by groups are taken from the European Commission Consumer Survey. The table consists of the number of
countries where individuals reacted specifically to the euro introduction and have perceptions regarding the change in
prices below or above the median EU12 level. For females the 2x2 Fisher’s exact (one-sided) test is used. The null
hypothesis is no association between the impact of the euro and price perceptions, while the alternative is that the
number of countries with the negative impact of the euro on life satisfaction and with the level of prices perceptions
above the median EU12 level is higher than the number of countries with the negative impact and with the level of
price perceptions below the median.
Table 5.2: Fisher’s Test Results for the EU12 Countries by Employment Status
The unemployed decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 2 2 1 5
above the median level of EU12 6 0 0 6
total 8 2 1 11
The employed or self-employed decrease increase total
below the median level of EU12 1 4 5
above the median level of EU12 2 4 6
total 3 8 11
The impact of the euro introduction 




















Source: authors’calculations. Notes: The test associates the impact of the euro introduction on life satisfaction with
the perception of prices. The impact of the euro for each country is taken from ordered logit results. The perceptions
of prices by groups are taken from the European Commission Consumer Survey. The table consists of the number of
countries where individuals reacted specifically to the euro introduction and have perceptions regarding the change in
prices below or above the median EU12 level. The Netherlands are excluded from the results for the unemployed due
to data unavalibility on perception of prices by the unemployed. Greece is excluded from the results for the employed
and self-employed since ordered logit results with different control groups are inconclusive regarding the sign of the
impact of the euro on life satisfaction. For the employed and self-employed the 2x2 Fisher’s exact (one-sided) test is
used. The null hypothesis is no association between the impact of the euro and price perceptions, while the alternative
is that the number of countries with the negative impact of the euro on life satisfaction and with the level of price
perception above the median EU12 level is higher than the number of countries with the negative impact and with
the level of price perceptions below the median.
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Table 5.3: Fisher’s Test Results for the EU12 Countries by Income
Income=1 decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 3 2 1 6
above the median level of EU12 4 2 0 6
total 7 4 1 12
Income=2 decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 0 4 2 6
above the median level of EU12 3 3 0 6
total 3 7 2 12
Income=3 decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 2 1 3 6
above the median level of EU12 2 4 0 6
total 4 5 3 12
Income=4 decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 2 2 2 6
above the median level of EU12 1 2 3 6





















The impact of the euro introduction 
on life satisfaction in 2002
Source: authors’calculations. Notes: The test associates the impact of the euro introduction on life satisfaction with
the perception of prices. The impact of the euro for each country is taken from ordered logit results. The perceptions
of prices by groups are taken from the European Commission Consumer Survey. The table consists of the number of
countries where individuals reacted specifically to the euro introduction and have perceptions regarding the change in
prices below or above the median EU12 level.
Table 5.4: Fisher’s Test Results for the EU12 Countries by Age
Age 16-29 years old decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 0 5 1 6
above the median level of EU12 1 4 1 6
total 1 9 2 12
Age 30-49 years old decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 1 2 2 5
above the median level of EU12 1 3 0 4
total 2 5 2 9
Age 50-64 years old decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 1 4 1 6
above the median level of EU12 1 5 0 6
total 2 9 1 12
Age more than 65 years old decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 4 1 1 6
above the median level of EU12 6 0 0 6




















The impact of the euro introduction 
on life satisfaction in 2002
two-sided p-value 0.455
Source: authors’calculations. Notes: The test associates the impact of the euro introduction on life satisfaction with
the perception of prices. The impact of the euro for each country is taken from ordered logit results. The perceptions
of prices by groups are taken from the European Commission Consumer Survey. The table consists of the number of
countries where individuals reacted specifically to the euro introduction and have perceptions regarding the change in
prices below or above the median EU12 level. Germany, Greece and France are excluded from the results for the age
group 30-49 since ordered logit results with different control groups are inconclusive regarding the sign of the impact
of the euro on life satisfaction.
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Table 5.5: Fisher’s Test Results for the EU12 Countries by the Level of Education
Less than 15 years of education decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 1 4 1 6
above the median level of EU12 3 3 0 6
total 4 7 1 12
15-18 years of education decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 1 4 1 6
above the median level of EU12 4 2 0 6
total 5 6 1 12
More than 19 years of education decrease no change increase total
below the median level of EU12 0 3 3 6
above the median level of EU12 1 4 1 6


















The impact of the euro introduction 
on life satisfaction in 2002
two-sided p-value 0.545
two-sided p-value 0.242
Source: authors’calculations. Notes: The test associates the impact of the euro introduction on life satisfaction with
the perception of prices. The impact of the euro for each country is taken from ordered logit results. The perceptions
of prices by groups are taken from the European Commission Consumer Survey. The table consists of the number of
countries where individuals reacted specifically to the euro introduction and have perceptions regarding the change in
prices below or above the median EU12 level.
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Table 6a: Summary of LPM Estimation Results for the EU12 Countries
increase decrease no change
increase Greece Austria
decrease
France      
Germany      
Portugal
Italy     
Luxembourg    
Netherlands
no change Finland











































The effect on average 
individual
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in 2002
Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of LPM results. The label "in-
crease"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance.
Table 6b: Summary of LPM Estimation Results
for the New Member Countries






















































The effect on average 
individual
The impact of the euro introduction on life 
satisfaction in the first year
Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: This table represents the summary of LPM results. The label "in-
crease"/"decrease" in the column and row means that the difference-in-differences estimators are positive/negative
and statistically significant for the particular year and for the particular group of controls. The label "no change"
corresponds to no statistical significance. The label "inconclusive" stands for Cyprus, Estonia, and Malta during the
second year, since there are no second year estimation results for these countries.
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Table 7: Pooled Estimation Results for the EU12 Countries
Control Country:
-4.053 *** -5.343 *** -4.689 ***
(0.068) (0.069) (0.074)
-2.380 *** -3.659 *** -3.005 ***
(0.063) (0.069) (0.070)
0.481 *** -0.805 *** -0.111 *
(0.066) (0.071) (0.065)
0.907 *** 0.981 *** 0.992 ***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
0.035 -0.180 ** -0.117 ** -0.005 -0.014 ** -0.027 ***
(0.067) (0.070) (0.046) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
0.138 * -0.038 -0.233 *** 0.017 -0.003 -0.031 ***
(0.075) (0.068) (0.066) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
-0.555 *** -1.802 *** -1.086 *** -0.078 *** -0.143 *** -0.155 ***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.030) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.194 *** 0.021 -0.044 -0.028 *** -0.018 ** -0.006
(0.074) (0.073) (0.050) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
-0.202 ** -0.026 0.168 ** -0.037 *** -0.017 0.011
(0.083) (0.070) (0.072) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
-0.043 *** -0.050 *** -0.042 *** -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
-0.071 *** -0.071 *** -0.074 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.329 *** 0.330 *** 0.341 *** 0.060 *** 0.060 *** 0.060 ***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
0.537 *** 0.517 *** 0.520 *** 0.09 *** 0.085 *** 0.087 ***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
0.200 *** 0.197 *** 0.220 *** 0.022 *** 0.018 *** 0.020 ***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.228 *** -0.214 *** -0.200 *** -0.056 *** -0.052 *** -0.050 ***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)
-0.133 *** -0.132 *** -0.131 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 -0.035 ***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.036) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
0.024 0.024 0.017 0.016 *** 0.013 *** 0.015 ***
(0.024) (0.017) (0.019) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
0.289 *** 0.290 *** 0.290 *** 0.056 *** 0.054 *** 0.054 ***

































63021 64059 63790 63466 64524 64244
0.032 0.062 0.040 0.054 0.065 0.062
-65578.10 -65437.22 -65577.143 -









Source: authors’ calculations. Notes: Dependent variable is life satisfaction. All treatment countries are included
into regression. Robust bootstrapped standard errors clustered at individual level are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Public Support for the Euro in the EU
Old EU Member States 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Austria 68.36% 68.11% 57.82% 69.22% 82.48% 73.58%
Belgium 74.57% 81.58% 76.98% 78.59% 85.13% 84.21%
Finland 57.29% 48.97% 49.38% 50.41% 68.87% 71.78%
France 74.05% 67.91% 68.35% 69.01% 73.38% 71.59%
Germany 57.17% 59.75% 51.48% 58.18% 64.63% 62.53%
Greece 78.97% 76.77% 78.59% 80.42% 74.90% 65.42%
Ireland 83.11% 86.98% 77.70% 83.17% 86.14% 84.75%
Italy 91.49% 88.22% 84.15% 85.83% 79.60% 73.26%
Luxembourg 82.88% 83.48% 78.58% 84.83% 90.49% 85.02%
Netherlands 77.11% 76.87% 68.70% 71.82% 67.51% 64.81%
Portugal 69.25% 76.04% 71.25% 69.38% 72.79% 72.86%
Spain 80.90% 79.78% 77.49% 76.20% 82.91% 73.57%
Denmark 37.32% 45.60% 43.93% 46.34% 57.89% 54.90%
Sweden 44.93% 47.12% 35.03% 44.31% 56.22% 43.58%
United Kingdom 45.72% 32.82% 26.95% 34.82% 35.13% 29.17%
New EU Member States 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cyprus 51.18% 51.17% 63.03% 67.45% 61.51% 55.70%
Estonia 51.51% 55.18% 62.55% 64.66% 63.03% 73.28%
Malta 52.75% 68.43% 72.49% 70.54% 69.54% 73.65%
Slovenia 84.21% 90.04% 91.84% 88.83% 85.33% 82.71%
Slovakia 63.56% 66.38% 71.01% 91.07% 89.25% 83.79%
Bulgaria 77.36% 73.33% 77.72% 72.15% 65.92% 66.25%
Czech Republic 60.40% 58.23% 54.59% 52.26% 39.77% 29.07%
Hungary 74.23% 70.21% 70.60% 71.10% 74.49% 65.58%
Latvia 49.61% 52.47% 55.11% 56.08% 58.00% 57.19%
Lithuania 50.92% 54.80% 59.04% 58.39% 56.95% 53.82%
Poland 58.78% 55.41% 50.29% 50.38% 48.30% 41.79%














































Source: the Eurobarometer. Notes: The table represents mean response to the question regarding the support for
the euro by country by year. The year of the euro introduction by a country is shaded.
Table 9: Perceptions and the Effect of the Euro on Life Satisfaction



















Average perception of change in own financial situation
Constant
Average perception of change in general economic situation
Constant








Source: authors’calculations. Notes: The sample consists of countries that introduced the euro, except for Malta for
which no data on perceptions are available. The dependent variable is the effect of the euro on life satisfaction which
takes values -1 (decreased), 0 (not changed), 1 (increased), according to previous estimations. Perceptions represent
average coeffi cient from the European Commission Consumer Survey on a particular perception during the year of
the euro introduction in a particular country. Bootstrapped robust standard errors clustered at country level are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively.
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